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Abstract 
Deleuze seeks to pry philosophy from the hands of those who would, grounding their 
judgments in a supposedly transcendent reality, distort or fail to recognize the true nature 
of things in the changing world. This task for a philosophy of the future, intended to 
project us beyond such moral categories as "good" and "evil" in favour of the alternative 
ethical categories, "good" and "bad", is to be achieved, Deleuze thinks, by overturning 
Platonism. Plato's doctrine of the forms is held by Deleuze to be an example ofthe 
corruption of metaphysics by the will to judge, characteristic of Christian morality (whose 
origins in Platonic philosophy are undeniable). For Deleuze, the philosopher is primarily 
a producer of concepts, not an agent who generates through judgment. Chapter One sets 
the agenda for the thesis by opening questions about what is good for the human agent, 
specifically in terms ofthe relation between an agent and the products s/he might 
produce. A brief account is given ofDeleuze' s position on goodness, offered in the light 
of his criticisms of the Platonic tradition. Questions are raised about what measures 
Deleuze takes to avoid transcendence, and about what consequences might follow from 
this move. Chapter Two attempts to rescue Plato from some ofDeleuze's more serious 
charges, and does so by considering Plato's concept of the Good in relation to his 
accounts of measure and of the chora. a concept of place. Contemporary Plato scholarship 
is used to show questionable presuppositions in Deleuze's account of Plato, for instance 
regarding the physics of the Platonic universe, the status oftranscendence, and the nature 
of the eidos, or form. Chapter Three examines Deleuze's own metaphysics ofDifference, 
Multiplicity and Event, in relation to traditional atomism, the philosophy oftime 
(duration) of Henri Bergson, and certain alternative theories of event. The relation of 
event and action is explored in the context of naming and intention. Chapter Four presents 
Deleuze' s theory of the Event as a theory of the Void, in relation to Deleuze's monism, 
and to time, goodness, and negativity. The relation between Deleuze' s theory of the Event 
and his Ethics is further developed, in order to open questions about the motivation for 
and nature of action in Deleuzian philosophy. Chapter Five synthesizes the various 
themes, and contrasts Deleuze with Plato on the question of the good for the agent, love, 
and action, all in relation to Deleuze' s Stoicism. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Out of Breath, Laughing 
We are fortunate that Foucault said so many silly things about Deleuze and his 
work. Once, for instance, he said that the twentieth century might one day come to be 
called "Deleuzian."1 Deleuze suggests it might be a little joke on Foucault's part, and so 
dismisses it.2 It is, however, a joke that has for years preoccupied commentators. (Ian 
Buchanan, for instance, recently edited a collection for the South Atlantic Quarterly, 
entitled, A Deleuzian Century?). Philosophy has always had its heroes, but one senses in 
this question something of the pop-status that philosophy has achieved today, in some 
quarters at least, even if the question remains philosophical. 3 Philosophy does seem to 
have become, or is now showing itselfto be, theatre: a little comedy, games and jokes, 
performed publicly by stars to the delight of commentators who might more aptly be 
called fans. 
Perhaps that- or certainly that- but not only that. Why would Foucault label the 
twentieth century "Deleuzian"? Deleuze would have us forget this joke between friends, 
but what is he hiding? Is he merely a little shy? We have to be suspicious; Deleuze says, 
after all, that a philosophy book should be part detective novel.4 
1 Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 165. 
2 A joke, De leuze thought, that was "meant to make people who like us laugh, and make everyone else 
livid. " See Buchanan's introduction to a special edition of The South Atlantic Quarterly, entitled, A 
Deleuzian Century? (ed. Ian Buchanan, The South Atlantic Quarterly, , v. 96, (Summer 1997)). 
3 Ian Buchanan notes that "[P]ainting Deleuze's portrait is not merely desirable- the fond wish of nostalgia, 
but a necessary move in the larger game of penetrating Deleuze' s thought" (Ibid. , 383). 
4 But who/what is the sleuth, for Deleuze? "A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species 
of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction. By detective novel we mean that concepts, with their 
1 
Commentators have tried to sort out how Foucault's comment might be true, 
pursuing the question of how Deleuze's philosophy is a philosophy fit for the twentieth 
century. That's one approach. But if the twentieth century is indeed fit to be called 
Deleuzian, Foucault's comment is certainly no joke. 
No, that will not do. Perhaps, instead, it was a harmless joke, a little wit. Deleuze, 
the thinker of the molecular, the minor, the multiple: surely it would be glorious irony if 
his name were one day to represent an entire century of human thought and action. Do 
Deleuze's concepts have such a power of replication? 
We recall, also, that Deleuze draws from Nietzsche the project for a "philosophy 
of the future."5 Now Foucault seems to mock Deleuze: "A Deleuzian century?"- surely 
not his own! IfF oucault is right, De leuze's philosophy is a philosophy of the present, not 
at all of the future. Not very untimely, one would have to say. Of course, we are being 
facetious- untimeliness in thought, as both Deleuze and Foucault know- is not so much 
a matter of being outside of one's time and in another, but a matter of being displaced in 
time, or perhaps of embracing what is always out of step with the present. And Deleuze 
takes the reversal of Platonism as the task for twentieth century philosophy, as though 
Nietzsche meant very simply that "future" which would be Deleuze's present.6 
zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations. They themselves change along with the 
problems. They have spheres of influence where( ... ) they operate in relation to 'dramas' and by means of a 
certain 'cruelty" '(Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, tr. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), xx). 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter 
Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 
6 DR, 59. See also Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, tr. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin 
V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 253 . 
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Deleuze remarks in L 'abecedaire that Foucault had such presence that upon 
entering a room, he transformed it into something else. 7 This struck De leuze as 
unenviable. And we know, too, that Foucault' s celebrity is much greater than Deleuze's. 
Perhaps in gesturing away from himself and toward Deleuze, Foucault was performing a 
sort of philosophical practical joke. That is to say, the joke is in the reactions of critics 
and commentators alike who are suckers for such delicious aphorisms, but in their delight 
fail to grasp the irony of what it might reveal. We must restrain ourselves from erupting 
into laughter at the thought that not only Deleuze but we too are the victims of such a 
practical joke, that this thesis is a pie in the face. 
Since even philosophy needs them, shall we play the straight man? 
1.2 A Eulogy for the Engineer's Boy? 
In 1995, Gilles Deleuze committed suicide, ending the pain of a severe respiratory 
illness that had plagued him for years. The final act in a life of pure immanence becomes 
our point of origin for an encounter with Monsieur Deleuze. 
To begin on such a note - to begin at an end - is painful, too. And to begin a 
philosophical essay with a biographical detail: such a decision must be j ustified. By what 
right do we introduce into a critical paper such gossip? We are encouraged to separate 
7 From the section "F" on Fidelity. Pierre-Andre Boutang, L 'abecedaire de Gilles De/euze, avec Claire 
Parnet, (1996). Deleuze' s comments on Foucault's power to transform are not metaphorical. (The question 
of the form is central for us.) Such is the power of the event - a focus for us at the end of Chapter Three and 
in Chapter Four. Where is the evidence for such a transformation as the one effected by Foucault, reported 
by Deleuze ? As evidence for such claims cannot be located in propositions, we will not be straying beyond 
limits De leuze himself would defend when we refer not only to what De leuze says in the film, but to his 
manner generally and what it suggests. 
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life from philosophy, to return to the texl Philosophy, after all, is concerned with Truth, 
the Real. We get into trouble when we ignore argument and begin listening to 
philosophical storytellers, biographers. Philosophy might lose touch with the real and 
become a game. This threat has forced those concerned with the philosopher's role as 
truth-seeker to nuzzle up close to scientists, whose work, we are to believe, gradually 
leads us asymptotically closer to Truth about the world. 
And yet Wittgenstein, silent on matters of Ethics ( unphilosophical matters), 
mystifies us as a human being perhaps more than as a philosopher. Schopenhauer' s 
misogyny, Kant's afternoon stroll, Heidegger' s Nazism: we wonder whether any of these 
details are accidental to the work of these philosophers. 
So what is philosophy? 
This is the question Deleuze and Felix Guattari set out to address in what would 
be the final significant text bearing Deleuze' s name: Qu 'est-ce que Ia philosophie? It is 
notable that Deleuze and Guattari pose the question after a lifetime spent doing 
philosophy, as though one carries out the act of philosophizing only later to see exactly 
what it was one was doing. Philosophy is what they, philosophers, have been doing. The 
first significant response comes in the introduction: 
We can see at least what philosophy is not: it is not contemplation, reflection, or 
communication. This is the case even though it may sometimes believe it is one or 
other of these, as a result of the capacity of every discipline to produce its own 
illusions and to hide behind its own peculiar smokescreen. It is not contemplation, 
for contemplations are things themselves as seen in the creation of their specific 
8 It is interesting to recall that Heidegger directs us away from the artist and the audience and toward the 
work of art itself See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings: f rom Being 
and Time (192 7) to the Task ofThinking (1964) , 2"d revision and expanded edition, trans. David Farrell 
Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, 1993), 143-2 12. Coming to grips with Heidegger ' the 
man ' in relation to Heidegger ' the philosopher' has been one of the central philosophical agendas over the 
past hundred years. See George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (New York: Viking Press, 1979, cl978). 
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concepts. It is not reflection, because no one needs philosophy to reflect on 
anything. It is thought that philosophy is being given a great deal by being turned 
into the art of reflection, but actually it loses everything. Mathematicians, as 
mathematicians, have never waited for philosophers before reflecting on 
mathematics, nor artists before reflecting on painting or music. So long as their 
reflection belongs to their respective creation, it is a bad joke to say that this 
makes them philosophers. Nor does philosophy find any final refuge in 
communication, which only works under the sway of opinions in order to create 
'consensus' and not concepts. The idea of a Western democratic conversation 
between friends has never produced a single concept. The idea comes, perhaps, 
from the Greeks, but they distrusted it so much, and subjected it to such harsh 
treatment, that the concept was more like the ironical soliloquy bird that surveyed 
[survolait] the battlefield of destroyed rival opinions (the drunken guests at the 
banquet). Philosophy does not contemplate, reflect, or communicate, although it 
must create concepts for these actions or passions. [ ... ]To know oneself, to learn 
to think, to act as if nothing were self-evident - wondering, 'wondering that there 
is being,' - these, and many other determinations of philosophy create interesting 
attitudes, however tiresome10 they may be in the long run, but even from a 
pedagogical point of view they do not constitute a well-defined occupation or 
precise activity. On the other hand, the following definition of philosophy can be 
taken as being decisive: knowledge through pure concepts. 11 
It is obvious that Deleuze and Guattari are struggling to understand what value 
philosophy has, given, for instance, that artists and mathematicians need not wait for 
philosophers to reflect on art and mathematics. Contemplation is not philosophy at all, 
since the products of contemplation are but the raw material upon which philosophy must 
9 Deleuze finds the Socratic question inadequate. That is not to say it is not valuable, or that Deleuze does 
not provide his own formulation of the problem. Consider: "To contemplate is to draw something from. We 
must always contemplate something else - the water, or Diana, or the woods - in order to be filled with an 
image of ourselves" (DR, 75). 
10 Deleuze and Guattari have here, surely, Heidegger as their target. Peter Trnka has correctly pointed out in 
his examiner's report on an earlier draft of this paper that commentators on whose work I draw in chapter 
two are sympathetic to some ofHeidegger's views. A word may therefore be due regarding the decision to 
use their material. Deleuze distrusts 'consciousness,' and is consequently profoundly at odds with 
Heidegger, the phenomenologist. (See footnote 17 for further comment on this matter.) And yet the two 
belong together in a very select group of philosophers concerned deeply with the nature of event, thought, 
and difference. As it could not be an objective of this paper to address in depth the relation between these 
two thinkers, we must be content in our assessment ofDeleuze to register his own objections to Heidegger's 
philosophical project. It is quite certain that Heidegger's wondering at Being is insufficient for Deleuze, and 
that De leuze has a superior sense of humour to the grave Heidegger. Beyond this, we need say nothing 
about their relation for now, since it is emphatically not my agenda in this paper to use Plato as a soldier for 
Heidegger against Deleuze. 
11 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 6-7. 
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do its work. And philosophy as communication is mere consensus-production for 
Deleuze, who displayed throughout his career a distaste for philosophical conferences, 
preferring to pursue his thought privately. 12 It is possible to communicate philosophy, 
though philosophy is more than communication. 
Deleuze thus attempts to hold open a place for properly philosophic activity -
activity distinct from other sorts of activities. Philosophy is not handmaiden to the 
scientists -or, better, it is that and much more. It is handmaiden, too, to art, mathematics, 
and politics. But so are all of these activities handmaiden to philosophy. States, works of 
art, and concepts are all engineered; the philosopher is one engineer among others, 
capable of devising a unique product that will encounter and engage with the products of 
scientists and artists alike. 13 The question of this thesis can now be made explicit. What is 
the relation between knowledge and production? How and what does a philosopher know 
through the production of pure concepts? Is Deleuze's answer to the question- What is 
philosophy? - a good answer? 
Philosophers often do produce concepts, but dispute arises over the motivation for 
the production of concepts, and over the question whether philosophers begin to go wrong 
when they begin this constructive activity. The logical positivists in the first half of the 
twentieth century thought that the history of metaphysics was filled with concepts that do 
nothing other than confuse us about the real. Concepts that do not apply to anything; 
names that do not refer to anything: such were, they claimed, the products yielded by the 
12 Deleuze taught philosophy, however, and this makes us wonder what exactly it was about conferences 
that bothered him so. Did he need the integrity of a single project or course - or voice? In L 'Abecedaire, he 
expresses considerable preference for the written word, in the section "C, as in Culture". 
13 Deleuze's father was an engineer/inventor before the First World War. See Boutang, "E, as in Enfance" . 
6 
history of philosophy - by philosophers carried away with themselves. In an opposed 
tradition of philosophy, Richard Rorty, though perhaps not as antagonistic toward the use 
of such concepts, would say that these concepts are not adequate to any thing-in-itself, to 
the real. He is happy enough to remain inside the text. Where the logical positivists want 
concepts to be adequate to the real, Rorty abandons any notion of a real outside the text. 
What are we doing when we use language, when we name? 
Deleuze's position falls somewhere between these two extremes, as we shall see. 
He was famously not worried about any supposed imminent end of philosophy or 
thought, and felt that he was doing philosophy in the traditional sense of the term. But 
there can be no doubt that, despite his empiricist leanings, Deleuze cannot identify 
himself with the logical positivists. What we are not doing as philosophers, as far as 
De leuze is concerned, is representing an unchanging real. De leuze says of himself in his 
book Foucault: "I am a cartographer."14 Is language an attempt to picture to oneself and 
locate those 'things' which are outside the text? Is that what he means by mapping? 
If so, it would be difficult to see how he is to be distinguished on this from the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. But Deleuze's account of mapping is not to be confused 
with the picturing of the Tractatus: 
Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; 
it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the 
tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the 
real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it 
constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of 
blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without 
organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is 
open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, 
susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, tr. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 44. 
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of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be 
drawn on a wall, conceived as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as 
a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is 
that it always has multiple entryways. In this sense, the burrow is an animal 
rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction between the line of flight as 
passageway and storage or living strata (cf. the muskrat). A map has multiple 
entryways as opposed to the tracing, which always comes 'back to the same.' The 
map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged 
'competence'. 15 
While we will not be concerned with them explicitly in this paper, such concepts as 
"rhizome" and "body without organs" should not be dismissed as metaphorical. They 
alert us to Deleuze's view of what it is we are actually doing when we produce our maps, 
be they pieces of philosophy, works of art, or political actions. Such acts are experiments 
in contact with the real - not efforts to reproduce the real, which Deleuze calls "tracing". 
Tracing has always to do with the same, whereas Deleuze's interest, throughout his 
philosophy, is to think and to produce the different. We are not striving when we speak 
about the nature of the world to achieve some fmal set of propositions which accurately 
describe it. Instead, we map - rather than trace - the changing world; and our mapping 
activity is both creative and constitutive ofthe world - that is, we too are part of a world 
that is ever-new, and ourselves and our activities in the world are themselves changing 
and creative. The real itself is ever-changing, and philosophers and artists (and 
politicians), cannot hope to represent the real as it is; the best one can do through 
representation is to reproduce a real that was. A philosopher must learn to intersect with a 
15 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Volume II, tr. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 12-3. Note please the claim that maps 
have to do with peiformance - forming through action. The term calls to mind a certain branch of the arts. 
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changing, novel real, for he is himself constituted from and somehow part of that 
changing real. 16 
1.3 Locating the Battlefield 
Heidegger sent us back to the work of art. Our habit had been to look to the artist 
or to the feelings and responses of the audience. But Heidegger - not having altogether 
left Husser! behind him - bid us direct our phenomenological glare17 toward the sculpture 
itself. The work of art achieved independence in the twentieth century. We now agree to 
imagine texts write themselves; having finally had mercy on the tortured author sweating 
over her typewriter in the hours after a deadline, we criticize the thick-skinned "implied" 
author of a text. 18 
16 Exactly what relation the philosopher, or any agent, has to the changing real is among our questions in 
this essay. Deleuze heralds Nietzsche and Kierkegaard for their efforts to engage with a changing real, and 
chides Hegel for his failure to do so: "[Nietzsche's and Kierkegaard's) objection to Hegel is that he does not 
go beyond false movement - in other words, the abstract logical movement of 'mediation. ' They want to 
put metaphysics in motion, in action. They want to make it act, and make it carry out immediate acts. It is 
not enough, therefore, for them to propose a new representation of movement; representation is already 
mediation" (DR, 8). 
17 By his own claims, Deleuze does not belong (as at least the early Heidegger very obviously does) to the 
tradition of philosophy that values 'consciousness' highly. The phenomenological perspective (Husserl's 
consciousness as consciousness ot) is the culmination of a modernist tradition stretching from Descartes 
through Kant and Hegel. In his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze writes that "consciousness is 
inseparable from the triple illusion that constitutes it, the illusion of finality, the illusion of freedom, and the 
theological illusion" (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, tr. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City 
Light Books, 1988), 20). These illusions, relating to goodness, freedom, and God, preoccupy Deleuze, who 
connects consciousness with the transcendent, and defines immanence as the unconscious (Ibid., 29). 
De leuze proposes an immanent good, rather than transcendent Platonic forms, which, as discussed in 
chapter two, have an intimate relation to the visual and thereby to consciousness. He rejects the notion of 
freedom as conscious choice among possibles, and offers an account of an unconscious, immanent principle 
of activity we might be tempted to call God. 
18 See Umberto Eco with Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler, and Christine Brooke-Rose, Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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Perhaps the novelist should die during the painful birth of her brainchild. 19 She 
acts too often the part of authority on her own work- or worse, on the creative process -
and we have had enough, haven't we, of these tales of missed meals and deadlines in the 
production of art? Art has a habit of killing, anyhow: it directs whatever force it 
commands against the social, the political, the historical. It attacks other art, art itself- at 
times it shackles and tortures itself. All in the generation of the new, of the novel. This is 
the rule of art - indeed, of life: nothing new without death. It is not strange, then, that for 
Heidegger- for whom we are all producers -we should also be waiters, beings-toward-
death. 20 But are we producers only? And does our interest in what is to come lead us to 
the right kinds of questions about generation? How do we knowingly engage this world of 
change? How do we deal with the new that confronts us? Is all of Being conditioned by 
production, to be understood in relation to production? 
Deleuze assumes as his project the "reversal of Platonism,"21 the task for "a 
philosophy of the future," proposed by Nietzsche; his philosophy is an attempt to explain 
the production of the new, the continual and unending production of a future, the 
guaranteed return of difference. There are great differences between Deleuze and 
Nietzsche, of course- though both see Hegel as their primary philosophical enemy, and 
19 See Michel Foucault, "What is an Author," in Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 113-38. See also 
Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Image, Music, Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (New 
York: Hill, 1977). 
20 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New Ym-k: 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1962), 311. 
21 LS, 265. The French "renverser," translated alternatively by "overturn" and "reverse," can suggest a 
violent upheaval, the result of a physical encounter or battle. It can be a synonym for "detruire" (to destroy) 
or "abolir" (to abolish). Alain Rey and Josette Rey-Debove, ed., Le Nouveau Fetit Robert (Paris: 
Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1993), 2168. While Deleuze wants to reverse Platonism, in bringing the simulacra 
to the surface, the project also suggests the overthrowing, as one might overthrow a regime, or the 
destruction of an oppressive force. 
10 
both define their project in terms of Platonic philosophy. Nietzsche's philosophy is anti-
systematic in style (and perhaps in content) and relies on aphorism, the philosophical 
fragment, and poetry. We must also remember that for Deleuze, and perhaps for 
Nietzsche, the reversal of Platonism is not the rejection of all things Platonic. 22 
Nietzsche's work seems itself to be alive; it is chaotic in nature at times, filled with 
beauty, anger, love - and certainly plenty of traditional philosophy, though stretched 
stylistically in startlingly new ways. Deleuze, on the other hand, felt no antagonism 
toward philosophical system building. His other great philosophical inheritance came 
from the great French process thinker Henri Bergson, from whom Deleuze borrowed the 
notion of an "open" whole or system. 23 
What Nietzsche despised in Plato was the transcendence of the Good that seeped 
into Christianity through Nee-platonism and became the Christian God. According to 
Nietzsche, God is dead. What is lost with transcendence is an absolute ground for values; 
Nietzsche himselfthen undertakes both to trace the history of values (Genealogy of 
Morality) and to ponder the possible future of value (Beyond Good and Evi/).24 Like 
22 
"The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism. That this overturning should 
conserve many Platonic characteristics is not only inevitable but desirable" (DR, 59). 
23 Consider the passage above from A Thousand Plateaus in which Deleuze describes the map as "open and 
connectable in all of its dimensions," as "detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification." The 
nature of system is a crucial one for De leuze, and will be discussed in detail in chapter three. One way of 
reading Deleuze's work is to focus on the notion of place and displacement, territorialization and 
deterritorialization as it is appears in the terminology of A Thousand Plateaus, and to wonder whether 
Deleuze did not delight in displacing himself everywhere within Hegel's system - sometimes siding with 
Greek atomists, professing in L 'abecedaire that Spinoza is in his heart. (We remember that Hegel himself 
thought that one must first be Spinozist if one is to be a philosopher). Where Hegelians have often had little 
trouble sorting out Nietzsche's place in the great Hegelian system, one wonders whether Hegel would have 
more trouble placing Deleuze. 
24 
"One should own up in all strictness to what is still necessary here for a long time to come, to what alone 
is justified so far: to collect material, to conceptualize and arrange a vast realm of subtle feelings of value 
and differences of value which are alive, grow, beget, and perish - and perhaps attempts to present vividly 
11 
Nietzsche, Deleuze rejects transcendence and the very notion of an absolute ground, and 
wants also to get beyond good and evil. But also like Nietzsche, Deleuze does not want to 
get beyond good and bad. De leuze everywhere opposes morality, placing in its stead an 
Ethics, the nature of which we shall discuss in chapters four and five. What kind of good 
has no evil for its contrary? Are we left with a purely aesthetic criterion of selection if we 
give up on the concept of evil? Is there a difference between a good life and an artfully-
lived life? Deleuze, citing Foucault, says there is: 
[E]stablishing ways of existing or styles oflife isn't just an aesthetic matter, it's 
what Foucault called ethics, as opposed to morality. The difference is that 
morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a specific sort, ones that 
judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent values 
(this is good, that's bad ... ); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what we do, 
what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved?5 
There is a difference cited here between the functions of two kinds of rules, those 
associated with morality and those associated with ethics. The former sort Deleuze 
describes as constraining, rules that by their nature can judge the action or intention in 
question, since this action or intention must measure up to an unchanging, pre-
established, transcendent value. But ethics consists of optional rules. At first glance this is 
an odd status for rules to have, since we are accustomed to thinking of rules as by 
definition not at all optional, but instead as expressions that draw their power to influence 
actions and intentions from their unchanging nature, from the fact that we cannot choose 
to throw out the rules whenever we wish. To do so would not be to have optional rules, 
but to have no rules at all, it seems. And yet it is because we presuppose that the function 
some of the more frequent and recurring forms of such living crystallizations - all to prepare a typology of 
morals" (Nietzsche, 97). 
25 Deleuze, Negotiations. 1972-1990, tr. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 
100. 
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of the rule is to determine action or intention (by exercising judgment) that we struggle to 
see what an optional rule might be. 
Where the constraining moral rule judges, the optional ethical rule assesses. This 
verb to assess preserves some of the meaning ofthe verb to judge, since there is a 
moment of appreciation involved, of recognition of the nature of the action or intention in 
question. But to assess does not include the prejudice in the verb to judge; that is, when 
someone is judging, she is not only examining the object in question in terms of its own 
powers, discriminating its own proportions with regard to itself, appreciating differences, 
measuring itself in relation to its own ways of existing. She is drawing the object into her 
own sphere, as it were, in order to transcend the noticed differences and offer a 'yes' or 
'no'- or, perhaps, a 'this is good, or right' or a 'this is bad or evil, or wrong.' 26 A certain 
uncommon behaviour carried out by a person strikes us as somehow dangerous, 
unhealthy. Morality would have us measure his action by the rules for behaviour; 
contradiction indicates to us that the action is wrong, and that therefore the actor is either 
ill or evil. Ethics, as Deleuze has it, proceeds by asking the question: how might this 
particular behaviour belong to a whole other set of actions in this person's life, to his 
ways of existing? Any 'rule' we adopt is an attempt to discover some consistency in the 
person's behaviour, some thread that opens for us a way to draw together an otherwise 
disparate set of details and differences in order to see how the behaviour might work for 
26 
" [ . .. ] Ethics, which is to say, a typology of immanent modes of existence, replaces Morality, which 
always refers existence to transcendent values. Morality is the judgment of God, the system ofj udgmenf' 
(Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 23). 
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that person, how it might be good for that person.27 This is the kind of good that Deleuze 
is working with, an immanent good as opposed to a transcendent good, where the latter 
measures from outside the kind of actions or intentions that we might support. 
For Deleuze, the marriage of metaphysics and morality begins with Plato. Plato's 
Good is that metaphysical principle of activity responsible for whatever harmony and 
integrity there is in the world. But it is also that which grounds moral judgments made by 
human beings. As Deleuze tells it, the Platonic philosophy has long been understood to 
turn on the distinction between the transcendent world of Forms or Ideas and the world of 
flux or change. According to this story, which is corroborated certainly by the tenth book 
of the Republic and by certain passages in the Phaedo, Plato held that 'objects' in the 
changing world have whatever discernible form they can be said to have because they are 
copies of the perfect and unchanging Form that exists eternally in an utterly transcendent 
world. Deleuze refers to this first distinction as the distinction between models and 
copies. The model grounds the copy insofar as the copy owes whatever integrity it has to 
some sort of relationship with a perfect Form. What sort of relationship this is proves to 
be a crucial issue in the history of philosophy. 
This first and familiar distinction in Plato grounds, according to Deleuze, a 
second, less obvious distinction: that between types of copies. Certain copies can be said 
to be well-founded because they share a crucial internal relationship to the Form of which 
they are copies. Deleuze claims that for Plato this internal relationship can be called one 
of likeness . Copies which are not well-founded, on the other hand, but which have an 
27 Is a similar method is carried out when, having decided that an act is evil, the moralist attempts to 
determine whether the actor is ill or evil? We will return to this matter in chapters four and five. 
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external relationship of resemblance Deleuze calls simulacra. In the language of the 
Christian tradition, Deleuze helps us to draw the distinction between internal likeness and 
external resemblance: man was made in God's image and likeness; when man sins, he 
loses any real likeness to God, though he continues to bear a resemblance to God; that is, 
he retains the image of God. 
Deleuze defines the motivation of the Platonic philosophy in these terms: the 
objective, for Plato, is to keep these simulacra "completely submerged," to keep them 
from insinuating themselves everywhere.28 What bears only an external resemblance to 
the perfect Forms is very dangerous; it pretends, for instance, to have qualities it does not 
have and might dishonestly seduce those to whom it could pose great threat. Plato' s 
method of selection through a process of division is intended to distinguish good copies 
from bad so that the good copies may be able to return, while the simulacra are 
suppressed. 
Transcendence is often abandoned in the history of philosophy after Plato, and the 
principle of the Good is rejected in favour of principles of activity named neutrally with 
respect to the question of value; here we think of such principles as the unmoved mover, 
or Thought thinking itself(Aristotle), One (Plotinus), duration (Bergson), Being 
(Heidegger), creativity (Whitehead). But themoral flavour of metaphysics is often 
retained by the subjugation of difference, or of the growling world of flux, to the identity 
of the Form or of the concept, often in its Aristotelian form. Differences are tamed and 
28 
"[T]o define the totality of the Platonic motivation: It has to do with selecting among the pretenders, 
distinguishing good and bad copies or, rather, copies (always well-founded) and simulacra (always engulfed 
in dissimilarity). It is a question of assuring the triumph ofthe copies over the simulacra, of repressing 
simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, preventing them from climbing to the surface, and 
'insinuating themselves' everywhere" (LS, 256-7). 
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slotted carefully into the categories of representation; no simulacrum escapes the mesh of 
representation. But the identity of the Form remains that which all copies must approach, 
or else they are judged to be bad, swept away. Deleuze's own wish is to liberate the 
simulacra from the oppressive machinery of the history of metaphysics which bears the 
influence of Platonic transcendence (the Good) and interprets difference always in 
relation to identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance. In other words, De leuze wants 
to disentangle metaphysics from morality. 
This paper explores the ways in which Deleuze attempts to keep the Good, as 
transcendent principle, out of Philosophy, an activity Deleuze described, we remember, as 
essentially productive in nature. Philosophy is the production of concepts. In chapter 
three, we shall try to unfold Deleuze's world in text, and in so doing to bring to light the 
nature of his own first principle, Difference. There, and in chapter four, we shall see how 
Deleuze replaces Plato's world with a world without judgment, a world where production 
is not enslaved to a morality grounded in a transcendence whose function is to nothing 
other than to ground morality. 
But is there a greater horizon than that of production, a horizon within which it is 
possible to locate the limits of production, to critique production? Where Heidegger29 
thought that Plato, and ancient philosophy as a whole, understood Being through 
production and against the horizon of production, John Sallis shows that for Plato, the 
inquiry into production is always accompanied by a critique of production, "a marking off 
29 And perhaps others - see GUnter Figal, "The Idea and Mixture of the Good," in Retracing the Platonic 
Text, ed. John Russon and John Sallis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 89: 
"Socrates pictures life as a product and, accordingly, the way we conduct our lives as a form of 
production." Obviously, important distinctions must be drawn between Plato and Socrates. 
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of its limits," as Sallis says. 30 De leuze is aware that for Plato not all is production. In 
chapter four as we follow Deleuze at every opportunity sealing up any room for the 
appearance of anything resembling this transcendent Good, it will become clear how 
conscious De leuze is of the threat that Plato and his Good pose. This metaphor of sealing 
is particularly appropriate, as it is over the issue of place, of emptiness, of no-place, of 
void, that Deleuze and Plato, with serious consequences at the level of action, part ways. 
Since so much rides on the consequences of this reversal of Platonism, we must 
ask whether Deleuze's reading of Plato is accurate. To abandon the transcendent Good31 
on the basis of a production accompanied by a critique of production without some 
attention to Plato' s own account ofthe production of the physical universe, as we find it 
in the Timaeus, might be premature. 
Seeking to explain the creation of the world without reference to an original 
model (so as to free us from the act of tracing into our own present what has already been 
and to allow us instead the creative activity of mapping), Deleuze turns to the origin of 
Western philosophy. He charges that Plato' s metaphysical principle of the Good is 
infected by morality.32 Deleuze argues that Plato's mania for judgment pushes him to 
reject not the possibility, but the value of novelty. If we could only forget about this 
30 John Sallis, Choro/ogy: On Beginning in Plato 's Timaeus (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1999), 51. 
3 1 For clarity in the rest of this introduction, it will be necessary at times to refer to the Good as 
transcendent, but the question of"where is the Platonic Good?" is to be addressed in chapter two . 
32 
" (T]he will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the moral. What is 
condemned in the figure of simulacra is the state of free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and 
crowned anarchy, along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and that of the 
copy. Later, the world of representation will more or less forget its moral origin and presupposition. These 
will nevertheless continue to act in the distinction between the originary and the derived, the original and 
the sequel, the ground and the grounded, which animates the hierarchies of a representative theology by 
extending the complementarity between model and copy" (DR, 265). 
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question of the good of it, in the moral sense, perhaps we would be better able to deal 
with the new. But what is it to choose difference over this kind of goodness? What 
difference does Difference make? 
Certainly, we must make decisions, we must choose. Some sort of process of 
selection must be involved; we need words,33 names, and Deleuze is aware of this. We 
want to ask: what is the good of difference? In silencing the transcendent Good, what sort 
of world does Deleuze propose? What world is he mapping? What is the cost of silencing 
the Good? What is the Good offering, saying to us, that Deleuze does not hear? Why, if 
he is so interested in overturning Plato, in having done with judgment, does the Good 
receive so little attention from Deleuze? Shall we so quickly excuse him for pretending to 
overturn Platonism without engaging with the difficult question: what is the Good? It is a 
daunting question; one with which Plato himself was uncomfortable. Further, why does 
Deleuze say so little about his own principle of different/dation? What is at stake that 
makes these thinkers hesitate to speak about these mysteries? And what are the 
consequences of such reticence? 
Could Deleuze have learned something from Plato's Good that might have helped 
him to refocus his philosophy, make it into something less frightening than the 
unquestioned embracing of difference, the fleeing of sadness and pain, the hopeless 
gasping for breath in the vacuum? To put the question simply: Deleuze would have us 
choose the Different over the transcendent Good; do we wish to do the opposite and 
choose the Good over the Different .. . or must we choose only one of them? 
33 Thanks to John A. Scott for the reminder that the Greek legein (cognate with logos) basically means to 
select, to choose, to attend particularly to. See H. G. Liddell, Robert Scott, and H.S. Jones, A Greek-English 
Lexicon, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 1033-4. 
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Chapter Two: Good and Difference in Plato 
"Deleuzianism is fundamentally a Platonism with a different accentuation. " 
- Alain Badiou34 
2.1 Simulacrum and Idea 
In his Difference and Repetition, Deleuze tackles the philosophical problem of 
identity, siting it within some ancient texts. He argues that, since Aristotle and the 
inception of the categories of representation, difference has been understood in terms of 
identity. De leuze seeks to free difference from the chains of identity, and to defend the 
claim that beneath identity is the free play of differences. One of his favourite examples 
drawn from the history of philosophy is that of the subject. The subject conceived in 
Cartesian terms as self-identical will lose its integrity in Deleuze who speaks, instead, of a 
larval subject. 35 This larval subject is not the underlying self-identical, unchanging 
substance it is for Descartes, but is produced, rather, by the free play of difference, or 
change. Identity becomes, for De leuze, a mere "surface effect." 
According to Deleuze, difference is in trouble even before Aristotle. Plato 
accounts for the apparent unity of an object in the changing world by reference to an Idea, 
with which the object has a relation of similarity. A good table is a table that bears a true 
likeness to the model or original, or Idea, "table". The Idea, as Deleuze says "can only be 
34 Alain Badiou. Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, tr. Louise Burchill (Minnesota: Regents of the University 
of Minnesota, 2000), 26. 
35 DR, 78. 
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defined by a positing of identity as the essence of the Same. "36 The origin of a thing's 
being is found in its formal cause: similarity to an Idea explains the existence of a 
particular being in the changing world. 
Because Deleuze is so often heralded as a thinker of difference, Alain Badiou's 
comment that Deleuzianism is fundamentally a Platonism "with a different accentuation" 
is peculiar,37 especially since Deleuze understands his project to be the "overturning of 
Platonism."38 But the subjection of difference to identity is not complete until Aristotle, 
he argues, since: 
[T]he Heraclitean world still growls in Platonism. With Plato, the issue is still in 
doubt: mediation has not yet found its ready-made movement. The Idea is not yet 
the concept of an object which submits the world to the requirements of 
representation, but rather a brute presence which can be invoked in the world only 
in function of that which is not 'representable' in things. The Idea has therefore 
not yet chosen to relate difference to the identity of a concept in general: it has not 
given up hope of finding a pure concept of difference itself. [ . .. ] Aristotle indeed 
saw what is irreplaceable in Platonism, even though he made it precisely the basis 
of a criticism of Plato: the dialectic of difference has its own method- division -
but this operates without mediation, without middle term or reason; it acts in the 
immediate and is inspired by the Ideas rather than by the requirements of a 
concept in general. It is true that division is a capricious, incoherent procedure 
which jumps from one singularity to another, by contrast with the supposed 
identity of a concept. 39 
For Aristotle, on Deleuze's reading, the only differences acknowledged are those between 
species. Within a particular species, there are many differences that do not receive further 
classification. 40 We might imagine, for instance, how vast the differences in the species 
homo sapiens, which are gathered under a single name. The self-identical concept gathers 
36 Ibid. , 265. 
37 Indeed, this claim appears during an argument in which Badiou characterizes Deleuze as a thinker not of 
difference, but of the One. 
38 ls there not a resonance with Marx's efforts to turn Hegel on his head? 
39 DR, 59. 
40 Ibid., 60. 
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up things that, though different, receive one name. Such is the nature of representation: 
what is by nature not representable is supposedly captured in the categories of 
representation- but what is not representable, difference itself, is thus given second rank 
behind the Identical (the concept). According to Deleuze, where Aristotle' s species 
catches too many fish, Plato considers what would be caught in such a mesh to be 
"undifferenciated logical matter, an indifferent material, a mixture, an indefinite 
representing multiplicity."41 It is within this mass that Platonic division will begin, with 
the aim of ordering according to degrees of participation in the Idea. Crudely, then, we 
can distinguish a range of copies that can be ordered by reference to an objective measure 
of goodness. 
What is not representable in the Platonic universe is the matter of the simulacrum: 
change, flux - the elements of Platonic philosophy inherited from Heraclitean philosophy. 
The Idea, or Form, in Plato is characterized by Deleuze as a "brute presence". It is real, 
not the product of an imagination or of the work of a philosopher, and it appears as the 
correlate of the Heraclitean flux in Plato, as that which is imitated in that changing world 
during the mimetic process which results in copies that owe their sustained, fragile, 
integrated being to those Ideas of which they are copies. It is in this sense that the Ideas 
are the correlate of the flux: a brute presence of some sort is thought necessary to account 
for differences of quality, differences in value, in the mass of unrepresentable mixture 
with which we are confronted.42 
41 Ibid., 60. 
42 See Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), 64: "Socrates says that 
thought begins with a contradictory experience, which Deleuze identifies as an encounter with the 
simulacrum." What kind of presence does a simulacrum have? 
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To use Badiou's language, we might say that in Plato, the emphasis, the accent, is 
on the role of the Good and the Forms in the relationship between the changing world of 
flux and the unchanging.43 Deleuze's accent is on the flux: 
Pure becoming, the unlimited, is the matter of the simulacrum insofar as it eludes 
the action of the Idea and insofar as it contests both model and copy at once. 
Limited things lie beneath the Ideas; but even beneath things, is there not still this 
mad element which subsists and occurs on the other side of the order that Ideas 
. d . ?44 Impose an receive . 
What is unchanging in Deleuze's metaphysics remains a question here- and Badiou's 
claim that Deleuzianism is a Platonism with a different accentuation rides on the issue 
whether there is in Deleuze something that corresponds with the Good in Plato. 
But before we can address this question, we must try to discern something of what 
the Good in Plato might be, especially since Deleuze himself, curiously, seldom writes 
directly about it, choosing to deal with the reflections of the Good as they appear in other 
aspects of Plato's philosophy. That is, he does not confront the blinding power of the 
Good directly, but attempts to locate its effects. Such an approach might receive Plato's 
own approval.45 We will use the subtle metaphysical language of the unlimited, and 
limited things, that Deleuze draws from Plato' s Philebus, where the question is the good 
for man. 
43 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, "What is Truth?" in Basic Questions in Theology: Collected Essays Volume II, 
tr. George H. Kehm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 19: "For Greek thought, the unity oftruth 
excluded all change from it. Change would entail multiplicity, a succession of different forms, and then the 
full, whole truth, the truth constant, could not be found in anything. It belongs to the essence of truth to be 
unchangeable and, thus, to be one and the same, without beginning or end." 
44 LS, 2. 
45 In his own philosophy, as we shall have cause to examine in chapter three, Deleuze employs a similar 
method, choosing to name and rename his own different/ciation (on which more later), but always 
retreating from any sustained discussion about it, preferring always to describe its effects. 
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By stressing difference, the unlimited in the Platonic cosmos, Deleuze raises a 
problem for himself: if the real is changing so radically, how can anything be said about 
it? If the aim of the philosopher is to represent- in language - the real, that task is made 
more difficult for one who posits the real as flux. Heraclitus is perhaps best known for his 
fire (change, flux), but he speaks, too, of the logos.46 The question of the relationship 
between logos and change is central for Plato, too, who devotes a dialogue named for the 
Heraclitean Cratylus to the matter. 
For Deleuze, stressing the play of difference does not render the philosopher 
speechless: the philosopher must not, however, be understood as one who represents the 
world in language.47 To conceive of the world, thus, as an object to be described, is to 
believe the fundamental philosophical question to be "What is X?" Deleuze writes of this 
question, commonly thought to be the central Platonic question (e.g. What is justice?): 
It is true that Plato employs this question in order to refute those who content 
themselves with offering empirical responses, and to oppose essence and 
appearance. His aim, however, is to silence the empirical responses in order to 
open up the indeterminate horizon of a transcendental problem which is the object 
of an Idea. Once it is a question of determining the problem or the Idea as such, 
once it is a question of setting the dialectic in motion, the question 'What is X?' 
gives way to other questions, otherwise powerful and efficacious, otherwise 
imperative: 'How much, how and in what cases?' The question 'What is X?' 
animates only the so-called aporetic dialogues [ ... ] From this point of view, Hegel 
is the culmination of a long tradition which took the question 'What is X?' 
seriously and used it to determine Ideas as essences [ ... ] [H]ow many theological 
46 Seth Benardete notes on page 3 of The Argument of the Action (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2000) that Aristotle ignored Heraclitus' logos; perhaps the popularity of change over word in 
Heraclitus is due to the great celebrity of Aristotle's account. 
47 One thinks of Wittgenstein 's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as an extraordinary attempt to picture the 
world, to represent it, at the cost of change. Play, however, in the form of a hidden activity, remains an 
issue there - absent, but perhaps given some presence in the profound seventh proposition. As is well 
known, play (language games) re-emerges in later Wittgensteinian work, once he has changed his position 
regarding the representational role of language. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922). 
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prejudices were involved in that tradition, since the answer to 'What is X?' is 
always God as the locus of the combinatory of abstract predicates. 48 
In place of a question that calls for an answer in the form of an essentialist description or 
definition- that is, a representation in language of some real object- Deleuze proposes 
questions that take account of the given, identify appearances(" ... in what cases?") and 
count ("how much?"). 
The question "How?" does seek a causal response, but of a limited sort. Where the 
question "What is X?" can be answered, for instance, as Aristotle would answer it, by 
appealing to material, formal, efficient, and final cause, the question "how" is interested 
only in efficient causality.49 Deleuze's intention is not to undermine the importance of 
final and formal cause for Plato, but to distinguish Plato from Hegel, in whose work there 
is virtually nothing of Heraclitus left (the reason, perhaps, why both Nietzsche and 
Deleuze abhor Hegel above all others). 
Questions like these- how much?, how?, and in what cases?- are queries about 
simulacra. The demon to be exorcised must be named, must be confronted, after all, and 
so while according to Deleuze Plato wants to eradicate the simulacra, the latter knows 
that it is no use ignorantly to reject all that is "unlimited": 
Socrates: But when you have grasped, my dear friend, the number and nature of 
the intervals formed by high pitch and low pitch in sound, and the notes that 
bound those intervals, and all the systems of notes that result from them, the 
systems which we have learned, conformably to the teaching of the men of old 
days who discerned them, to call 'scales,' and when, further, you have grasped 
certain corresponding features ofthe performer's bodily movements, features that 
must, so we are told, be numerically determined and be called 'figures ' and 
'measures,' bearing in mind all the time that this is always the right way to deal 
48 DR 188 
49 Se: Michael Hardt, Gilles De/euze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993 ), 4-11. 
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with the one-and-many problem - only then, when you have grasped all this, have 
you gained any real understanding, and whatever be the 'one' that you have 
selected for investigating, that is the way to get insight about it. On the other hand, 
the unlimited variety that belongs to and is inherent in the particulars leaves one, 
in each particular case, an unlimited ignoramus, a person of no account, a 
veritable back number because he hasn't ever addressed himself to finding 
number in anything. 50 
This passage introduces us to what separates Plato from Deleuze, the motivation for 
counting and measuring: the situational, relative measuring is Plato's attempt to deal 
effectively with the simulacra so as to determine the nature of the "one" that is sought. 
The perennial philosophical problem of identity and difference is, for Plato, the problem 
of the one and the many, of finding whatever unity in difference there may be. The 
particular version of calculative procedure that Plato chooses as his example in the 
passage above, is that of the art of music - a favourite of the Pythagorean Plato, since he 
sees harmony as an obvious example of an integration of differences: a unity produced 
from a variety. 
Knowing the unity of the many is no easy matter, however. Even at the end of the 
process outlined above, Socrates tells Protarchus that this measuring is the way to get 
" insight" about the one, as though this exhausting process could never be exhaustive, 
could never reveal the complete nature of the "one" sought. The one still eludes 
definition. Whether Plato conceives of the questions of "how much, how, and in what 
case?" as intended to open up that which is ultimately sought (that X in the question, 
"What is X?") remains an issue. We can say, however, that these questions do not enable 
50 Philebus, 17c-e, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. R. Hackforth, ed. Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 1093-1094. Both Stephanus 
references and references to the Cairns/Hamilton edition are given (in that order) the first time a work of 
Plato' s is cited. For all other citations of Plato, only Stephanus page references are given. 
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us to answer that question;51 thus, though the God of the Christian tradition is traceable 
through Augustine and Plotinus to Plato, Plato himself is uncomfortable with the notion 
of the Good, wary of it. He never offers (nor does he think it possible to offer) a 
description for the good, nor any explicit solution to the question: What is the Good? 
Indeed, he is uncomfortable with naming the good at all. 52 
And yet Plato does name the many that is being enumerated for study: first, the 
systems of notes and intervals are called "scales"; and secondly, the physical movements 
of the performer' s body are called "figures" or "measures". The terms "scales" and 
"measures" gesture, by their presence, toward acts of evaluation. He seems to say that 
when we are confronting the many in search of knowledge of music, we do not begin as 
though lost in the unlimited; rather, we begin with systems of comparisons between notes 
and intervals, and with a series of measured motions for our bodies to imitate. 
That is, we are always already immersed in a valued world - never in a pure 
becoming. While becoming does, for Plato, rumble underneath this world of values, there 
is already a history of values, the consequences of past evaluations. Thus we are 
immersed in that which bears some essential relation to the Good. But we do not pretend 
that there is nothing frightening in this - or that there is not a danger that what will come 
to be will be merely the perpetuation of values, the products of past evaluative acts, acts 
of measuring and mismeasuring. 
51 See Philebus, 18a, where Socrates suggests it may be possible finally to "reach" the one; but to reach and 
to represent are, of course, radically different acts. 
52 
"Names, I maintain, are in no case stable" (Plato, Letter Vll, 343a-b, In The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 
Including the Letters, tr. L.A. Post, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, I 969), 1590.) 
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2.2 Good, Measure 
It appears we are interpreting Plato as equating measure with the Good. Is this a 
legitimate move, or must we be careful not to collapse the good so quickly into another 
term? Later in the Philebus, Plato writes: 
Socrates: [A]ny compound, whatever it be, that does not by some means or other 
exhibit measure and proportion, is the ruin both of its ingredients and, first and 
foremost, of itself; what you are bound to get in such cases is no real mixture, but 
literally a miserable mass of unmixed messiness. 
Protarchus: Very True. 
Socrates: So now we find that the good has taken refuge in the character of the 
beautiful, for the qualities of measure and proportion invariably, I imagine, 
constitute beauty and excellence. 53 
Shortly thereafter, Socrates claims that the good, which has not been found under a single 
form, might be secured in the conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, and truth; and he 
also assents to Protarchus' trinity of beauty, truth, and measuredness, such that proportion 
and measuredness are equated. 54 A compound, then, exhibits both measure and 
measuredness (proportion). A well-proportioned compound appears well-proportioned. 
But something else appears as well: measure, itself. Measure shines through the well-
measured compound. The Good, then, we may say, has taken refuge in the conjunction of 
beauty (i.e. measure), or that which shines through a well-proportioned object; proportion 
(measuredness), or that which has been measured out (of the unmeasured); and truth. The 
Good is not equivalent to measure, but is somehow caught between measure, proportion, 
and truth. The Good is hidden in, and by, appearance. As GUnter Figal explains, the Good 
somehow retreats and is concealed as beauty shines through and appears (as the 
beautiful): 
53 Philebus, 64d-e. 
54 Ibid, 65a-b. 
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(T]he Good is the unity of peras [limit] and apeiron [unlimited]. This unity can 
only be the fortunate coincidence of the two principles in which form retains the 
harmonious proportions in the midst of becoming, and the ephemeral nature of 
becoming comes to anchor in form. The Good would be this unity, if only we did 
not have to speak of it as the Beautiful. Nevertheless, every time the Beautiful is 
made manifest, it is still possible to predicate ' good' to the fortuitous unity of 
peras and ape iron. Thus, in calling the unity 'good,' we are actually referring to 
the power of the Good, which makes itself felt, precisely at the moment it eludes 
us and takes refuge in the Beautiful. This is why the power of the 'Good' is 
beyond all being and can thus serve as the horizon from which it is possible to 
recognize that something in the realm of being has succeeded in becoming 
beautiful. 55 
As limit limits the unlimited, a mixture is produced. The nature, or location, of the 
conjunction or joint between the limit and the unlimited will determine whether the good 
is present. Figal rightly says that the Good is the unity of the limit and the unlimited. It is 
conceivable that, in a particular case limit might not adequately limit the unlimited; that 
is, a sustained and integrating unity, indicative of the harmonization of the unlimited's 
tendencies toward change and dissolution, might not emerge. 
In such a case we have a bad likeness, a poorly mixed bit of badly measured 
messiness - no true unity; and, therefore, we can infer that the Good was/is not present. 
But since measure and proportion are the qualities of the Beautiful, we must say that the 
true unity itself appears to us as beautiful, and that the Good is only seemingly present 
and thus cannot be equated with the unity. Figal concludes that it is the power of the 
Good that does not appear; the Good is present speciously as the Beautiful in the unifying 
of limit and the unlimited. The Beautiful testifies to the power of the Good, but is not 
itself the Good. We have, then, the Good, Beauty (measure, or limit), the Beautiful (unity 
of Beauty, or measure, and the unmeasured), and the Unmeasured or unlimited. We 
55 Figal, 94. 
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could, then, also add the Simulacrum to our hierarchy, as that mixture of Beauty and the 
Unmeasured in which there is no unqualified presence of the Good. 
In the famous sun analogy of the Republic, where the Good is compared at length 
to the sun; we encounter the issues of visibility, or ofthe shining through of the Good, as 
well as the power of the Good: 
The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of 
visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it 
is not itself generation. 
Of course not. 
In like manner then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive 
from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and 
essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still 
transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. 56 
The two aspects of the Good that are here drawn out, as that which provides for 
generation and growth, and as that which lets things be known to be what they are, forces 
us to explore the relation of "being known" to "appearing" ... and even to "being". Are we 
not misconstruing the sun analogy by attributing to it an aspect of knowing that has 
something to do with appearing? 
Truth, like the Good, would seem to be the sort of thing that cannot itself 
"appear". When we say there is truth in a work of art, we do not mean by that that we can 
point to a particular figure or colour and say, "here is the truth in this painting". It is 
equally difficult to point to a proposition and say, "there is truth"; "John is a bachelor" 
may be a true statement, but the truth of it must be sought somewhere other than on the 
page. Perhaps it is sought in a correspondence between an idea represented in the 
56 Plato, Republic, Bk. VI 509b-c, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. Paul 
Shorey, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 744 . Plato 
has not forgotten his position here regarding the difficulty of speaking about the good, for the passage 
above concludes: "And Glaucon very ludicrously said, Heaven save us, hyperbole can go no further." 
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proposition and a state of affairs in the world - but in any case, truth does not appear as 
truth. It may, rather, come to presence in the beautiful object. To say that truth appears as 
the beautiful is to distinguish oneself from a proponent of a correspondence theory of 
truth, in whatever form. 
In this we are in good company. Both Heidegger and Gadamer57 draw out this 
notion of"unconcealing," ofthe event-like nature ofthe appearance of Truth in Plato. 
Knowledge surely has some relation to Truth. 58 Heidegger and Gadamer find in the 
Greeks the notion of truth as somehow "coming to presence," "unconcealing itself," 
"disclosing itself." The Greek for what is generally translated into English as "truth" is 
aletheia, derived from Lethe, which is the River of Forgetting. 59 So in addition to the 
coming-to-appear present in the term aletheia, there may also be a sense of truth as "un-
forgotten," remembered. How are these matters related? What has truth-as-revelation to 
do with truth-as-remembrance? John Sallis writes: 
In the Platonic texts [ ... ] remembrance is thought as union of the eidos that shines 
through and gathers such things. Here the word eidos [ . . . ]has the same sense: that 
which is seen, the look that something presents when one looks at it, the look that 
things of the same kind have in common so as to look alike, the look that can be 
envisioned even when the things that had that look have passed away. In coming 
to have before one's vision that enduring look of things that come and go, one 
57 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations 
Relating to the Philebus, tr. Robert M. Wallace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 
58 Heidegger, Being and Time, 56-7. The phenomenology that joins Plato, Heidegger, and Sallis is here 
evident. See John Sallis, Force of Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 28-9: " (A]t 
the centre of the Republic one is - at the very least - left wondering whether the beginning that would be 
the final original will not always have withdrawn into its own veiled image-making, into fathering and 
sending images of itself without ever imparting itself as such." 
59 
"[A]nd there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness, whose waters no vessel can contain. 
They were all required to drink a measure and each one as he drank forgot all things" (Rep Bk. X 62 1 a-b). 
See Liddell, et. al., 1044, where Lethe is given as the name for the river of forgetfulness. See also Liddell, 
et. al. , 64, where "not-forgetting" is given as the second meaning for aletheia. The importance of 
recollection as a theme in Platonic philosophy has its roots in several other dialogues, as well, including of 
course the Meno and the Phaedo. 
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brings those things back in their full presence, indeed in a presence of which they 
themselves, stamped by passingness, are incapable.60 
The Greek term eidos, whose plural form, idea, lies behind the infamous 'theory of ideas' 
derives from the earlier Greek (v)ideo and has been smothered in layers and layers of 
philosophical interpretation. Sallis argues we are hardly able to hear what Plato's "form", 
his eidos. originally said (or originally says). In trying to hear what the word is saying 
above the static generated by the tradition,61 Sallis finds that the eidos is that which has 
some sort of permanence, as a sort of eternal look that a thing has, a look that can be 
remembered, a look that does not pass away as does the unlimited, becoming, change that 
gives rise to the look. Justification for care over the question of the status of the Forms, or 
Ideas, is easily found in Plato's own texts. In the Timaeus, he writes: 
Is there any self-existent fire, and do all those things which we call self-existent 
exist, or are only those things which we see or in some way perceive through the 
bodily organs existent, and nothing whatever beside them? And are those 
intelligible forms, of which we are accustomed to speak, nothing at all, only a 
name?62 
60 Sallis, Chorology, 30. 
61 
"Does one know what the so-called forms are, even if such Greek words as eidos and idea are retained 
and, through them, the link to vision, to the look of things? Does one know even how to ask the question? 
As soon as one asks what, one has already broached - that is, assumed - precisely that which is thought as 
eidos. The eidos is what something is. It answers the question: ti esti . .. ? Thus, if one asks what a form is, 
one is asking: What is the what? That is, one just doubles the question and risks being ensnared in mere 
double talk. [ . .. ] Here one needs, above all, to be on guard against naively projecting back into the Platonic 
texts a conceptuality and a language that were forged only in and through those texts - or on the basis of 
what they achieved and at the cost of moving away from them" (Sallis, Chorology, 49). 
62 Plato, Timaeus 51 c-d, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, translated by 
B. Jowett, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 
1178. See also Parmenides, 132b, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. Francis 
Macdonald Cornford, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), 926: "But, Parmenides, said Socrates, may it not be that each of those forms is a thought, which 
cannot properly exist anywhere but in a mind." A little later (Parmenides, 135c-d), however, Plato has 
Parmenides - the thinker of the One - warn Socrates of the danger of giving up the search for the forms: 
"But, on the other hand, Parmenides continued, if, in view of all these difficulties and others like them, a 
man refuses to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite form in every case, he will have 
nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is 
always the same, and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But of that 
consequence I think you are only too well aware." 
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Timaeus wonders precisely what we wonder- are these forms simply names? Already in 
philosophy's history, in the texts of the philosopher perhaps best known for his doctrine of 
the forms, there is an explicit awareness of the dubious nature of the forms. It may be the 
case that the only things that exist are those that we perceive. But what is perceived is 
perceived in the present, and usually it testifies to (appears as though it has come from) 
something before it. That is to say, what is perceived is perceived as passing, and as 
having had an origin, and as destined toward a conclusion (an end, of some kind). 
On Sallis' reading, eidos, what we call "form", does not seem to be transcendent 
in the radical sense usually thought characteristic of Platonism: that is, we are not to 
imagine that there is another world in which there would be a Form of table, somehow or 
other an eternal entity (or even a set of relations, or algorithm for the construction of 
"table") elsewhere. 
Admittedly, however, the eternal look of a thing is somehow or other elsewhere: 
that is, if the flux is taken seriously, whatever is here is changing, whereas there is 
something indestructible, unchanging, eternal in the look of the thing, such that we can 
recall it. Is it in the past? The entity that had that appearance is certainly gone, and yet 
somehow the look is not itself past but present- in its "full presence" as Sallis says .63 We 
have, in Sallis' view at least, good reason to wonder whether there is quite the 
transcendence in Plato that De leuze seems to attribute to him. 64 
63 How is presence to be understood for Plato? As we shall see, it is to be understood in terms of place. 
Heidegger characterizes it differently in On Time and Being, Trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1972), 2: "Being is determined as presence by time." 
64 
"Contrary to what Plato believed, there is no measure high above for these mixtures and combinations of 
Ideas which would allow us to defme good and bad mixtures. Or again, contrary to what the pre-Socratics 
thought, there is no immanent measure either, capable of fixing the order and the progression of a mixture 
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2.3 Place and Difference 
This question as to where the forms are is crucial. As Sallis notes, they are 
remembered, and they are fully present when remembered. The forms are thus at least 
intelligible - that is, whether we might ultimately grant them some being that does not 
depend upon their being remembered by a mind, they are remembered - though they 
originate in the visible world. Leaving open for the moment the question of the 
ontological status of the forms, Sallis notices something interesting: 
[E]ven though both paradigm and image are distinctively all-inclusive, they are 
inclusive in decisively different ways. The difference has primarily to do with 
place; that is, what distinguishes the kind of inclusion characteristic of the visible 
cosmos is that, unlike intelligible inclusion, it holds together in an extended place 
beings that with respect to one another are in different places within the 
comprehensive place. It is as if in the transition from intelligible to visible 
something like place came into play, letting things be set apart as they are 
gathered into the comprehensive visible cosmos. As the chora, which seems like 
place, will ~rove always to have come into play in the very opening of 
difference. 5 
The chora is the place which accommodates the gathering up of (maintained) differences 
into identity; whereas intelligible inclusion does not preserve the differences, but subjects 
differences to identity: the relation is one of parts to whole, where the identity of the 
whole destroys the integrity of the parts as distinct differences. What is afforded by place, 
Sallis thinks, is the possibility for difference to be maintained in such a way that there 
remains a community of differences, without this being a community of parts to a whole. 
in the depths of Nature (Physis); every mixture is as good as the bodies which pervade one another and the 
Earts which coexist" (LS, 130-1 ). 
5 Sallis, Chorology, 60. 
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We can now proceed to consider the question of the generation of the world, to 
investigate the physics of the mimetic process to which we referred above. The clue we 
need in order to engage with the question how the many is generated is, as John Sallis 
suggests above, the nature of the place in which (where) it is generated. What, then, is this 
strange chora, that it should accommodate the one and the many if indeed, as Sallis seems 
to suggest, it does? 
It appears in the Timaeus, a dialogue in which Plato unfolds a physics intended, at 
least in part, as an alternative to the Democritean, atomistic physics.66 For the ancient 
Atomists, the issues of difference and identity were fairly simple: there are absolute 
differences between self-identical atoms which fall in what EdwardS. Casey calls "strict 
void", a (no-)place which is completely inert, which is pure nothing: it would be 
misleading to say that it even relates atoms to each other, though in some sense or other 
the atoms are in the void. Any identity in an Atomistic world of this nature beyond the 
self-identity of the atoms is illusion: the apparent identity of compound substances is 
simply that - apparent. Within that void, contact between atoms is possible, and they may 
become entangled, but aside from brute physical contact, there is no community 
whatsoever. In contrast to such a world, the Platonic universe includes a genuine 
66 
" In the revolution of the universe are comprehended all the four elements, and this being circular and 
having a tendency to come together, compresses everything and will not allow any place to be left void" 
(Tim, 58a-b ). See also Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 
33: "Plato's primary opponents in the Timaeus are the ancient Atomists, who held that cosmogenesis occurs 
by the interaction of discrete bits of matter within a circumambient empty space (kenon). Empty space itself 
possesses no predetermined routes, much less any qualities of its own. Nor does it possess places or 
regions; in its radical placelessness, it is a prime candidate for what I have called the 'strict void' and 'no 
place. ' In contrast to this model, the Receptacle is richly plenary. The only real emptiness it knows occurs 
in the form of the tiny interstices at the edges of the regular figures that come to fi ll it out. Neither outside 
itself (for there is nothing outside the Receptacle) nor within itself is there any sheer emptiness." 
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community of differences; the choric place is not radical placelessness, 67 and 
consequently, the position of a "one"68 on the chora affects the entire community of ones. 
And perhaps more significantly, the "ones" here are even less obviously self-same than 
Democritean atoms. 
Part way through the dialogue named for him, Timaeus forges a new beginning, 
characterized by the appearance of the chora, described below as a "third kind" - a kind 
ignored by Deleuze in his characterization of the Platonic metaphysics: 
This new beginning of our discussion of the universe requires a fuller division 
than the former, for then we made two classes; now a third must be revealed. The 
two sufficed for the former discussion. One, which we assumed, was a pattern 
intelligible and always the same, and the second was only the imitation of the 
pattern, generated and visible. There is also a third kind which we did not 
distinguish at the time, conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the 
argument seems to require that we should set forth in words another kind which is 
difficult of explanation and dimly seen. What nature are we to attribute to this new 
kind of bein~? We reply that it is the receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all 
generation. 6 
In addition to the intelligible pattern and its imitation is the chora or receptacle, which is 
not merely the site of generation, but also nurses that which is generated. Later, we find 
Timaeus characterizing the chora as a mother, in a trinitarian analysis modeled on the 
conception of a child, when he says, "we may liken the receiving principle to a mother, 
67 
"A region is not just a formal condition of possibility. It is a substantive place-of-occupation. Chora, 
translated both as ' region' and as 'space' by Comford, connotes occupied place, for example, a field full of 
crops or a room replete with things[ . .. ] A choric region is substantive without being substance: rather than 
a thing, it is a locatory matrix/or things. Such a region is finally a matter of place rather than space - if 
' place' implies finite locatedness and 'space' infinite or indefmite extension. Despite its curious 
adumbrations of the modern idea of space as something invisible, the Receptacle remains above all a scene 
of implacement" (Casey, 34 ). 
68 The quotation marks should remind that what is at stake is the nature of these "ones," as we shall soon 
see. 
69 Tim, 48e-49b. 
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and the source or spring to a father, and the intermediate nature to a child. "70 Ultimately 
we are pursuing the question of the status of the source, whether it is transcendent for 
Plato. But since the source is absent, though there is a role throughout the Timaeus for 
self-same being, we delay comment about its nature while we attempt to discern 
something further about the nature of the receptive principle. 
Objects, in a changing world generated by the source and the receiving principle, 
testify to a union ofthese two parents: 
[A]lso we must acknowledge that one kind of being is the form which is always 
the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from 
without nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any 
sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is 
another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, 
always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is 
apprehended by opinion jointly with sense. And there is a third nature, which is 
space [ chora] and is eternal, and admits not of destruction and provides a home 
for all created things, and is apprehended when all sense is absent, by a kind of 
spurious reason, and is hardly real - which we, beholding as in a dream, say of all 
existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that 
which is neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence.71 
Timaeus says of this receptive principle that it is: "[a]n invisible and formless 
being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, 
and is most incomprehensible."72 The receptacle must be invisible and formless , and must 
not distort the image of that which will appear on its reflective surface. 73 The chora, to 
reflect faithfully74 the qualities of the visible which is to take place in it, must not 
contaminate the image or distort it with properties of its own. It mirrors, serves as a place 
70 Ibid., SOd. 
7 1 Ibid., 52a-b. 
72 Ibid., 5 la-b. 
73 The receptacle "never departs at all from her own nature and never, in any way or at any time, assumes a 
form like that of any ofthe things which enter into her; she is the natural recipient of all impressions, and is 
stirred and informed by them, and appears different from time to time by reason of them." (Tim, SOb-c). 
74 See Casey, 33. 
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that is almost not75 a place at all - is empty enough to enable the act of production to take 
place, revealing as visible a sharp image. 
Though the receptacle is formless, it is active. Timaeus compares its activity to a 
winnowing, such that the generated images that pass over the receptacle affect its motion, 
and are themselves affected by the previous motion of the reflective surface: 
[B]eing and space and generation, these three, existed in their three ways before 
the heaven, and ... the nurse of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by 
fire, and receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the affections 
which accompany these, presented a strange variety of appearances, and being full 
of powers which were neither similar nor equally balanced, was never in any part 
in a state of equipoise, but swaying unevenly hither and thither, was shaken by 
them, and by its motion again shook them, and the elements when moved were 
separated and carried continually some one way, some another. As, when grain is 
shaken and winnowed by fans and other instruments used in the threshing of com, 
the close and heavy particles are borne away and settle in one direction, and the 
loose and light particles in another. 76 
The chora' s motion preserves the motion of particles whose bodies have been swept 
away. An image that in one sense no longer is leaves traces of its being for that which is 
to come. What this means is that though the reflective surface has no form and thus does 
not impose its own character on that which is to cross it, it is the site of a gift giving, of 
the leaving of an inheritance in the motion of the bowl. The nurse of generation is full of 
75 See John A. Scott, "Having a Need to Act," in Transformations of Urban and Suburban Landscapes, ed. 
Gary Backhaus and John Murungi (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 131: " In the Phaedrus we meet 
the charioteer who acts as the articulating focus for the differentially integrated action joining the horses. 
The charioteer takes-and-gives in the same act. The charioteer adds nothing, and achieves everything. He 
reflects the horses ' motions to each other. If the charioteer adds anything he runs the risk of instant 
destruction. Using the language of the Timaeus, the charioteer is the chora,- the receptacle - the time/place 
that lets the horses each do different things together as an integrated whole." 
76 Tim, 52d-53a, my emphasis. Here is the role of difference, which is absolutely fundamental. There would 
be no reason to imagine that any particle would be good by virtue merely of being what it is, and that others 
would be bad by nature, and that the chora in the simple act of allowing particles to separate themselves 
exercises a moral judgment over them: "The nature of the light and the heavy will be best understood when 
examined in connection with our notions of above and below, for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the 
universe is parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other - the one a lower to which all 
things tend which have any bulk, and an upper to which things ascend against their will" (Tim, 62c-d). 
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powers- is filled with the powers of the images, is shaken by them, but also has its own 
capacity to receive and to pass on particles. When a new image comes to pass on the 
receptacle, it will encounter a shaking bowl - it will encounter in its own present the 
motions of past images, as they are preserved in the vibrations of the place. 77 
The place operates, through its capacity to receive, as that which enables the flux 
to be separated into its components. The particles are shuffled off, separated out, 
according to their own nature; like becomes a neighbour of like, but by reason not of a 
similarity to the neighbour, nor of a difference to that which is unlike it, but by virtue of 
its relationship with the receptacle. That is to say, the direction of a particle is a function 
of its own character and motion, and of the motion of the chora. 78 The chora, then, is that 
which allows for the measuring to take place; as that which never departs from its own 
nature and remains selfsame, it will allow beings to measure themselves out against one 
another.79 
77 It remains significant that the place is not such as to distort, of its own nature, the forms that cross its 
surface, for this maintains the integrity of the relationship of past motions to present motions. In this way, 
~lace is responsible for the integrity of time- time, which is always subordinated to motion for Plato. 
8 The trouble becomes, though, that over time it is possible that an imbalance of a certain set of particles in 
the flux could radically alter the motion of the receptacle, so that new particles that come to take the place 
of old ones might well be rather different, since they were given their place by some interaction between 
themselves and a novel set of motions. Ifthis is the logic of being, then our contemporary neighbours (those 
who share the same time and space as us) may well carry a truth about ourselves, and our children may 
react to us violently. 
79 John A. Scott (private correspondence) directs us to Phaedo 99c, where the Greek expression deuteron 
ploun, usually translated from the Greek by the comparable idiomatic English phrase "makeshift," is 
employed in a discussion about the way in which dialectic works. Literally, the phrase deuteron ploun. a 
sailing term, means "second sailing." Scott says," Navigators do two 'sailings' as they triangulate by a 
totally remote but effectively present, star. I suspect some vestige of this navigational paradigm remains in 
dialectic as Plato and Aristotle develop it. It may well evoke the measured movement of a vessel between 
the two co-ordinate points in a triangulation, an indirect, reflective, 'navigational' approach which defines 
the dialectical procedure Socrates describes at Phaedo 99c, based as it is on the integration provided by a 
separate good that links not only those practicing a dialectical discourse, but also the particulars ' 
participation in their form." Deleuze takes issue with Plato over the separateness of that which guarantees 
the integrity of the world. Is the chora sufficiently separate, or different, from that which is in flux to satisfy 
Plato's concern that the good be uncorrupted by that which is changing? 
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At the outset of the Timaeus, the theme is set clearly: 
Socrates: One, two, three, but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of those who 
were yesterday my guests and are to be my entertainers today? 
Timaeus: He has been taken ill, Socrates, for he would not willingly have been 
absent from this gathering. 
Socrates: Then, if he is not coming, you and the two others must supply his 
place. 80 
How does the absence of the fourth help to focus the dialogue? As soon as we recognize 
an absence, we must decide how to fill it, since nature abhors the void. But what is that 
one who is missing? How do we know what place he would have filled, since his place is 
determined by his relation to ourselves? The absence of the fourth, precisely because he is 
missed, and his place must be filled, affords us an opportunity to see something of 
ourselves.81 It is here, then, that measure and proportion become important. 
As the place of connectivity, 82 as the site of the interaction of differences, the 
chora is also the site83 of measuring, where the fragile, distinct - that is, different -
identities in the physical world encounter each other and are limited by each other. John 
Russon reminds us of the point above about the role of the agent in the universe, as one 
80 Tim, 17a-b. 
81 The manner in which Timaeus and the other two must repay the debt to Socrates incurred by all four, 
including the one now absent, is a fascinating matter. For it is truly impossible to do anything other than 
r:roduce a new absence (in the form of debt) from the interest produced in the previous day's discussion. 
2 See Casey, 48: "[P]Iace is [not] simply the opposite of void, as if it were merely a matter of replacing the 
void with a plenum. Even the place-proffering Receptacle, though it is expressly designed as a critique of 
the void of the Atomists, is not, strictly speaking, a plenum. Place includes much indissociable absence- as 
depth, as distance, as difference of location, as dislocation itself. Place neither fills up a void nor merely 
papers over it. It has its own mixed, ambiguous being. But one of its essential properties is its connectivity -
its power to link up, from within, diversely situated entities or events." Where the void for the Atomists has 
no capacity to connect atoms, to integrate the differences between them so as to produce new identities, the 
chora's nature is to do this exactly. It affords the genuine opportunity for a community of differences. 
83 See John Sallis, "Traces of the Chora," in Retracing the Platonic Text, ed. John Russon and John Sallis 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 64: "There can be no question, then, but that the 
chora will remain to some extent in force after the god' s return. At the very least it will limit what the 
artisan god can achieve in his cosmic fabrication; it will limit the productive operation of divine or noetic 
causes." 
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identity in difference that sustains itself, in Heraclitean fashion precisely by differing from 
the other it encounters at the site that is the chora: 
For us, to be is to be recognizing the differing, this striving. Our soul differs- is 
determinate - as the ability to differ from the whole sphere of differences as 
differences. It is our soul which is the space of universal differing- the chora- or, 
as Aristotle says of mind (which he describes as Timaeus describes the chora), the 
place of all forms. Mind is the cause of all things being able to be what they are, 
because it is the space of recognition - the space of comparison in terms of forms, 
that is, in terms of the good as such. 84 
We begin to see roles that appeared to be played by the transcendent Good now overtaken 
by the activity of the chora. The chora is that which reflects the beautiful images: it is the 
site of the production of the Beautiful, and its own mirror-like emptiness is what enables 
beauty to appear. The chora also serves to connect differences, thus, by receiving them 
and holding them together in a communal site, it gives rise to an act of measuring where 
the integrity or unity (the good) of one is generated by one's differing from that into 
community with which it is brought by the chora. How does this work? 
There are two forces at work: force of integration and force of strife. John Russon 
notes the force of integration as harmonizing or equalizing: "To harmonize is to equalize, 
to bring together, into the generative tension which is the space of comparison and 
measure, to bring into 'with. "'85 The force of strife opposed to this reaches its extreme 
form in the image of war and battle upon which Sallis focuses in his discussion of the 
Republic in Chorology, where he says that "war is the most extreme figure of motion, the 
figure of motion brought to its traumatic extreme in such a way that at its very moment of 
84 See John Russon, "We Sense that they Strive: How to Read (the Theory of Forms)," in Retracing the 
Platonic Text, ed. John Russon and John Sallis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 
80. 
85 Ibid., 76. 
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completion it reverts into the withdrawal of all movement, the rigor of death, the silent 
immobility of lifeless bodies lying on the battlefield. "86 
The potential for this extreme case of opposition - a too radical differing which 
destroys the identity of the other- is always there. It is what Plato perceives as the threat 
of the flux (what Deleuze calls the mad becoming) the danger of destroying the limit (the 
other) which maintains the integrity of the self. The metaphor of the battle runs 
throughout the Platonic dialogues. We find a particularly helpful example in the Sophist: 
Stranger: Well, what name shall we give to the practitioners of this art [the art of 
refutation]? For my part I shrink from calling them Sophists. 
Theaetetus: Why so? 
Stranger: For fear of assigning to them too high a function. 
Theaetetus: And yet your description has some resemblance to that type. 
Stranger: So has the dog to the wolf- the fiercest of animals to the tamest. But a 
cautious man should above all be on his guard against resemblances; they are a 
very slippery sort of thing. However, be it so [i.e. let them pass for Sophists], for 
should they ever set up an adequate defense of their confines, the boundary in 
dispute will be of no small importance. 87 
The issue, again, is that of resemblances, similarities - the possibility of deception, 
the similar appearances of radically different beasts, and the dangers of not knowing the 
one from the other. But what we notice here in the Sophist is that, while Socrates warns 
that one should be on guard against resemblances, the similarity is allowed to pass given 
that the boundary will be in dispute should the beast begin to defend itself as that which it 
may merely appear to be. The danger of the mistaken identity of false simulacra, of 
misnaming, looms, but it is cradled within the dialectic between the two interlocutors who 
share a place and depend upon each other to maintain the integrity of the discourse (and 
86 Sallis, Chorology, 28. 
87 Plato, Sophist, 230e-23l b, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. Francis 
Macdonald Comford, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), 973. 
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ultimately of each other) by measuring against the other, always.88 The boundary, the 
limit, must be in dispute - or else it becomes dangerous. How dangerous it would be to 
unfold a definition of justice if one could not count on one's interlocutors to take such a 
thing seriously enough to challenge it as absurd, as comical, when it turns out to offer too 
little at the level of action. 89 
2.4 The Economy of Being: (Naming the) Limits of Production 
In the Parmenides- a dialogue that begins, we recall, in the marketplace- Plato 
explores through Parmenides, the thinker of the One, the economics of Being. Early in the 
dialogue we see what is crucial for Plato -that the assertion of the One is impossible 
without the implication of the many. Zeno, the great philosophical offspring of 
Parmenides, discusses his book, which defends the thesis "Being is" by attempting to 
render the claims in favour of change and motion (and, thus, the many) more absurd than 
Parmenides' own claim. Zeno's paradoxes were generated as a plurality of defenses for 
his philosophical father; it is as though the giver (Parmenides) of that which is self-same 
(the One) incited the response of a dangerous and destructive (multiple) Other which 
could be fended off, perhaps, only by the giver's child (Zeno). 
88 See Russon, 80: "It is as mind that the good can be as the being of the difference, as the demand that we 
strive for the good together. Giving thought to the good together, we give space to the good together - we 
~ive space to determinateness." 
9 See Rep, Bk. II 372e: "Good, said I. I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we 
are considering, but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn't such a bad suggestion, either. For by 
observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true 
state I believe to be the one we have described - the healthy state, as it were." Socrates knows the comedy 
here - a comedy that is possible only because the interlocutor resists bursting into laughter and insists on 
the serious nature of the dialogue. 
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Zeno, the character from the Parmenides, says of his book of paradoxes: "This 
book, then, is a retort against those who assert a plurality. It pays them back in the same 
coin with something to spare."90 We cannot fail to notice that Zeno is engaged in a 
generative struggle here - one in which, indeed, interest is generated. The very dynamic 
of Being is to produce more than there was; the One can be such only through a Many 
against which it asserts itself. And there is a suggestion that this is indeed a mimetic 
process, as Zeno notes in the same section of the dialogue that before he could decide 
whether to publish his book, to let it see the light, someone had copied it 
"surreptitiously." 
There is in Plato's own texts nothing settled with regards to the One and the 
Many; between them, on the other hand, there is motion - the motion of the Many 
proceeding forth from the One, and perhaps of the Many being recollected back into the 
One. We have reason then to relax over the seemingly contradictory positions attributed 
to Plato: the fascistic Plato, he who would value the One at a cost to the Many, and the 
Heraclitean Plato, who embraces change and appears concerned over the practical, lived 
consequences of any speculation that would devalue the manifold, that would be detached 
from the activity of the agent. But what is the act that enables the agent to be engaged in 
the flux? 
De leuze acknowledges at the outset of the Logic of Sense that for Plato there is a 
peculiar relation between language and the mad becoming - it is obvious, for instance, in 
90 Parmenides, 128d-e. 
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the Cratylus. The issue is one of challenging the other, of measuring the other.91 So much 
in Plato depends, then, upon the response of that which is challenged. 92 If the challenge is 
too great, the other is destroyed (as in the case of war). Ifthe challenge is too weak the 
object takes flight from, eludes the name. Sallis says: 
One begins to realize that Timaeus was not speaking loosely when he declared 
that the logos seems to necessitate attempting to reveal a third kind. One could 
even say that, for the move from the twofold to a third kind, logos is the 
touchstone. When it touches or attempts to touch fire and the others, they take 
flight in a manner that is incomparable to anything that occurs within the compass 
of the twofold. However imperfect a couch may be in comparison to its paradigm, 
it can be called couch without proving already to have been becoming something 
else. Not only the paradigm but also the product made in its image is sufficiently 
selfsame and determinate that they can to a degree sustain the name; later Timaeus 
will say explicitly that the image shares both the name and the look of the 
paradigm (see 52a). Only fire, air, water and earth are fugitives from logos, indeed 
in such a way that their very flight points to a third kind that would harbour them 
outside the twofold. One could say that the flight of such self-extinguishing 
indices as fire traces a way beyond the twofold of paradigm and image. Their 
flight traces a passage, a way out to the receptacle in which they would be 
received and held. It is thus that they are traces of the chora, namely, as traces 
indicating the way to the chora.93 
Deleuze's "line of flight" is thus not without philosophical precedent. This dynamic of 
flight from one's name is dramatized in Book I, Chapter 19 of Aristotle's Posterior 
Analytics, where a universal is directed toward particulars which flee from it as in a rout 
in battle. There is a point, however, at which one responds to one's name: that is the place 
where identity in difference is established. When Deleuze characterizes the human animal 
91 The Ancient Greek katagoreusis, from which we get our term "category", means "accusation" . See 
Liddell, et. a l. , 887b. 
92 
"(I]f anyone, in imitation of that which we call the foster mother and nurse of the universe, will not allow 
the body ever to be inactive, but is always producing motions and agitations through its whole extent, which 
form the natural defense against other motions both internal and external, and by moderate exercise reduces 
to order according to their affinities the particles and affections which are wandering about the body, as we 
have already said when speaking of the universe, he will not allow enemy placed by the side of enemy to 
stir up wars and disorders in the body, but he will place friend by the side of friend so as to create health" 
(Tim, 88d-e). 
93 Sallis, "Traces," 61. 
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as essentially more a fleer than a fighter, we have in mind Socrates (in battle, in court, in 
prison) and Aristotle (on the run), and we wonder whether a man can be either without 
being both. 
What sort of battle are we fighting? Are we not helping De leuze to slay the father 
in Plato's texts by attempting to make the transcendent immanent, by suggesting, with 
John Sallis, that the Forms might themselves have an origin in the flux- and that the 
being that belongs to what is in flux somehow involves a return to this origin? Why do 
we want to kill the father? Why help Deleuze, why abandon transcendence? What kind of 
desire is it that insists on bringing the outside in? 
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Chapter Three: Difference and Event in Deleuze 
"Because antinaturalist philosophers did not want to consider the void, the void 
encompassed everything. Their Being, their One and their Whole are artificial and 
unnatural, always corruptible, fleeting, porous, friable, or brittle. They would rather say 
that "being is nothing" than recognize that there are beings and there is void- that there 
are simple beings within the void and that there is void within compound beings. "94 
- Deleuze 
In the above passage, from an essay on Lucretius in the appendix to Logic of 
Sense, Deleuze engages with the one/many problem and indicates his preference for the 
naturalistic philosophy of such Atomists as Democritus and Lucretius. Like Deleuze's 
philosophy, Democritus' atomism is a philosophy that stresses difference. What we note 
first about the latter is that there are many atoms, and that there are both atoms and a void 
in which they fall freely. Atoms for Democritus are self-same, however, so that this 
philosophy does not claim difference without positing identity simultaneously: the 
difference between atoms presupposes the unity of each atom. Nevertheless, the universe 
is not to be described as one without serious qualification to that claim: the atoms do not 
belong to the universe as parts to a whole. 
More significant than the difference between atoms, however, is the difference 
between atoms and void. This difference is not so easily understood to presuppose identity 
as such; or, better, it is not explained by this identity, or cannot be reduced to the 
comparison of two unities. We have already seen that the totality of atoms does not form 
a whole which might be called self-identical, and it is difficult to imagine in what sense 
the void, which is strictly speaking, no-place, could be self-identical. 
94 LS, 268. 
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Deleuze has popularized the term "multiplicity," which has its roots in 
mathematics - and in philosophy in the works of Henri Bergson, whose influence upon 
Deleuze's thought was profound. We hear often that Deleuze is a thinker of the 
multiplicity, a philosopher of Difference, and straight off the misconceptions abound. 
Both enemies and friends of Deleuzian philosophy rage against confusions over this issue 
of what difference, or mulitiplicity, is for Deleuze. 
Constantin V. Boundas, as we shall see, believes that with the theory of the 
multiplicity, Deleuze95 overcomes the philosophical problem of the one-many. Indeed, in 
A Thousand Plateaus, we find Deleuze and Guattari excitedly forwarding the equation 
PLURALISM=MONISM, confirming that despite the emphasis on difference, Deleuzian 
philosophy must be understood as a novel effort to think difference and identity 
together.96 Boundas wants to ensure that Deleuze's multiplicity is not thought to be 
another term for the many; multiplicity encompasses the one and the many. 
Alain Badiou, a staunch opponent ofDeleuze's, happily agrees with Boundas that 
Deleuze's so called philosophy of difference is not a philosophy of the many. According 
to Badiou, however, it is precisely because Deleuze's philosophy is not a philosophy of 
the many - of true difference, as Badiou would have it - that it is reducible to yet another 
version of a philosophy of the One. 
If the multiplicity is not the many of the Democritean atomists, why does De leuze 
claim that there are simply beings and void? We feel a pull in two directions. Badiou and 
95 Or Deleuze-Bergson, as in Constantin V. Boundas, "Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual," in 
Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
96 Such is the thesis of Todd May's "Difference and Unity in Deleuze," in Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of 
Philosophy, eds. Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowki (New York; London: Routledge, 1994), 33-
50. 
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Boundas will not allow Deleuze to be called an Atomist in the Democritean sense, and we 
may find out that they are right to object to such designation. This chapter will attempt an 
unfolding of these multiplicities, ofDeleuze's metaphysics of difference. It will turn out 
that, to a point, I too share the reading proposed by Badiou97 and Boundas. But to what 
point?98 
3.1 Deleuze and Bergson: Multiplicity and Difference 
According to Bergson, "philosophy has never frankly admitted [the] continuous 
creation of unforeseen novelty."99 In his view, change or becoming has always been 
trivialized and misunderstood by thinkers for whom the real is the unchanging. Again, the 
Platonists with their transcendent, perfect, and unchanging Ideas are the target: "[T]hey 
imagined that Being was given once and for all, complete and perfect. [ ... ] It was Time 
which, according to them, spoiled everything." 100 The God of Augustine's Confessions, 
for instance, is outside Time such that He has knowledge of what is in man's past, present, 
and future.101 Bergson argues against this conception that there is a perspective outside 
time that shows time to be mere appearance, an illusion experienced only by beings who 
cannot foresee a future which already exists. 
In the last chapter, we found reason to wonder whether Being is given "once and 
for all" for Plato himself, or whether the giving of Being might be a continual process 
97 Badiou, to be fair, will be with me throughout this essay - he will say, for instance, that Deleuze's 
£hilosophy is a philosophy of Death, that De leuze is a Stoic, etc. 
8 In chapter four, we shall raise again the question of atomism and difference against the background of an 
organicist, folded Deleuzian universe. 
99 Henri Bergson, 'The Possible and the Real," in Philosophers of Process, eds. Douglas Browning and 
William T. Myers (Bronx, New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 186. 
100 Ibid. 
101 See Chapter 11 of Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, The Confessions ofSaint Augustine, trans. F. J. 
Sheed. (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943). 
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which takes place at the site of the chora. Bergson would not dispute that copies of Being 
are produced continually. According to Bergson, these copies, "shadows projected in 
time,"102 are not Being; the union of transcendent Ideas is Being, and these are not given 
again and again. Time is but an image of eternity. But if, as Bergson suggests, such 
theories of the unreality of what passes in time are great errors, why do we find them so 
compelling? 
Bergson claims that our "ordinary logic is a logic of retrospection" which leads us 
to believe that each newly created, real moment in time is the realization of a possible 
which preexisted it. When we have the experience of a novel event, we thrust it back into 
the past, imagining that it is the result of a limitation of a (perhaps infinite) number of 
possible events which were to come. The real event is defined as the possible event that 
preexisted it plus some 'reality'. Such a formulation of the problem highlights how 
peculiar is the familiar ontology of the real and the possible. Despite how frequently we 
are caught by surprise by some novel happening, we imagine that if only we had known 
enough about the ' state of affairs' prior to the occurrence of the new event, we would 
then have possessed a knowledge of that event as a possibility which preexisted the real 
event. That is to say, whether we know it or acknowledge it, the possible preexists and 
resembles the real. 
In place ofthe possible/real pair, Bergson proposes the pair virtual/actual. Both 
the virtual and the actual are real. The virtual does not become real as it is actualized; it 
is perfectly real without being actual. Nor does the virtual resemble the actual. The 
relation of virtual to actual is as cause to effect, as (the activity of) production to the 
102 Bergson, "The Possible and the Real," 186. 
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product. 103 The possible has no productive capacity; the real is the limitation of the set of 
possibilities. If the real is produced, it is not produced by the possible, but by an activity 
of negation, the negation of all possibilities but the one which is realised: not-x, not-y, but 
z. The virtual, on the other hand, produces the actual. The actualization of the virtual is a 
movement of production which yields a product (the actual) that does not resemble the 
virtual itself or the process by which it is produced (actualization). Deleuze explains: 
[I]n order to be actualized, the virtual cannot proceed by elimination and 
limitation, but must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts. [ ... ] 
[T]he characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by 
being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of 
differentiation in order to be actualized.104 
Virtuality is revealed to be productive, and to produce by differing with itself, that from 
which it will be different - namely, the actual. But what is this 'virtual'? 
The term, borrowed from Duns Scotus, qualifies the nature of a being's properties. 
That which is virtual has the capacity to produce in some other being a property which it 
does not itself' have' formally. In the glossary to their collection of medieval texts, 
Tweedale and Bosley, drawing from its use in Scotus, offer the following helpful 
definition of virtual existence: 
Some perfection exists in a cause X just in case X does not really (or formally) 
have that perfection but can cause it to exist in other things. For example, God 
does not Himself really have the perfection of corporeality, i.e. God is not 
(formally) a body, but He can cause other things to have bodies, and thus has that 
perfection virtually. This contrasts with having the perfection 'formally,' i.e. as a 
real feature directly inhering in the subject. 105 
103 See Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 
1988), 106: "While actual forms or products can resemble each other, the movements of production do not 
resemble each other, nor do the products resemble the virtuality they embody." 
104 Ibid., 97. 
105 Richard N. Bosley and Martin M. Tweedale, ed., Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1997), 670. See Bosley and Tweedale, 120, for selections from Duns 
Scotus' Ordinatio I. See also Constantin V. Boundas, "Deleuze-Bergson," 87: "A virtual X is something 
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The example chosen for this glossary definition is ~n appropriate one for us, since 
corporeality, or materiality, is the actual, that which is produced in the process of 
actualization. Bergson's claim is that what is is not exhausted by what is material; matter 
is, rather the effect of an efficient causality, a productive process of actualization, that 
points to the "insistence" (by contrast with material "existence") of what is here called 
virtual. 
It is crucial for Bergson that the virtual is not removed from (that is, transcendent 
to) the actual, that it is immanent to the effect. Bergson believes this distinguishes himself 
from Plato, for whom the cause (the Good, or the Ideas) is radically external (or 
transcendent to) the effect. De leuze explains the distinction between Plato and Bergson: 
[O]nly the Good accounts for the difference of the thing and lets us understand it 
in itself, as in the famous example of Socrates seated in his prison. Thus Plato 
needs the Good in his dichotomy as the rule of the choice. There is no intuition in 
Plato, but an inspiration by the Good. [ . . . ] [For Plato, and Bergson in The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion,] What presides over the distribution 
[ decoupage] of things is evidently their function, their end, 106 so much so that at 
this level they seem to receive their difference in itself from the outside. But it is 
precisely for this reason that Bergson both criticises the notion of finality and does 
not stop with the articulations of the real: the thing itself and the corresponding 
end are in fact one and the same thing, envisaged on the one hand as the mixture it 
forms in space, and on the other hand as the difference and simplicity of its pure 
duration. There is no more need to speak of an end: when difference has become 
the thing itself, there is no more need to say that the thing receives its difference 
from its end.107 
which, without being or resembling X, has nonetheless the efficiency (the virtus) of producing X. ( ... ] The 
possible must be realized, and the presence of its realization is subject to two essential rules, resemblance 
and limitation." 
106 See Plato, Theaetetus, 149d-e, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. Francis 
Macdonald Comford, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), 854, where Socrates claims that midwives pride themselves more on selecting genealogical lines 
(matchmaking) than on cutting umbilical cord to release the child from the mother. 
107 Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson' s Conception of Difference," in The New Bergson, ed. John 
Mullarkey (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 52. 
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On this reading, for Plato the thing and its end are split, and the changing thing, the copy, 
cannot be itself without receiving its difference from a Good that is completely external to 
it. The power of difference, of that which makes a thing what it is, is not internal to the 
thing itself. That which explains what is actual is removed absolutely; with Kant, it has 
receded from us to such a degree that what remains for metaphysical speculation is only 
the 'mixture in space.' For Bergson, there is no absolute split between the thing and its 
cause (difference). What appears as a mixture in space, the actual, is the product of a self-
differing by the virtual, what he calls duration. 
Duration, or duree in the French original, 108 is a complex notion. Bergson uses the 
term to refer to an experience that is unrepresentable. The experience is that oftime' s 
flow. All attempts to represent the flow oftime result in the spatialisation oftime, 
according to Bergson. The experience can be analyzed, cut up, but the integrity of the 
whole is lost in such an activity, and duration cannot be reconstituted from the pieces into 
which it was originally analyzed. Movement, too, a notion which is intimately connected 
to the temporal issues, is similarly a whole which cannot be represented. 109 Attempts to 
represent it result in logical paradoxes, the paradigm examples of which are Zeno's. 11 0 
In what sense can it be said that the flow of time is a whole? It is not a closed 
108 Indeed, as duree is the irreducible "stuff' of Being, though a rather novel conception of it, John A. Scott 
may be right to wonder whether in duree the French dur, which is translated into English as "hard," and 
which may suggest an albeit unique sense of substantiality. 
109 See Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, tr. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1946), 15 . 
110 See Milic Capek, Bergson and Modern Physics: A Reinterpretation and Re-evaluation (Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), 338: "Bergson' s view ofZeno's paradoxes was 
consistently held through all his books: the paradoxes arise from the fallacious assumption that motion and 
time are divisible in infinitum, that is, that the only parts of them which are indivisible are geometrical 
points and durationless instants. This assumption is based on the confusion ofthe movement itself with its 
motionless trace in space; it is this motionless trace, not the act of moving (Ia mobilite, le mouvant), which 
is infinitely divisible." 
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whole, or a set, which would be composed of parts. Duration is change, variation. It is not 
homogeneous, but heterogeneous in nature. It is an "open whole" defined by a totality of 
relations that are ceaselessly changing. Deleuze writes, in the course of a discussion of 
Bergson: 
If one had to defme the whole, it would be defined by Relation. Relation is not a 
property of objects, it is always external to its terms. It is also inseparable from the 
open, and displays a spiritual or mental existence. Relations do not belong to 
objects, but to the whole, on condition that this is not confused with a closed set of 
objects. By movement in space, the objects of a set change their respective 
positions. But, through relations, the whole is transformed or changes 
qualitativel('- We can say of duration itself or oftime, that it is the whole of 
relations. 11 
The open whole, which is duration, the virtual, changes qualitatively. What these "terms" 
to which the relations are always external are remains to be seen. The whole displays a 
"spiritual or mental existence." Does this mean that it is illusory, as some epiphenomenal 
experience that is reducible to something that would be physical and not spiritual? 
It is easy enough to imagine that the experience of time is somehow or other a 
psychological illusion, that the flow itself is not real, that there is an ordering of events 
along a ' timeline', and that our descriptions of the real are possible without reference to a 
qualitative experience of flow. Such a theory oftime has been defended by so-called 
'date-theorists' such as Bertrand Russell, and more recently, D. H. Mellor. For them, 
whatever we mean by ' flow of time' is surely illusory, purely psychological - to be 
explained by reference to what is real, i.e. the ordered series of discrete events. 
If we are asking whether "duration" for Bergson is psychological in the same way 
that the flowing present is purely psychological for Russell and Mellor, the answer must 
111 Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-image, JO. 
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be no. For Bergson, the virtual, as we saw, was perfectly real. Duration is not illusion. 
The real does not change for Russell and Mellor. For them, the ordered series of events is 
what is real, and the experience of process or flow is illusory. Duration, on the other hand, 
is the flowing present which drags along its past into a future which is radically not 
already there. Bergson's theory would be called a tense theory oftime - it does not 
attempt to reduce the reality of tenses (past, present, future) to the two-term series of 
events proposed by Mellor and Russell (before and after). 112 
Duration does not flow over an eternal and unchanging series of actual 'events' on 
a timeline, as Russell and Mellor would have it. The actual occurrences in the material 
world do not underlie duration as a real that would ground duration; instead, the material 
is produced by the self-differentiation of duration. A consequence of the derivation of all 
that is from the self-differentiation of duration is that space is not, as for Kant, an a priori 
form, but is itself produced in the differentiation, a posteriori to time - and also to matter 
itself. 113 
De leuze can be called Bergsonian because this ontology of the virtual forms a 
large part of his own philosophy; we shall see in a moment what Deleuze does with 
Bergson's duration. It will be helpful, though, to begin by noting that what makes 
Deleuze's philosophy stand apart from Bergson's, though both offer an account of the 
112 See D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York: Cambridge University Press), 1981. For the 
origins of the distinction between tense- and date-theories of time, see J. Me. Ellis McTaggart, "The 
Unreality of Time," in Philosophical Studies by the late J Me. Ellis McTaggart, ed. S.V. Keating (London : 
E. Arnold & Co., 1934), where the same distinction is discussed through reference to A- and B- series. 
113 
"Space, in effect, is not matter or extension, but the 'schema' of matter, that is, the representation of the 
limit where the movement of expansion (detente) would come to an end as the external envelope of all 
possible extensions. In this sense, it is not matter, it is not extensity, that is in space, but the very opposite" 
(BG, 87). We will return to this interesting move in chapter four. 
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production of novelty, is what we might call the 'weight' of the past. In his Introduction 
to Metaphysics, Bergson writes: 
Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the 
present, the present either containing within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly 
growing image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its continual change of 
quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. 
Without this survival of the past into the present there would be no duration, but 
only instantaneity. 114 
For Bergson, the past is dragged along behind us. While it is true that what is present is 
what is actual, the past is preserved virtually in the present moment. While new presents 
are endlessly created anew, the past bears upon each new present as a "heavier and still 
heavier load." While De leuze agrees with Bergson on the matter of the insistence of the 
past in the creation of novel, actual moments - moments which are created, in some 
sense, 'out of' the past - it is precisely to the idea of the past as burdensome that he 
objects. If in Bergson's philosophy the past serves to ground the passing of the present 
moments (the presents which 'pass' into a pure, virtual past), Deleuze will introduce a 
universal "ungrounding" which shatters the repetition of a pure past in each new present 
moment, freeing, he thinks, an uncompromised production of novelty. 115 
Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, sets out to account for the production of a 
novelty that would free itself from the conditions of its production. He begins by drawing 
Bergson's concepts of duration and multiplicity116 into his own terminology of difference 
114 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. T. E. Hulme (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 40. 
115 See the editor's introduction in Constantin V. Boundas, ed., The Deleuze Reader (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 7: "Bergson's memory/repetition, without the time of the Eternal Return, would 
tend to immobilize past and present and to disempower the intuition of the irreducible multiplicity that, 
nevertheless, animates Bergson's texts. Isn't Plato's recollection, after all, a sufficient warning against 
putting our trust in mnemosyne and letting it chase after the shadow of the one." 
116 
"It seems to us that Duration essentially defmes a virtual multiplicity (what differs in nature). Memory 
then appears as the coexistence of all the degrees of difference in this multiplicity, in this virtuality. The 
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and repetition. The self-differentiating activity of duration becomes in Deleuze's 
philosophy the complex notion of different/ciation- a term which joins the two processes 
of differentiation and differenciation. Deleuze writes: 
The greatest importance must be attached to the 'distinctive feature' tic as the 
symbol of Difference: differentiate and differenciate. The totality of the system 
must be expressed in the complex notion of '(indi)-different/ciation'. It is as 
though everything has two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar 'halves', the two 
halves of the Symbol, each dividing itself in two: an ideal half submerged in the 
virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential relations and on the other 
by corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted on the one hand by the 
qualities actualising those relations and on the other by parts actualising those 
singularities. Individuation ensures the embedding of the two dissimilar halves. 
[ ... ] [S]omething which exists only in the Idea may be completely determined 
(differentiated) and yet lack those determinations which constitute actual 
existence (it is undifferenciated, not yet even individuated). 117 
We should understand these as two distinct processes that do not resemble each other. 
Differenciation does not 'take place' in the actual world so much as it results in the actual 
world. 118 That is to say, differenciation is the actualisation of the virtual, a single process 
in which the virtual differs from itself. Differentiation is the reconfiguration of the 
singular points that make up the virtual. This process, which has to do solely with 
relations between virtual "terms" or "elements", is the process by which the virtual whole 
changes. Boundas explains: 
elan vital, finally, designates the actualization of this virtual according to the lines of differentiation that 
correspond to the degrees - up to this precise line of man where the Elan Vital gains self-consciousness" 
(BG, 112-3). 
117 DR, 280. 
118 See Salanskis, "Idea and Destination," in Deleuze: A Critical Reader ed. Paul 
Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 61 , where Salanskis thus slightly misunderstands things: "There is an 
'ideal genesis' called differentiation, on which is modeled a differenciation in the register of the actual. On 
the side of the ideal, the problem is determined, its own singular points precipitated, and the parts with their 
distinctions which will constitute the actual are deduced from this problematic distribution of an ideal 
polarization in the virtual. Differenciation occurs in the actual space of solutions." 
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Far from being the entire notion of difference, differenciation is about the 
production of entities which can find their reason for their production in the Idea-
structure. Left to its own resources, the process/production of entities will permit 
only the discernment of nuances or differences in degree, in which case the notion 
of difference will be left subordinate to the concept of identity. Different/ciation 
expresses simultaneously the compossibility of the 'elements' inside the virtual 
and the divergence of the series in which the virtual is actualized. It is as if the 
virtualities exist in such a way that they actualize themselves in splitting up and 
being divided. 119 
Here we see the virtual grounding the actual, the virtual as the "reason for" the production 
of actual entities. The virtual here is given yet another name: the Idea-structure, 120 which 
is but the configuration of virtual elements, a configuration that differentiates itself. 
This Idea-structure is Deleuzo-Bergsonian "multiplicity", which is not to be 
confused with the many of the Ancient atomists whose Atoms are self-identical, actual, 
material. To call it a structure suggests it is a stable and self-same set of parts; but this 
world of singularities is the world of pure becoming, of simulacra, and the term 
multiplicity is misleading because, like the term "relation," it does not suggest activity. As 
Boundas rightly explains, however, it is crucial that some sort of activity be heard in the 
term "multiplicity": 
Neither 'multiplicity' nor ' the multiple' convey precisely the sense that Deleuze-
Bergson wishes to convey. One needs a noun like ' the multiplier' or a gerund like 
'the multiplying' as a qualifier of multiplicity in order to capture the sense that 
Deleuze assigns to different/ciation.121 
Deleuze never tires of naming and renaming his principles, and the consequence can be 
confusion. Different/ciation is a name for Difference, and also a name for multiplicity. 
119 Boundas, "Deleuze-Bergson," 91 . 
120 De leuze' s term "Idea-structure", from DR, stands for the configuration of a particular multiplicity. 
"Ideas are not concepts; they are a form of eternally positive differential multiplicity, distinguished from the 
identity of concepts" (DR, 288). 
121 Boundas, "Deleuze-Bergson," 83. 
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The Idea-structure is purely virtual, and it is reconfigured through the activity of 
differentiation; but this activity never takes place without the simultaneous activity of 
differenciation which produces a line of becoming, the actualization of these virtual Idea-
structures, the splitting of the virtual. It would seem that the actual, the product of this 
differenciation, has no potency whatever here, and indeed one wonders whether this 
might be an appropriate characterization of Bergson's philosophy. As we shall see, 
though, it is at this point that Deleuze breaks from his Bergsonism and develops his 
theory of the counter-actualization of the event. 122 
The production of these repeating presents in the material world is accomplished 
by the differenciation; this activity is that by which the material world is given. But when 
we say that this activity results in the material world, we mean that it is endlessly creating 
the material, the actual, which, of course, is the domain of the present. The activity of 
differenciation links the virtual to the actual, however. The problem for Deleuze and 
Bergson is to account for the creation of present moments, given that they are produced 
'out of a virtual which is not itself 'in the present'. Deleuze invokes the category of the 
pure past to explain the passing of the present: the present which passes must pass 'into ' 
something. It does not pass into a 'present moment that was,' but into the whole past, the 
past which coexists with the present - with the passing present. This is the virtual, the 
pure past - which according to Deleuze is of purely "ontological significance". He writes: 
[T]he present is not; rather it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but 
it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or the useful. The past, on the 
other hand, has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless 
122 My thanks to Peter Trnka for his help in clearing up a confusion on my part regarding the status of 
counter-actualization in Deleuze's thought. 
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and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is identical with 
b . . . lf 123 emg m 1tse . 
De leuze distinguishes, here, two 'times': the time of the present and the time of the past. 
The series of actual present instants forms just one series of time, and the repetition which 
draws together these presents is described as a "bare repetition". A second synthesis of 
time is the synthesis of the pure past, which De leuze calls the "clothed" repetition. Each 
of these repetitions has a unique relationship to difference. Difference, different/ciation, is 
"between" these two repetitions. Difference is not located in the first series of present 
moments, the bare repetition, obviously a repetition of the same; all differences in the 
actual, material world are subordinated to identity, for reasons we saw in chapter two. 
Difference-in-itself produces the actual, and it is insofar as it "draws off' a virtual 
difference that the material world is constituted, but difference is not located in the 
material world. 
The second repetition, the clothed repetition, the repetition of the pure past, 
"includes" difference. This pure past, as we saw, is "identical with being in itself', and 
somehow difference is trapped between this repetition and the repetition of the material 
world. We might say that, for Deleuze, Difference relates Being to Becoming, or in other 
words, there is a difference between being and becoming. Since the pure past is not 
constituted as present instants are constituted, but grounds the passing of these present 
instants, it is a priori to the production of new presents. Whatever difference there is 
seems indeed to be rolled up in this past, such that we wonder where novelty has gone. 
Because the passing of presents is grounded in the past, difference is ' included' in a past 
123 BG, 55. 
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that contains whatever differences are to be produced. It is here that Deleuze must break 
with Bergson. 
Instead of a drawn-off difference (in the series of presents) or a difference 
included in a pure past, De leuze proposes a third synthesis of time, a third repetition, that 
would be nothing other than the repetition of difference, the return of the different: 
difference is not included in this repetition, but difference repeats. As Deleuze says, 
"Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only 
identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which 
belongs to the different or turns around the different."124 And again: 
We see, then, that in this final synthesis of time, the present and [past] are in tum 
no more than dimensions of the future : the past as condition, the present as agent. 
The first synthesis, that of habit, constituted time as a living present by means of a 
passive foundation on which past and future depended. The second synthesis, that 
of memory, constituted time as a pure past, from the point of view of a ground 
which causes the passing of one present and the arrival of another. In the third 
synthesis, however, the present is no more than an actor, an author, an agent, 
destined to be effaced; while the past is no more than a condition operating by 
default. The synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once both 
the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its 
production, and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor. 125 
Ultimately, it is this third repetition that ensures the return of difference and the 
communication of the many differences that are joined at the level of the virtual. 126 The 
pure past is able to ensure only the coexistence of the various levels of the past. 
Differences of degree coexist here, are held together by the pure past, included in it. But 
124 DR, 41. 
125 Ibid., 94. 
126 See Robert Piercey, "The Spinoza-intoxicated man: Deleuze on expression," in Man and World, v. 29, 
no. 3 (July 1996), 272: "The Event corresponds to the 'good' or 'secret' repetition; the material world 
corresponds to the 'bad' repetition, or the repetition of the same; and the field of events corresponds to the 
difference lying between the two repetitions." Does Piercey forget that there are three repetitions? On our 
reading, the Event, as we shall see, is properly the third repetition; there is a 'clothed' repetition at the level 
of the field of events, and it seems that Piercey may forget this. 
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the third repetition is the return of the different. It is what ensures the continual 
production of the novel that renders the repetition of a pure past a mere condition of the 
production of the new; and it destroys the agent through which the new is realized, the 
agent of metamorphosis, that through which the creation of a new product is made 
possible. It is in this repetition that all differences communicate. That is, it is this 
repetition that enables Deleuze to bring together the two distinct processes of 
different/ciation as one active, dynamic principle, Difference, which by its nature returns 
(returns the different). 
3.2 Activity of Different/dation 
This principle of different/ciation- a creative activity of some kind operating in, 
and immanent to, the universe it is responsible for producing - is a very complex notion 
indeed. What sort of activity is it? Philip Goodchild, who laments Deleuze's ' strange 
materialism', claims that "Deleuze himself subscribes to a 'quiescent atheism' in which 
all questions and problems concerning God must be removed or forgotten before 
philosophical thought can begin."127 It is true that Deleuze is hostile toward a morality 
grounded in a transcendent world or Being, and that one of his objectives is to free 
philosophy from theological tendencies. But Goodchild, who is certainly right to find in 
Deleuze nothing similar to an Augustinian Christian God, might pursue the issue of God 
in Deleuze with more success than he thinks. Deleuze seems to agree with Nietzsche on 
the matter of the death of God. But which God has died? He notes that "It is Feuerbach 
who is the last thinker of the death of God: he shows that since God has never been 
127 Philip Goodchild, "A Theological Passion for Deleuze," in Theology 99 (1996), 357. 
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anything but the unfold of man, man must fold and refold God."128 To say that God is 
nothing but the "unfold of man" is, it seems, to profess atheism. God is the product, 
unconscious or not, of man, and thus the degree of 'reality' we would attribute to Him is 
considerably less than what Goodchild would require in order to have his theological 
passion for Deleuze satisfied. 
And yet the fold has a particularly interesting status in Deleuze's philosophy. 
Jean-Luc Nancy says the fold, for Deleuze, is in a sense Being itself. 129 Alain Badiou 
believes the fold is the key concept for Deleuze's thought, and uses it to make his case 
against Deleuze - that despite the latter's attempts to produce a philosophy that accounts 
for the novel, the different, Deleuze fails to do so precisely because the new can never be 
anything but a perpetually folding and unfolding One: 
It can be said that there is nothing new under the sun because everything that 
happens is only an inflection of the One, the eternal return of the Same. It can 
equally be said that everything is constantly new because it is only through the 
perpetual creation of its own folds that the One, in its absolute contingency, can 
indefinitely return. 130 
And we find in Deleuze's texts confirmation for Badiou's claims where Deleuze writes 
that "The One remains involved in what expresses it, imprinted in what unfolds it, 
immanent in whatever manifests it: expression is in this respect an involvement."131 And, 
128 De leuze, The De leuze Reader, 100. 
129 Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Deleuzian Fold of Thought," in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 112. The claim is a problematic one, since only the pure past is 
what really is, and the pure past is not itself the activity of different/ciation. We might say that being 
belongs to the fold. 
130 Badiou, Clamor, 97. 
131 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, tr. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 
1990), 16. 
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rather poetically, Deleuze asks, "[E]ven if the production of difference is by definition 
'inexplicable,' how can we avoid implicating the inexplicable at the heart ofthought?"132 
Here we have to note Deleuze's careful use of terminology: the French verb for ' to fold ' 
is plier, from which we get a series of terms including "inexplicable", that which cannot 
be unfolded, and "implicating," or enfolding. In Deleuze's philosophy, the activity of 
different/ciation, the folding of the One cannot be completely unfolded to the point, 
explicated. That which produces difference is inexplicable. It is no wonder, then, that 
Deleuze speaks directly about different/ciation so rarely and renames it constantly. The 
Fold is but one name for that activity. 
Should we so quickly suppose that this activity is an immanent Deleuzian God? 
There are plenty of reasons to suppose so: he names Whitehead's Process and Reality as 
"one of the greatest books of modem philosophy,"133 a book in which Whitehead 
proposes a notion of God as process; Bergson's philosophy culminates in the Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion, in which process is divine; and Deleuze draws 
considerably from Spinoza and Leibniz, two philosophers for whom theology and 
philosophy are not unrelated. Deleuze's comments on Leibniz' s God give us reason to 
think that Deleuze is indeed talking about God when he speaks of different/ciation: 
[ ... ] God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest 
compossible. He becomes Process, a process that at once affirms 
incompossibilities and passes through them. The play of the world has changed in 
a unique way, because now it has become the play that diverges. 134 
132 DR 227 
133 Ibid., 284-5 . A full account of Deleuze and process philosophy would have to include, also, considerable 
attention to Whitehead. 
134 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, tr. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993 ), 81. 
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The key point is the divergence which is produced by this divine process, which is 
nothing other than an energy capable of producing disjunctions, divergences. 135 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze discusses directly the question of the 
'identity' of the differentlciation: how can we name it at all, even ifwe do need to reject 
these names and create new ones, except if it has some sort of (fleeting) identity. Deleuze 
writes: 
There is no doubt that there is an identity belonging to the [dark] precursor, and a 
resemblance between the series which it causes to communicate. This 'there is' , 
however, remains perfectly indeterminate. Are identity and resemblance here the 
preconditions of the functioning of this dark precursor, or are they, on the 
contrary, its effects?136 
There is137 an identity: the precursor itself, or difference, is not self-identical; on the 
contrary, it is in a perpetual state of differing from itself. But identity belongs to it; that is, 
it has identity, and is not itself possessed by identity. This is crucial to Deleuze, for whom 
Difference must not be subordinated to identity. That there is identity is never in doubt. 
But this is not the identity of a transcendent and self-same God. Deleuze writes: 
Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only 
identity, but identity as a secondary power, the identity of difference, the identical 
which belongs to the different or turns around the different. Such an identity, 
produced by difference, is determined as 'repetition'. Repetition in the eternal 
return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different. 138 
135 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Volume I, tr. Helen 
R. Lane and Robert Hurley (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 13: "[T]he sole thing that is divine is the 
nature of an energy of disjunctions." 
136 DR, 119. 
137 We are reminded ofHeidegger's late essay On Time and Being, in which he writes ofthe Es gibt, the " It 
gives," or "There gives," or "There is," as it can be translated. See Heidegger, On Time and Being. Neither 
Deleuze nor Heidegger conceives of the ultimate principle as a selfsame God. 
138 DR, 41. Note, too, Plato at Rep, Bk. VII 518c-d: "But our present argument indicates, said I, that the true 
analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of 
an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so 
this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, 
like the scene-shifting periactus in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence 
and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good, do we not?" 
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We now see how difference-in-itself is repetition-for-itself, as Deleuze claims. Returning 
is the returning of the different; repetition has no in-itself, but belongs to the different. 
This third repetition is the power of Difference to return. De leuze writes of a difference 
"between" two repetitions, the bare and the clothed repetitions, the simple material 
repetition and the repetition of the whole of the pure past, contracted together, in each 
passing material present. Difference is trapped between these two. It is the third 
repetition, or the Eternal Return of the Different, that loosens difference from these two 
repetitions that use difference (draw off difference) or include it (in the repetition of an 
unchanging pure past). 139 
The complexity of the metaphysics of difference is a consequence of what 
difference is. Difference is what is, but since what is must be different, difference is not 
only Being - but also Becoming. Difference is not phenomenon, but the "noumenon 
closest to the phenomenon" for Deleuze. The phenomenal world, the actual, material 
world, is the product of an actualization of the virtual. 
The difference afforded by Deleuzian "multiplicity" is not different enough for 
Badiou, who finds in Deleuze yet another variation on a philosophy ofthe One. And yet it 
seems that Badiou and the more sympathetic commentator Boundas, from opposite sides, 
share a reading ofDeleuze's philosophy of Difference - as though the ' object' (to speak 
loosely) were not in doubt. And Deleuze makes an especially interesting case for our 
139 
"If we consider all three serial kinds - the connective synthesis on a single series, the conjunctive 
synthesis of convergence, and the disjunctive synthesis of resonance, we see that the third proves to be the 
truth and the destination of the others, to the degree that the disjunction attains its positive and affirmative 
use. The conjunction of zones makes visible therefore the divergence already present in the series which it 
coordinated globally, and the connection of a zone makes visible the wealth of details already contained in 
the series which it apparently harmonizes" (LS, 229). 
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study of how such philosophical systems (objects) belong to agents who engage with 
them. He endlessly opposes mere representation and advocates, rather, a more engaged 140 
philosophy, where "encounters" are sought. This, he thinks, is where history of 
philosophy becomes constructive and productive, where we do not ask what texts mean 
but how they work. 
To adopt Deleuze's program for reading is already to be Deleuzian; we are asked 
to evaluate the texts, to engage with them, as Deleuze himself does. 141 Ian Buchanan 
suggests that this is prerequisite to a proper reading of De leuze. It is as though one's 
freedom as a reader is compromised from the outset, or even before, such that it is 
impossible to choose to be Deleuzian. The text claims its reader; one does not choose a 
text, but is chosen by it. That this compromises a certain notion of freedom, the freedom 
to select among 'possibles,' is already obvious; and indeed, as we shall see, Deleuze 
concedes this notion of freedom, defending rather a notion similar to that we find in the 
Stoics. 
The religious overtones of this account of philosophy are not accidental. While 
Deleuze writes with disdain for the transcendent, and for a certain theological brand of 
philosophizing, and while he is undeniably Nietzschean in many senses, we cannot ignore 
that he declares himself a Spinozist, and that he borrows greatly from the thought of 
140 Deleuze claims to forget everything he learns, claims to learn only in relation to a project, claims not to 
be encyclopedic, and to find something to be feared in those who are, such as Umberto Eco, for whom 
Deleuze claims to have deep respect. See "C, as in Culture," in L 'Abecedaire. 
141 We should be wary of this "as", since it indicates an imitation of Deleuze' s activity; oceanic differences 
always rumble beneath the appearance of imitation, according to De leuze. Plato, too, is preoccupied with 
the importance of engaging with a text in the Phaedrus, where the reception of Lysias' discourse is at stake. 
See also Plato, Protagoras, 342b-347b, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. 
W.K.C. Guthrie, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 
335-40. 
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Bergson. For Bergson and Spinoza, God's nature is at stake, and they each offer accounts 
of this nature which are at odds with much of their respective theological traditions. 142 lt 
thus remains an open question for us whether it is to speak metaphorically to say that our 
souls are at stake when we engage with Deleuze's texts. 143 Have we already been called? 
Must we be Deleuzian, or can we resist the force of the pull toward his philosophical 
system? It may turn out that what is at stake in this philosophy is the nature of resistance; 
the horizon for us, then, is political. 
We wonder whether it is possible not yet to be Deleuzian. At least it is possible 
not yet to know one is Deleuzian. We begin our investigations, which may reveal who we 
are, or which may result in who we are, by pursuing the tension we find between the 
claims made by Badiou and Boundas and the claims we find in the passage with which 
we began this chapter. 
3.3 Event 
Deleuze, we must remember, defined his project in relation to Platonism. For 
Plato, on Deleuze's reading, there are gradations of Being, or degrees of participation in 
those perfect Forms, or in the Good; metaphysics and morality are inseparable. Forms are 
defined as "Good". Simulacra, in the world of Becoming, are judged to be more or less 
good to the degree that they participate in the Forms of which they are copies. Indeed, in 
Deleuze's terminology, the simulacrum, which is a bad copy or an instance of becoming 
142 It is not difficult to multiply examples of thinkers who rethink God's nature, without abandoning the 
idea entirely. Whitehead is a good example; Deleuze calls Process and Reality one of the great books of 
modern philosophy. Both Whitehead and Deleuze are Leibnizian, too. And Deleuze draws considerably 
from Duns Scotus. What Deleuze abhors is transcendence and the moralizing that is grounded in it. 
143 At Protagoras, 312c, Socrates warns Hippocrates of the dangers of entrusting one's soul to another (in 
this case to Protagoras). 
67 
that eludes the action of the Idea, is judged to be evil by Plato, who seeks to eliminate it. 
But we sense a tension in Deleuze, especially when he begins to speak in terms of 
noumenon and phenomenon, terms from a Kantian, not a Platonic, Idealism. Deleuze 
thinks of Kant as an enemy, of course, since Kant posits a transcendent reality in which is 
judgment is rooted. But Deleuze's own philosophy, which he calls a "transcendental 
empiricism" or an "empiricism of the Idea," certainly draws considerably from Kant. We 
cannot help but wonder whether there isn't in Deleuze's separation of ontological levels a 
corresponding difference in value144, when so much happens at the level of difference and 
becoming (the virtual level), leaving the material world to be the realm of "bare 
repetition", a product which has no potency of its own. What prevents this philosophy 
from being another example of the devaluation of the actual in relation to some other 
level of Being? 
We might begin by reminding ourselves, firstly, that there is no absolute division 
between registers, such that over here or behind everything we find the virtual. The actual 
is really only one face or one mask of Difference - a face or mask that is not banished 
from Difference. The lines of becoming or differenciation are not destructive lines of 
rejection, but lines of production. There is no judgment here that the actual is bad in any 
144 The concern appears in feminist writings about Deleuze, and about Deleuze and Guattari. See Nicole 
Shukin, "Deleuze and Feminisms: Involuntary Regulators and Affective Inhibitors," in Deleuze and 
Feminist Theory, ed. Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 
150: "For Deleuze and Guattari, doing is seldom connected with voluntary effort, since a body is defined in 
terms of its virtuality rather than its actuality. So the accumulated labour, the uncounted, unpaid body hours 
of women, insofar as they have sedimented a majoritarian history and reinforced domesticity, are 
inconsequential compared with the pure possibility that idles within a girl. [ ... ]De leuze may incline too far 
towards the involuntary, neglecting nuances of actual woman for the sake of a feminine infinitely in 
potentia, but it would certainly be no better to place excessive weight on the actual and foreclose what is 
possible for women. Somehow a balance must be struck." The concern that action, and the actual generally, 
do not matter for Deleuze is unfounded. It seems, on the contrary, that he is very much concerned with the 
nature of action, indeed. 
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sense. It is not even the case that all "becoming" flows in one direction, from the virtual 
to the actual. Deleuze writes of"counter-actualization", a process intimately connected to 
his theory of the event. 
The term ' event' is common enough. Earlier in this chapter, we noted its use by 
such thinkers as Russell and Mellor, whose conception of the event could hardly be called 
"spiritual" or "mental." But the term "event" appears in such various contexts, 
philosophical and otherwise, that we risk misunderstanding Deleuze's very specific use of 
the term. He warns us against thinking, for instance, that the media deal in events: 
I don't think the media have much capacity or inclination to grasp an event. In the 
first place, they often show a beginning or an end, whereas even a short or 
instantaneous event is something going on. And then, they want something 
spectacular, whereas events always involve periods when nothing happens. 145 
An event has some relation to the temporal series of passing present moments, but it is 
not limited by this series, such that we could say that at timet event 'x ' begins or ends. 
The event stretches beyond the discrete moments of time, seems to ride along atop the 
actions of material bodies that exist in the present. Deleuze distinguishes the field of 
events from the field of actions: 
In an airplane hijacking, the threat of a hijacker brandishing a revolver is 
obviously an action; so is the execution of the hostages, if it occurs. But the 
transformation of the passengers into hostages, and of the plane-body into a 
prison-body, is an instantaneous incorporeal transformation, a 'mass media act' in 
the sense in which the English speak of speech acts. 146 
Here it becomes obvious that the event is not itself some series of states of affairs whose 
beginning and end we might mark. The event, Deleuze says, is preserved eternally; it 
145 Deleuze, Negotiations, 159-60. 
146 TP, 81. 
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does not disappear with the passing of the present. 147 It challenges good sense, which is 
always, for Deleuze, the sense of direction (the vector from the present toward the future), 
and which has to do only with the time of bodies and action. 
Is Deleuze drawing extraordinary conclusions from something rather simple? 
Indeed, a plane can become a prison, if certain actions occur, but what ontological status 
should we grant to the new description of the body in which certain actions occur? That 
is, does something new come into being with the very description of what is? Indeed, that 
is a possible avenue, though it might only shift the problem rather than resolve it. What, 
after all, is an action? We can admit the appearance of certain motions of bodies in space, 
but what constitutes an act? Where one brandishes a revolver (or threatens to), whether it 
is loaded, whether one is in a public building: conditions like these, each of which 
presupposes a description filled with its own presuppositions, give us cause to doubt that 
we can trust in the motions of material bodies; it does seem as though something is 
involved in the situation that is incorporeal though real. Paul Patton shows that this 
Deleuzian theory of events has a counterpart in the Anglo-American philosophical 
tradition: 
Anscombe argues that because actions involve intentions and because having an 
intention presupposes some description of what it is one intends to do, it follows 
that the same spatio-temporal occurrence may correspond to a series of actions: 
moving a lever up and down, pumping water, poisoning a well and so on. Human 
actions can be identified as actions of a particular kind only by taking descriptions 
into account. This thesis about the dependence of actions upon descriptions 
implies that the nature of actions is not exhausted by any particular description or 
set of descriptions.[ . .. ] In Anscombe' s view, since the same spatio-temporal 
147 
"[T]he living present [ . . . ] happens and brings about the event. But the event nonetheless retains an 
eternal truth upon the line of the Aion, which divides it eternally into a proximate past and an imminent 
future" (LS, 63 ). 
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occurrence may constitute more than one action and therefore be described in a 
variety of ways, it follows that the nature of actions is essentially indeterminate. 
For Deleuze, there is a similar indeterminacy associated with the event proper or 
pure event, since this is not reducible to the manner in which it is incarnated in 
particular states of affairs.148 
Intention helps to determine the nature of an action, here. Actions are understood as being 
motivated by intent - or in certain cases as being unconscious- but in every question 
regarding an action, the issue of intent must be raised. Does the plane become a prison 
body if the gun is not loaded? Or ifthe person brandishing it is mentally incompetent and 
unaware what he is doing? If the passengers are determined to act as though the whole 
field of relations has changed, something has indeed passed in the complex field of 
spatio-temporal motions, ideas, emotions, perceptions (conscious and unconscious), and 
the event emerges. If there is no counter-actualization of this event, if the passengers, for 
instance, do not recognize the new set of relations issued in by the act that has taken 
place, it might still be the case that the plane has become a prison (so long as the name 
'prisoners' can belong to individuals unconscious of their circumstances). To react to the 
event, to counter-actualize it, is to begin to own the event for oneself. It is to recognize 
that the event has taken place (unconsciously, in part, since events are constituted in part 
by unconscious perceptions and dispositions), that one belongs to the event unless one 
can act in accordance with the new field of relations and thereby come to own what has 
happened, to own up to what has happened to one. The passenger who does not get the 
sense of the situation, who does not recognize that the plane has been transformed into a 
prison, might casually stand up and head for the bathroom, only to become a victim. We 
148 Paul Patton, "Redescriptive Philosophy: Deleuze and Guattari 's Critical Pragmatism," in Microp olitics 
of Media Culture (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 200 I), 35-6. 
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get some sense of the complexity of the situation, however, when we appreciate that a 
courageous act in such a situation might be to test the event by behaving as though it 
hadn't taken place. In that case the casual passenger's intention constitutes his action in 
part - and action that already begins to issue in yet another event, perhaps even a 
reformation of the plane-body from the prison-body - and determining the nature of his 
act (nai've? Or perhaps sly?) might require yet another attempt to grasp the event and to 
counter-actualize, this time on the part of the person holding the gun. 
We might draw conclusions to which Patton does not appeal. He chooses to 
emphasize the "indeterminacy" of actions and events; what we must note is the presence 
of language -or better, the presence of the material in language, which is to say that no 
action takes place outside language. Naming is the issue here- and not a reckless, 
irresponsible naming. 149 Anscombe's point is not to defend the indeterminacy of actions. 
The action does not depend upon the description, as though any description of a spatio-
temporal occurrence is the description of an action, where one is no better than the next. 
The description bears some relation to the occurrence, and the action sits somewhere 
between matter and language. Descriptions can be bad for Plato, Aristotle, and G. E. M. 
Anscombe. This does not mean that the descriptions ineffectively represent the spatio-
temporal occurrence. It may mean that they do not provide a place for the recognition of 
the action that integrates a series of spatia-temporal occurrences. 150 
149 On the gravity of the act of naming, consider Paolo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra 
Bergman Ramos (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970), 76: "To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to 
change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a 
new naming. Men are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection." 
150 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, tr. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Bk.II, Ch. 19. 
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Getting the description right, which requires both naming and a capacity to hear 
when something about the account of the situation sounds slightly out of tune, is the 
central problem for every agent in the above example. Naming is an attempt to orient 
oneself in relation to what has happened. One 'names' the situation, categorizes it, 
accuses it of being 'x.' If the event somehow responds to the name that it has given- if 
the infinite set of details, the particulars, are somehow harmonized, integrated, understood 
as belonging together under the name we have given it, one can then begin to act in 
relation to the event, and thereby to own it, rather than to be bullied by it. In the case in 
question, once one has apprehended that it the plane is a prison body, a whole set of 
actions becomes available - of which it is possible some might be able to thrust back 
through the virtual a shock wave capable of resetting the variables and beginning a new 
event, even a reformation of the plane body from the prison body (as would be achieved 
were the gun to be seized from the hand of the hijacker). The implication is that a failure 
to apprehend the event leaves us in danger of being destroyed by our inability to act 
within the complex set of relations that to a large extent determines us. Often, this leaves 
us unable to act at all. 151 
Naming is important for Deleuze, but commentators, like Buchanan, feel uneasy 
discussing such things, reminding themselves that Deleuze and Guattari want them to ask 
not what books mean but how they work. Any talk of right names or good names sets off 
alarms, and for good reason: Deleuze is certainly not interested in representing the real in 
names. (Perhaps, though, as we've suggested, Plato is not interested in this either.) What 
151 It is interesting to note this example of De leuze's regarding the event - an event which by its nature 
probably interrupts the possibility of communication between passengers, and thus leaves the passenger to 
apprehend for him/herself, in solitude one might say, the nature of what has happened. 
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was the cause of De leuze's distaste for philosophical conferences and the 'discussion' 
which takes place at symposia? It was not a radical skepticism, a firm belief that nothing 
valuable could be said anywhere. After all, he wrote voluminously, taught, and engaged 
in interviews on occasion. Naming, for Deleuze, is not necessarily, however, an activity 
to be shared by philosophers. It can be, perhaps, if a world is created in which two 
thinkers are joined together, as he and Guattari came to be. The thinker is essentially 
solitary for Deleuze, but this is a novel solitude - a solitude which is the solitude of a 
discrete world, not of a subject. Deleuze has no aversion to talking with and forming a 
block of becoming with another human being; he does this with Claire Parnet in 
Dialogues, and he does this with Guattari several times. But while all worlds do 
communicate152 in the One, in the third Repetition, in the Event - all ofthese terms name 
that which enables the communication of disparate series - this is a molecular 
communication, a community of singularities, not a community of subjects. The whole 
remains open for Deleuze, which means that a true pluralism is possible. 
We have not yet sorted out what Deleuze believes the thinker does, though it has a 
relation to events and to naming. In the next chapter, we pursue this theme of the atomism 
of worlds. The thinker produces concepts that have a relation to sense and to the event. It 
is through the counter-actualization of events, that is, through the production of sense, 
that an actor can become worthy of what happens to him. 
152 
"What brings destiny about at the level of events, what brings about an event to repeat another in spite of 
all its difference, what makes it possible that a life is composed of one and the same Event, despite the 
variety of what might happen, that it be traversed by a single and same fissure, that it play one and the same 
air over all possible tunes and all possible worlds - all these are not due to relations between cause and 
effect; it is rather an aggregate of noncausal correspondences which form a system of echoes, of 
resumptions and resonances, a system of signs - in short, an expressive quasi-causality, and not at all a 
necessitating causality" (LS, 170). 
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Chapter Four: Deleuze and the Void 
"[H]ow far can we unfold the line without falling into a breathless void, into death, and 
how can we fold it, but without losing touch with it, to produce an inside co present with 
the outside, corresponding to the outside? It's a matter of 'practices. "'153 
" 'Where ' is the battle? "154 
- Deleuze 
4.1 Void and Time 
Though concerns have been raised, for instance by Alain Badiou, regarding 
Deleuze's monism, Deleuze has married his thought to that of the Ancient Atomists and 
indeed has a great deal to say about the nature of plurality. In this chapter we will show 
how Deleuze handles the concept of 'void' with care, and with extraordinary results. We 
wonder whether Deleuze' s philosophy is best characterized as a philosophy of time, as 
suggested by the Bergsonian influences we explored in the last chapter, or as a 
philosophy of place. It is true that at the metaphysical and physical level, Deleuze devotes 
a great deal of attention to both. Perhaps the balance will be tipped by considering his 
philosophy at the political and/or ethical level. Does Deleuze really understand place as 
well as he does time? 
That the void should become so important in this philosophy is remarkable, given 
Deleuze's assault on the Negative. Another objective in this chapter is to show just how 
hard De leuze works to rid his philosophy of the plague of negativity; and how it forces 
him to rethink the nature of need, desire, lack, evaluation, comparison. The last section of 
153 Deleuze, Negotiations, 113. 
154 LS, 101 
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this chapter explores the consequences of this fundamental rethinking of key 
philosophical issues, and becomes the subject of the last section of this chapter. 
Robert Piercey characterizes the ontological "fields" in Deleuze's philosophy in 
his essay titled suggestively, "Deleuze: The Spinoza-Intoxicated Man," as such: "[W]e 
have a tripartite division of ontological fields: the Event; events, or ideal states of 
difference which 'communicate' in the Event; and the world of material objects, which is 
the 'spatiotemporal realization. "'155 The choice of terms is appropriate: there are three 
ontological .fields, though we must take care not to think that such a distinction means that 
there are three separate worlds, as though the field of ideal states of difference were 
'outside' the field of material objects. Deleuze's reflections on the nature of place begin 
to become very interesting at this point. 
The material world, or the world of simple presence, is the site of extension, 
where space originates, a posteriori to the extended beings. The first plane is, 
nonetheless, the plane of space. 
The second field, the field of events or ideal states of difference, is a field of non-
being, though, as De leuze says, not of negativity: 
We have seen that Ideas are genuine objectivities, made up of differential 
elements and relations and provided with a specific mode- namely, the 
'problematic' . Problems thus defined do not designate any ignorance on the part 
of a thinking subject, any more than they express a conflict, but rather objectively 
characterise the nature of Ideas as such. There is indeed, therefore, a me on, which 
must not be confused with the ouk on, and which means the being of the 
problematic and not the being of the negative.156 
Thus, the second field is the field of the problematic, of (non)-Being as Deleuze writes it, 
155 Piercey, 272. 
156 DR, 267 
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meaning to indicate that this is a field of potency, not of radical negativity or empty 
nothingness, but which gives rise to the sensible, to material being at the spatiotemporal 
level. This, as we saw, is the nature of the virtual field. This is not a field of absolute not-
Being, where that would be characterized by an inert character. This is the field of 
problematic being, of a potency which is not actual, but which will yield the actual. 
Difference is "intensive" as opposed to extensive. As Deleuze writes, "Intensity is not the 
sensible but the being ofthe sensible."157 This field of intensity is problematic insofar as 
its effects are beings, and thus deserves to be called the being if this term means cause. 
That is why, above, Deleuze brackets the "non", since there is a positive, potentiality to 
this virtuality, which is yet not actual, which recedes from actuality even in producing it. 
This character justifies the decision to give this problematic level a pair of names: non-
Being and Being- or, together, "(non)-Being."158 
What appears to us as 'place' is only extension, and this has, for that reason 
perhaps, gradually 'replaced' the richer notions of place that we find in Plato and 
Aristotle, for instance. Deleuze is careful not to make extended space a priori; in fact, he 
claims that space is a posteriori to the material beings that we declare to be ' in space'. 
Space, rather, is in these bodies. 
157 Ibid., 267. 
158 In the passage above, Deleuze calls that second field the field of the me on, which must not be confused 
with the ouk on. Is there in Deleuze's philosophy room for a third ontological field, a field that would be the 
ouk on? The field of the Event? That in which all being communicates would then be radical not-Being, or 
void.See Liddell, et. al., 1266, where the authors deal with the usage of those operators from which to me 
on and to ouk on are derived, and offer the following: "ou, the negative of fact and statement, as me of will 
and thought; ou denies, me rejects; ou is absolute, me relative; ou objective, me subjective, - the same 
differences hold for all compds. of ou and me." It must be remembered that Deleuze always has in mind 
Hegel as an opponent, and that there is a resistance to a philosophy preoccupied with the being of the 
negative rather than of the problematic, but in his argument against the subordination of difference to the 
negative as it is pushed to its limit, which forms the core of DR, Deleuze nowhere advocates abandoning the 
question of the being of the negative. 
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But because space is derived from the actual, and the actual is the product of the 
virtual, space is the product of the virtual, and we could say that space remains within the 
virtual; the material world is not distinct from the virtual, we remember, but is a "last 
nuance" of duration. The virtual thus grounds the actual. But what about Deleuze's 
universal ungrounding? 
We discover that the ground is overturned when we find that the self-
differentiating virtual has a peculiar relationship to void, radical or absolute placelessness, 
no place. We learn where Deleuze's world, folded as Badiou is fond of saying, breaks 
with a Leibnizian world: 
[T]he Baroque Leibniz does not believe in the void. For him it always seems to be 
filled with a folded matter, because binary arithmetic superimposes folds that both 
the decimal system- and Nature itself- conceal in apparent voids. For Leibniz, 
and the Baroque, folds are always full. 159 
Deleuze's admiration for Leibniz is deep, as we have seen, but ultimately Leibniz is a 
moral thinker, though an admittedly complex one, and his Best of all Possible Worlds is 
an effort to save some version of the Platonic Good in the form of a divine process which 
ensures the harmony of the world. The way to get past morality is through the void; but 
Deleuze, whose worlds are, as Badiou rightly claims, full and folded, cannot reintroduce 
the void as 'space' in which the folds are simply located. 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze gives us the crucial clue, attributing the discovery 
of the void to the Stoics: 
The Stoics had already elaborated a very elegant theory of the Void, as at once 
extra-Being and insistence. If incorporeal events are the logical attributes of 
beings and bodies, the void is like the substance of these attributes; it differs in 
159 FL, 36. 
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nature from corporeal substance, to the point that it cannot even be said that the 
world is 'in' the void. 160 
If the virtual were to be in the void, the void would serve to ground the virtual; instead, 
the void is that which ungrounds the virtual, the pure past. But what does it mean to say 
that the void is the 'substance' of the incorporeal events? What is it to be extra-Being and 
insistence? We can come to understand the nature ofthe void only through that of which 
it is the substance, the event. 
According to Piercey, events are ideal states of difference, and they 
"communicate" in a single Event. Deleuze says they do not belong to the present which 
"makes them exist", but to the "unlimited Aion, the Infinitive in which they subsist and 
insist."161 Deleuze distinguishes these two "times" which have some relationship to 
events: 
There are two times, one of which is composed only of interlocking presents; the 
other is constantly decomposed into elongated pasts and futures. There are two 
times, one of which is always definite, active or passive; the other is eternally 
Infinitive and eternally neutral. One is cyclical, measures the movement of bodies 
and depends on the matter which limits and fills it out; the other is a pure straight 
line at the surface, incorporeal, unlimited, an empty form of time, independent of 
all matter. [ ... ] It is the incorporeal Aion which has been unfolded. [ ... ] This 
Aion, being straight line and empty form, is the time of events-effects. Just as the 
present measures the temporal realization of the event- that is, its incarnation in 
the depth of acting bodies and its incorporation in a state of affairs - the event in 
tum, in its impassibility and impenetrability, has no present. 162 
The definite, "active or passive" time of which Deleuze speaks here he elsewhere calls 
"Chronos." This temporal series, as we saw earlier, is constituted by 'interlocking' 
presents that pass. The actual (active) presents are grounded by the passive, the pure past. 
160 LS, 347. 
161 Ibid., 53-4. 
162 Ibid., 62-3. 
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An event cannot be said to have a present, as the past 'has' the present for Deleuze. 163 
Events are freed from this circle and subsist or insist on the Aion, that which 
enables the communication of all events, the time of events-effects: 
A position in the void of all events in one, an expression of the nonsense of all 
senses in one, univocal Being is the pure form of the Aion, the form of exteriority 
which relates things and propositions164. In short, the univocity of Being has three 
determinations: one single event for all events; one and the same aliguid for that 
which happens and that which is said; and one and the same Being for the 
impossible, the possible, and the real. 165 
Univocal Being is the pure form ofthe Aion, the third repetition from Difference and 
Repetition. In this passage, Deleuze's complex metaphysics is drawn together. Univocal 
Being is the Event, the position in the void for all events, that which by holding them 
together in that void enables them to communicate166. In the Logic of Sense, Deleuze 
writes of the "esoteric word [ ... ] a non-identifiable aliquid"- where aliguid is the 
Medieval Latin philosophical term for difference. In a single field of difference, things 
and propositions are related. The field of difference gives rise to states of affairs (through 
the process of actualization), which embody events, ideal states of difference; but without 
these states of affairs, there are no events. From one 'side' ofthings, then, the events ate 
'born' ofthe actual. 167 
163 Is Bergson's image ofthe past as rolled up in the present in Deleuze's mind when he declares the time of 
Chronos to be cyclical? 
164 
"The Aion is precisely the border of the two [tables or series], the straight line which separates them; but 
it is also the plain surface which connects them, an impenetrable window or glass. It circulates therefore 
throughout the series and never ceases to reflect and to ramify them. It makes one and the same event the 
expressed of propositions and the attribute of things" (LS, 64). 
165 Ibid., 180. 
166 
"Metaphysical surfaces (transcendental field) is the name that will be given to the frontier established, 
on one hand, between bodies taken together as a whole and inside the limits which envelop them, and on 
the other, propositions in general" (LS, 125). 
167 
"[A]t the limit of dense bodies, an event is incorporeal (a metaphysical surface); on the surface of words 
and things, an incorporeal event is the meaning of a proposition (its logical dimension); in the thread of 
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Deleuze claims that "sense" is the "event" itself, 168 and that "[t]he most general 
operation of sense is this: it brings that which expresses it into existence; and from that 
point on, as pure inherence, it brings itself to exist within that which expresses it."169 It is 
not easy to see how sense can itself bring about that which expresses it. But where for 
Bergson, the relation between the virtual and the actual is always directed, such that the 
actual is produced by and grounded by the virtual, Deleuze's ungrounding repetition 
enables the interplay of these two fields. The virtual series and the actual series 
communicate by means of the great Event which relates them, but which belongs to them, 
and does not ground them- for how could a void ground? 
4. 2 Ethics in the Void 
Ian Buchanan focuses on the process of counter-actualization of events, as it 
appears in Deleuze's philosophy. While we are composed of singularities, and thus it is 
difficult to say that ' we' are actual- indeed, we bathe in the virtual, in the being of the 
problematic, in Idea - this does not mean we do not make attempts at a "global 
integration" of the local "larval" selves of which we are composed. Deleuze is concerned 
only to oppose the idea of a given subject; that is to say, of an identity beneath all 
differences to which becomings might belong or happen. Thus Buchanan writes: 
The event is the sense we make of what happens. We might bemoan a misfortune, 
or resign ourselves to it, or take charge of it (become worthy, in other words), by 
saying, as Joe Bousquet did, we were born to embody it. To the extent we take 
discourse, an incorporeal meaning-event is fastened to the verb (infinitive point of the present)" (Foucault, 
"Theatrum," 175 ). 
168 LS, 22. 
169 Ibid., 166. 
81 
charge of events we counter-actualize what occurs, we see beyond actions and live 
the purity of the event, the crystal of sense awaiting us in all phenomena. 170 
Here the Stoic inheritance in Deleuze's philosophy becomes apparent. Counter-
actualization is a name for the act of taking ownership of what happens to oneself; of 
measuring up or becoming "worthy" of what we suffer. 171 Deleuze himself writes: 
The actor thus actualizes the event, but in a way which is entirely different from 
the actualization of the event in the depths of things. Or rather, the actor redoubles 
this cosmic or physical actualization, in his own way, which is singularly 
superficial - but because of it more distinct, trenchant and pure. Thus, the actor 
delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and keeps from the event 
only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events 
t t l . t• 172 - a coun er-ac ua zza wn. 
There are two actualizations, then: one that seems to produce the individual who seems 
herself to be, in turn, necessary for the second, the counter-actualization. It is to this that 
Alain Badiou points when he wonders "[w]hether the Event with a capital 'E' might not 
be De leuze's Good. In light of the way it requires and founds the temperament of' the 
free man,' this would seem probable."173 Badiou notes the capital "E"- denoting the 
single event that enables the communication of the various events. This Event indeed 
does enable the communication of the various lines of becoming that move from the 
virtual Idea-structures to the actual world. But it is also, as the straight line of the Aion, 
the border between propositions and things, and thus "exists" on the surface of, and 
depends upon the production of, propositions. 174 
Badiou discovers what is crucial for De leuze - that this complex ontology of the 
170 Ian Buchanan, Deleuzism: A Metacommentary (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 79. 
171 See editor's introduction ofBoundas, ed. , The Deleuze Reader, 9: "Real amor f ati is not in the 
acceptance of the actual state of affairs, but in the 'counteractualization' of the actual, so that the virtual 
event that inheres in it may be, for the first time, thought and willed." 
172 LS, 150. 
173 Badiou, Clamor, 27. 
174 One is reminded ofHeidegger's comments about the relation between Dasein and Being. 
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Event is indistinguishable from an Ethics that accompanies it. 
Nothing more can be said, and no more has ever been said: to become worthy of 
what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the offspring 
of one's own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to 
break with one' s carnal birth- to become the offspring of one's events and not of 
one's actions, for the action is produced by the offspring of the event. 175 
The novelty that Deleuze seeks to accommodate in his philosophy has a relation to the 
actual field; action itself is produced by the "offspring" of the event. De leuze seeks to 
explain change, rebirth, metamorphosis- and such change is simply not possible for that 
which is entirely carnal. Freedom has nothing to do with choosing among possible 
outcomes. Freedom is purely spiritual in nature, freeing oneself from the cruelty of the 
actual world, and measuring up to the actual by willing and releasing the event. 176 
This is undeniably a brand of Stoicism, and indeed the Logic of Sense is if nothing 
else an elaboration of and renewal of a Stoic ethics. We see Deleuze elaborating a 
sophisticated atomism: 177 
The metamorphoses or redistributions of singularities form a history; each 
combination and each distribution is an event. But the paradoxical instance is the 
Event in which all events communicate and are distributed. It is the Unique event, 
and all other events are its bits and pieces . .. 178 
Deleuze's atoms are not actual bits and pieces of matter, but events which communicate 
175 LS, 150. 
176 How much does Deleuze owe here to Kant? Nothing like freedom is imaginable in the world of 
appearances, in the phenomenal. Certainly Deleuze's explorations of the virtual are, as we have seen, his 
pursuit of that which Kant deemed beyond the power of the faculty of cognition (though, of course, not 
beyond pure reason in its practical application). Through this process of counter-actualization, whose vector 
runs from the actual toward the virtual, Deleuze does suggest that an encounter with the phenomenal may 
force a redistribution of virtual singularities. 
177 It is already obvious in DR that Deleuze's philosophy is 'atomistic' : "[T]he Epicurean atom still retains 
too much independence, a shape and an actuality. Reciprocal determination here still has too much the 
aspect of a spatio-temporal relation. The question whether modem atomism, by contrast, fulfils all the 
conditions of a structure must be posed in relation to the differential equations which determine the laws of 
nature, in relation to the types of'multiple and non-localisable connections' established between particles, 
and in relation to the character of the 'potentiality ' expressly attributed to these particles" (DR, 184 ). 
178 LS, 56. 
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and are distributed 'in' the Unique event (Event), Deleuze's void. As he says, "The atom 
is that which must be thought, and that which can only be thought."179 We have already 
noted that the Event is the pure and empty form of time, the Aion. Deleuze has pursued 
the concept of the void further than those thinkers who insist upon understanding it as 
spatial. It is in pushing thought to this limit that Deleuze goes beyond Kant, we might 
say, by finding the (no)-place where time and space are not absolutely different: they are 
traceable to the void. 
Remarkably, Deleuze finds the clue to this discovery in Plato: "Plato rightly said 
that the instant is atopon, without place. It is the paradoxical instance or the aleatory 
point, the nonsense of the surface and quasi-cause."180 The paradoxical instance is the 
Event, the void, the "place where the event bursts forth as sense."181 We can now return 
to the fascinating suggestion ofBadiou' s that Deleuze's Event is his version of Plato's 
Good. The Event, for Deleuze, is the void- an instant, what Deleuze calls in his essay on 
"Lucretius and the Simulacrum" the "time smaller than the minimum of continuous 
time." The void is thus temporal for De leuze. While there are temporal issues related to 
the operation of the Good, for Plato, time gives way for him to the active nature of place. 
Deleuze's Platonism becomes visible when we consider that, for him, "The event 
is the identity of form and void. It is not the object as denoted, but the object expressed or 
expressible, never present, but always already in the past and yet to come." 182 As we saw 
in chapter two, Plato's chora was the place ofthe appearance of forms, though it is in 
179 Ibid., 268. 
180 Ibid., 166. 
181 Ibid., 137. 
182 Ibid., 136. 
84 
nature itself formless , entirely empty, and capable therefore of reflecting the forms. When 
a form passes on the chora, is it inseparable from that chora? If so, we might be inclined 
to say that there is an identity of form and chora. This passing would then be the cause of 
the identity, the explanation of the identity. We recall that the chora is a receptive place, 
capable of receiving and passing on the form that will fleetingly occupy it. Any supposed 
identity of form and chora would have to be fleeting, achieved only insofar as the chora 
receives and passes on the form that is present, if only long enough to become absent. 
But for Deleuze, the key issue is that the event is never present. For Plato, the act 
of receiving and passing-on which takes place on the chora (or perhaps is the chora) is 
necessarily present if any identity is to be maintained. It remained a question at the 
conclusion of our second chapter where the Good is in relation to this active chora, but 
we have reason to be cautious, since Plato insisted upon the radical otherness of the 
Good, of how crucial it is that it be able to avoid corruption by the changing world of 
appearances, of forms. Is the act of the chora sufficiently incorruptible? Is the chora itself, 
strange as it is, sufficiently other? When we ask, "where is the Good, for Plato?", are we 
justified in wondering whether the introduction of this chorology might not have been 
Plato's late effort to ask, with incredible caution, repeatedly stressing the nature of the 
Timaeus' "bastard" discourse, how much presence the Good has here? The Republic itself 
demonstrates that the Good has presence through its absence, though it is not itself 
'present. ' Is the same the case for Deleuze' s event? 
We have been given reason to doubt that the Event is the Good, since the Event 
seems itselfto be the void, the third repetition, the pure and empty form of time, the 
Eternal return of the Different. In "Lucretius and the Simulacrum," however, Deleuze 
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pursues Epicurus' concept of the clinamen, which has itself a peculiar relation to the void. 
The clinamen is often thought to be a strange motion by which atoms freely falling in the 
void suddenly swerve and become interlocked, forming compounds. Deleuze argues that 
the clinamen is for Epicurus actually an originary motion, that which gives the atom its 
originary direction, without which there would be no collisions. 183 The clinamen is called 
a "differential of matter" and a "differential ofthought". 184 For Deleuze, it is that which 
allows the atomic lines to collide; it is the energy of a disjunctive synthesis. The 
clinamen, then, is an ancestor to Deleuze's different/ciation, his Difference. Deleuze's 
own philosophy, a transcendental empiricism, a "pluralistic mysticism", 185 is a modern 
reworking ofEpicurus' theory, the strangeness and sophistication ofwhich is not 
appreciated if the clinamen is seen as superfluous to a bare materialist philosophy.186 
The reason why we cannot easily collapse De leuze's philosophy into a Platonism 
is that the former refuses any ground. Which is Deleuze's reworking of Plato's Good?-
the Event (void, Repetition) or different/ciation (clinamen, Difference)? The dilemma is 
false, since for Deleuze, there is necessarily difference and repetition, where the latter is 
the returning of the former, and not its ground. 
While Badiou stresses Deleuze's Platonism, he admits what seems undeniable: 
183 Ibid., 269. 
184 Ibid., 269. 
185 In DR (57), Deleuze cites the poet B. P. Blood, about whom, as Deleuze notes (31 1-2), William James 
wrote a paper entitled "A Pluralistic Mystic," published in the Hibbert Journal in July of 1910. Would 
Deleuze object to such a characterization of himself? 
186 De leuze indicates elsewhere that there has been a long confusion about what kind of materialism the 
ancient atomists proposed: "[T]he atom of the ancients, from Democritus to Lucretius, was always 
inseparable from a hydraulics, or a generalized theory of swells and flows. The ancient atom is entirely 
misunderstood if it is overlooked that its essence is to course and flow. The theory of atomism is the basis 
for a strict correlation between Archimedean geometry (very different from the striated and homogeneous 
space of Euclid) and Democritean phystics (very different from solid or lamellar matter)'' (TP, 489). 
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that Deleuze opposes transcendence of all kinds. If Deleuze has a 'version' of the Good, it 
is certainly not something external and unchanging, something in which we might ground 
judgment. 187 Aware that for Plato, "the good must always have its contrary", 188 and wary 
of the tyranny of the negative as it appears in Hegel, 189 Deleuze systematically seals off 
the vacuum, fills up the world (which is 'in' that great void, time), leaving no room for 
the Good to seep in. 
4.3 Having and Needing 
John Russon, a commentator on Plato and on Hegel, shows how Plato accounts 
for "determinateness," what makes a thing what it is, what makes it different: "To be a 
determinateness is thus to be a striving- a striving to be this and not that, and this striving 
to be not that is thus a pursuit of itself, which means it projects a good in terms of which 
it is to be measured- what Aristotle would call its telos."190 Identity is here a function of 
negativity. I become what I am by striving not to be x, y, z. Deleuze's philosophy of 
difference is aligned, however, against this logic of identity and negativity, and the 
method of evaluation (measuring) that often accompanies it: 
Those formulae according to which 'the object denies what it is not' , or 
'distinguishes itself from everything that is not' are logical monsters (the Whole 
of everything which is not the object) in the service of identity. It is said that 
187 See Gilles De leuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, tr. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), especially the essays entitled, "To Have Done With Judgment," and 
"Plato, the Greeks." 
188 Theaetetus, l76a. 
189 
"[T]he stakes here are indeed the negative and the positive in the absolute: the earth girded, 
encompassed, overcoded, conjugated as the object of a mortuary and suicidal organization surrounding it on 
all sides, or the earth consolidated, connected with the Cosmos, brought into the Cosmos following lines of 
creation that cut across it as so many becomings (Nietzsche' s expression: let the earth become lightness .. . )" 
(TP, 510). 
190 Russon, 79. 
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difference is negativity, that it extends or must extend to the point of contradiction 
once it is taken to the limit. This is true only to the extent that difference is already 
placed on a path or along a thread laid out by identity ... 191 
Here, it is obvious that what truly offends Deleuze is the Hegelian culmination of the 
reign of identity and the negative, the roots of which are certainly to be found in the 
Pythagorean and Parmenidean streams in Platonic philosophy. We must be careful to 
note, however, that Deleuze is sensitive to the striving of which Russon speaks, and even 
of the importance of projecting a 'good' in Aristotle's, and perhaps not in Plato's, use of 
that telic principle. 
Deleuze everywhere provides an insightful, if counter-intuitive rethinking of the 
nature of a phenomenon generally presented in terms of the negative. In Anti-Oedipus, 
Deleuze opts against analysis, refusing to treat natural limits as "breaks" or 
"interruptions". As he and Guattari write, "[B]reaks or interruptions are not the result of 
an analysis; rather, in and of themselves, they are syntheses. Syntheses produce 
divisions ... " 192 For Deleuze, everything is production. He does not allow himself, 
therefore, to interpret the striving of the soul as anything other than a productive activity; 
it cannot be inspired by an emptiness or a neediness. 
Deleuze traces the problem of a needy desire to Plato: "To a certain degree, the 
traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the very first step that 
191 Deleuze goes on: "Hegel's circle is not the eternal return, only the infinite circulation of the identical by 
means of negativity" (DR, 49-50). 
192 AO, 41 . Obviously here with psychoanalysis (that other awful consequence of the negative) as his target, 
Deleuze will not allow holes in the universe, further confirming our account of his temporalization of the 
void. See also TP, 32: "It is not even sufficient to say that intense and moving particles pass through holes; 
a hole is just as much a particle as what passes through it. Physicists say that holes are not the absence of 
particles but particles travelling faster than the speed of light. Flying anuses, speeding vaginas, there is no 
castration." John Sallis, however, following Plato's decided preference for construction and synthesis, 
faithfully names these same limits "beginnings " . 
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the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us choose between production and 
acquisition."193 Deleuze has in mind here the method of division employed in the Sophist 
and in the Statesman, though the themes are equally present in the Republic, the 
Protagoras, and the Timaeus. At stake here is the problem of possession- how one 
acquires what one desires and how objects acquire and possess the properties that are 
their limits. Certainly Plato insists upon the importance of having, and of its fundamental 
ontological difference from producing what is possessed. But for Deleuze, who says in 
Anti-Oedipus that "everything is production" and in The Fold that "being is having," there 
is no need to choose one over the other, as he suggests Plato does. 
In order not to have to select only one of the two processes of acquiring and 
producing, De leuze is forced to reconsider the nature of possession. He altogether refuses 
to conceive of desire as grounded in a radical absence, as inspired by lack194 or need195 -
in short, by what he sees as the negative. 196 The negative/positive relation of perfectly 
balanced contraries is of no interest to Deleuze. Desire is not the need for the lost object, 
the object of a reminiscence, that which would 'complete' one, that part missing from a 
given whole. Instead, "[D]esiring-production is pure multiplicity." 197 Desiring-production 
193 AO, 25. 
194 
"Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in 
desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression" (AO, 26). 
Also: "Lack (manque) is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. [ .. . ] It is never 
primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack" (AO, 28). 
195 
"Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are 
counterproducts within the real that desire produces" (AO, 29). 
196 John Scott in his "Having a Need to Act" defends the position that need is precisely something one can 
have- and in that sense, at least, is not negative but positive. Deleuze would say, quite literally, that 
"nothing" has this need. 
197 AO, 42. 
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is the multiplicity, the state of free differences 198 that give rise to atomic lines of 
becoming, and that communicate but do not form parts of a (closed) whole. 
In order to explain need and lack without reference to the negative, Deleuze 
makes them a matter of time and "interest" when he writes that "a being does not 
correspond to our expectation and we grasp it purely as lack, the absence of what interests 
us." 199 "Lacking" requires a reference to the future and expectation. For Deleuze, what is 
absent is not really needed- it was merely what we expected, what interested us. What 
interests us are encounters, collisions - or rather, interests are themselves encounters and 
collisions, they are produced, and are rooted in the virtual realm of differences, of (non)-
Being, of Idea-structures, of question-problem complexes.200 
For Deleuze, "interest" does not belong to a network of needs, for need is at the 
active level, and interest is generated in the virtual; needs are the consequence of the free 
production of interest. The result is an economy without debts/ 01 a world free of 
judgment. 202 Where interest is produced by the self-differing of the virtual, De leuze 
198 See Dorothea Olkowski, "Morpho-logic in Deleuze and Irigaray, in De/euze and Feminist Theory, ed. 
Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 88: "Butler refers to 
De leuze's notion of desire as 'emancipatory', 'a precultural eros', ' an originally unrepressed libidinal 
diversity', and ' an ahistorical absolute' (Butler 1987: 213-15). Such qualifications are damning in Butler 's 
view, since in her estimation, it is principally the willingness to locate desire in purely social and historical 
terms that elevates the work of Michel Foucault above his (approximate) contemporaries Deleuze, Derrida, 
and Lacan. Given Butler's Hegelianism, only to the degree that historicisation takes place can philosophy 
effect its break with the Hegelian system that always already accounts for any rupture with itself." Butler's 
faith in history is not shared by Deleuze or Plato. 
199 BG, 17. 
200 
"[The P]osing and solution of a problem [ . . . ] appears to Bergson to be more important than the negative 
determination of need" (BG, 129). 
201 
" If exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are those of repetition. There is, therefore, an 
economic difference between the two" (DR, 1). Is Deleuze at odds with Nietzsche on this matter?: "One has 
to repay good and ill - but why precisely to the person who has done us good or ill?" (Nietzsche, Beyond 
Good and Evil, 91 ). 
202 
"What's interesting isn' t whether I' m capitalizing on anything, but whether there are people doing 
something or other in their little comer, and me in mine, and whether there might be any points of contact, 
chance encounters and coincidences rather than alignments and rallying-points (all that crap where 
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would say of debt that it has no capacity to drive generation, but that its being belongs in 
the actual register, a sort of surface effect of the free play of interest. Eugene Holland 
notes that, "Deleuze, by contrast [with Derrida], is not concerned with reaffirming any 
debts - not even selective or figurative ones. "203 And yet we find Constantin Boundas, 
among the best ofDeleuze's commentators,204 adoring, loving205 Deleuze too much to be 
properly Deleuzian, struggling with, but insisting on his, debt to his "maitre": 
We who contributed to this issue of Man and World gladly acknowledge a debt to 
De leuze - a debt of thought and a debt of life. He has been a teacher to us; and we 
now say this in the way that he himself, without ceasing to be critical of 
discipleship, did once say of Sartre, 'il a ete mon maitre'. But this memorial issue 
does not attempt to pay debts. Somehow they do not matter now. Our intention 
here is rather to celebrate a life. 206 
A celebration- an expressive and joyful celebration. Perhaps Boundas' response to his 
awareness of debts is the only one of which the "free man" is capable. This relation of 
debt to freedom is at the heart of our study. On Deleuze's (Foucauldian) analysis, the 
relation is clear. "Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, whereas discipline was long-
everyone's supposed to be everyone else's guilty conscience and judge). I owe you lot nothing, nothing 
more than you owe me. I don't need to join you in your ghettos, because I've got my own" (Deleuze, 
Negotiations, II). 
203 Eugene W. Holland "Marx and Philosophies of Difference," in The South Atlantic Quarterly, v. 96, no. 3 
(Summer 1997), 535. 
204 But not the only one also to owe something to Deleuze ... See Jean-Clet Martin, "Philosophy of the 
Concrete," in The South Atlantic Quarterly, v. 96 (Summer 1997), tr. Alex Martin, 627: " We owe Deleuze 
thanks for having taught us the practice of a concept that need not be dialectical. The oeuvre he has given us 
to think is probably the finest philosophical creation since Hegel. Accordingly, Deleuze is the knight of 
thought, a knight who moves neither in a straight line nor diagonally, but, as on a chessboard, by jumps, 
leaving a gap in his wake that drives him on to another series. And it is this jump that we call becoming: 
becoming mule or mandarin, on the back of a nomadic concept." 
205 See Korsten, "ls Bess a Bike? Gender, Capitalism and the Politics of a BwO in Lars von Trier's Breaking 
the Waves," in Micropolitics of Media Culture: Reading the Rhizomes of Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Patricia 
Pisters (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), 147: " In their reworking of the Oedipus complex, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that Freud had it wrong on several levels but was right in: ' having determined 
the essence or nature of desire, no longer in relation to objects, aims or even sources (territories) but as an 
abstract, subjective essence - libido or sexuality' . An analogy to this conception of desire is one aspect of 
the idea of love as it was propagated by Jesus: love as an abstract subjective essence that is not confined to 
one person, but that is free-floating and can be bestowed on anyone." 
206 Constantin V. Boundas, ed., "Introduction," Man and World29 , no. 3 (July 1996): 234. 
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term, infinite, and discontinuous. A man is no longer a man confined but a man in 
debt."207 
Which do we prefer? Deleuze's philosophy is an attempt to deal with the way in 
which power, in its endless conquest of humanity, enslaves us at every tum through ever-
new methods of' discipline' and 'punishment'. Commenting on Foucault, De leuze's 
response indicates the distance he does obtain from the Stoics, through a little joy, a little 
humour: 
Foucault never looked on writing as an aim or an end in itself. This is precisely 
what makes him a great writer and imbues everything he writes with an increasing 
sense of joy and gaiety. The Divine Comedy of punishment means we can retain 
the right to collapse in fits of laughter in the face of a dazzling array of perverse 
inventions, cynical discourses and meticulous horrors. A whole chain of 
phenomena, from anti-masturbation machines for children to the mechanics of 
prison for adults, sets off an unexpected laughter which shame, suffering or death 
cannot silence. The torturers rarely laugh, at least not in the same way. Valles has 
already contrasted the revolutionaries' unique sense of gaiety in horror with the 
horrible gaiety of the torturer. Provided the hatred is strong enough something can 
be salvaged, a great joy which is not the ambivalent joy ofhatred, but the joy of 
wanting to destroy whatever mutilates life.208 
Is this a defensive laughter? There seems to be no real touch of ressentiment about it. 
What sort of laughter is this? 
It is a shallow laughter, a laughter ofthe surface; and Deleuze knows it. He thus 
remains, unwillingly, a Stoic209, bearing the great burden of sadness: "One of the most 
profound constants ofNaturalism is to denounce everything that is sadness, everything 
that is the cause of sadness, and everything that needs sadness to exercise its power."210 
207 Deleuze, Negotiations, 181. 
208 F, 23. Italics mine. 
209 Badiou agrees: "[T]his philosophy is essentially, just like Stoicism (but not at all like Spinozism, despite 
the reverence in which De leuze holds Spinoza), a philosophy of death" (Badiou, Clamor, 13 ). 
210 LS, 279. 
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Ultimately, what joins Deleuze to Plato is an uncompromising honesty. Deleuze never 
hides his sadness; he seeks, through concepts, to alleviate it. That he bears a burden is 
undeniable. In L 'abecedaire, he reflects on the misuse of Anti-Oedipus by those who took 
it as a license to destroy themselves through what Deleuze would call a 'fascist' use of 
drugs, an ever-present danger. His conscience bears the weight, but it is too heavy. We 
hear him echo Nietzsche: Let the earth become lightness. 
4.4 Encountering Self and Others 
My claim that Deleuze is ' sad' or 'happy'211 could not reasonably be interpreted 
to mean that I have some sort of direct access to, incontrovertible evidence of, the quale 
of 'sadness' or 'emotional pain' appearing inside his conscious experience, as this would 
require the immediacy characteristic of being Gilles De leuze. This leaves us with three 
options when it comes to commenting on the psychology of the other: ( 1) say nothing 
whatever; (2) ask the person how s/he feels and trust the evidences/he gives, and/or 
review unsolicited claims about his/her own psychological states; (3) make a judgment 
based not solely on the claims offered by the supposed authority (the person in question), 
but on any and all evidence available from a critical examination of the context in which 
claims are made, the body language of the speaker, facts of the person's life, etc. 
2 11 Or. Peter Trnka suggests in his examiner's report that I should omit from this final draft what he calls my 
"attempts to psychologize Deleuze' s problems." I have since revised certain portions of the thesis in 
accordance with Dr. Trnka's appropriate cautioning on these delicate matters, and I am thankful to him for 
his careful eye. As I have elected to decline respectfully to make certain changes, I offer here my 
justification for a certain set of observations that may seem instances of such psychologizing. (Ambiguity in 
the examiner's report must prevent me from presenting what follows as though the occasion for this 
particular footnote, or any other occasion, is a speCific instance to which Dr. Trnka means to refer.) 
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There are, no doubt, some who would propose we choose the first option, 
considering all psychological evidence to be outside the bounds of philosophy. This 
strikes me as a hasty and presumptuous course of action, considering that human beings 
live largely inside a web of ideas, feelings, memories, etc. - all of which must be 
explained in any comprehensive philosophical account of the real. 
The second option is perhaps thought a safe middle ground, insofar as we admit a 
certain amount of evidence based on our trust that our subject is honest. The unstated 
premise here, however, is that honesty and truth have a necessary correlation. This ' safe' 
ground is in fact a hazardous zone, fenced-off arbitrarily and dangerously, considering 
that the need to be honest (or the feeling of being honest) is itself a mental phenomenon. 
(That is not to mention the linguistic problems regarding the conversion of a 'sense of 
things' into a proposition to be trusted regarding some mental phenomenon.) 
The third option, the one I am here taking, is feared for the great complexity 
involved in forming a judgment. Such judgments must be received critically and 
subjected to constant revision, for the presentation of any new data can at times shatter 
the conception supported by the past judgment made. This is not the place to defend an 
account of how one judges, though the very thrust of this paper is to suggest that such 
judgment, if it is possible, needs a social place, an integrated place, in which objections 
can be raised. With regard to the psychological, that is to say, there is no safe ground 
whatever; we cannot risk leaving it out of the discussion, we cannot trust naively that the 
power to name one' s own psychological states is possible in seclusion, and we cannot 
have a clear and final account of any individual, characterized as he or she is by infinite 
complexity, psychological and otherwise. 
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Deleuze himself, I suggest, proceeds by some version of the third option outlined 
above (and the distinctions between my own approach and that of De leuze might form the 
spine of another paper). This is the Nietzschean thread in Deleuze' s philosophy, for 
Nietzsche writes: 
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: 
namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every 
philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had 
grown.tt2 
We are mining the unconscious, as Deleuze himself advises (see our introductory 
chapter). To rule out from the beginning any moral impetus in Deleuze' s philosophy 
because he consciously works to rid his philosophy of morality is presumptuous. This, in 
part, is what we mean when we say we must resist being already Deleuzian. 
Granted this point, then, though De leuze himself proposes an ethics that does not 
define itselfthrough sadness, though he prefers to speak of joy, we are free to wonder 
why this does form one of the motivations of his entire philosophy. We cannot do so, of 
course, without considering his philosophical justification. Neither, however, can we do 
so without presenting for consideration the moment mentioned in the text above, during 
section 'D for Desir' in L 'abecedaire in which Deleuze admits to feeling responsible for 
those who mistakenly used Anti-Oedipus as an excuse to destroy themselves. Yet he finds 
it impossible to assign blame to anyone who goes too far (as in the case of drugs or 
drink). Here there is undeniable sadness in De leuze over the consequences of his actions, 
but more significantly over the case in which a person turns him or herself into pulp, 
though one gets the sense that Deleuze feels helpless. I suggest that to treat this 
2 12 Nietzsche, 13, my italics. 
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phenomenon is as available for discussion is not to psychologize Deleuze's problems. For 
our objective is not to judge Deleuze as sad, but to present this moment as a missed 
opportunity for him, an opening we shall seize, to ask the question whether his 
philosophy gives the agent the power to act in response to such sadness, to make 
judgments in the social realm capable of generating not only something with the power to 
break down the causes of self-destruction, but also the forgivenesi 13 Deleuze might have 
been unconsciously needing. 
That Deleuze seems to be handcuffed in relation to the question what to do, if 
anything, about those for whom one feels responsible, those who stand to destroy 
themselves forces us to question his account of joy and sadness, since he does consider 
these in relation to action: "[ .. . ] only joy is worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near to 
action, and to the bliss of action. The sad passions always amount to impotence."2 14 What 
does it mean to say that sadness, or guilt or shame, etc., 'amount' to impotence? If he 
wishes to say that while sad, depressed, we are far from action - we feel impotent - then 
the case in question is proof of that, since Deleuze seems to have nothing to offer for the 
'victims' of Anti-Oedipus. We might grant that joy brings us near to action- but is there 
no virtue in the moment of fragility, in the moment of weakness? Might there be a place 
in the process of determining what action, of many that might potentially bring joy or be 
characterized by joy, for sadness - as a recognition of something that is lacking, that is 
needed? 
2 13 Regarding the relation between irreversibility in action and forgiveness, see Hannah Arendt, "Labor, 
Work, Action," in The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: 
Penguin Books, 2000), 181: "The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility is the faculty 
of forgiving, and the remedy for unpredictability is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises." 
2 14 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 28. 
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But what is meant here by joy and sadness? Deleuze says: 44 [ ••• ] we experience j oy 
when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and sadness when, on 
the contrary, a body or an idea threatens our own coherence."215 There is something 
threatening Deleuze's coherence in the case from L 'abecedaire, something that threatens 
to break down the self, to interrupt the joy of action where action is an attempt to 
produce, to put into motion something that could create the new - in the form of a 
concept that might effect a counter-actualization of that painful real. But is the problem 
the occasional moment of sadness, or the threat of becoming trapped in a contagious 
melancholy? Deleuze writes: 
How can one keep from destroying oneself through guilt, and others through 
resentment, spreading one's own powerlessness and enslavement everywhere, 
one's own sickness, indigestions, and poisons? In the end, one is unable even to 
encounter oneself.216 
Unable even to encounter oneself -leaving little hope of knowing the self. How, then, to 
justify this going beyond, this attempt to encounter the other, fraught as it is with conflict 
that seems always to give birth to guilt and resentment in varying measures? Since the sad 
passions seem to be part of our psychological landscape, since eliminating them entirely 
is not likely possible, even if it were desirable, what are we to do? Please, begs Deleuze, 
at least do not spread this sickness. And his request must fall upon us as noble, since he is 
surely right that much horror and pain is bred by horror and pain. Here is a request that 
commands the exercise ofNietzsche' s four virtues: "courage, insight, sympathy, and 
solitude."2 17 But is that lonely subject, the one we cannot ever encounter (as even Plato 
2 15 Ibid. , 19. 
2 16 Ibid., 23 . 
217 Nietzsche, 226. 
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would say), to be abandoned? Is there no competition among these virtues? What shall we 
say of the needy subject who has the courage to try to know a self he cannot encounter? -
if his pursuit requires him to forsake his solitude? 
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Chapter Five: Action and Direction 
"Idealism is the illness congenital to the Platonic philosophy and, with its litany of 
ascents and downfalls, it is even philosophy's manic-depressive form. Mania inspires and 
guides Plato. Dialectics is the flight of ideas, the Ideenjlucht. As Plato says ofthe Idea, 'it 
flees or it ~erishes ... 'And even in the death of Socrates there is a trace of a depressive 
suicide. " 18 
- Deleuze 
"Whatever is done from love always occurs beyond good and evil. "219 
-Nietzsche 
Deleuze and Plato propose rival philosophies of flight. For Plato the ideas take 
flight, and we take flight after them. Deleuze, as we saw in the introduction, wants his 
concepts to survey, to fly over, the battlefield. The concept, Deleuze says, is the event. He 
says also that "sickness and death are the event itself."220 What distinguishes Deleuze 
from Plato is that the former chooses AND where Plato must choose OR.221 For Plato, the 
Idea flees or perishes; the art of dialectics depends upon the binary choice that the agent 
must make. For Deleuze, relations are external to their terms, to the singularities. It is the 
conjunctive synthesis of the AND, the conglomerations of atomic terms (together with an 
energy of disjunction, Difference), that defines the Deleuzian philosophy. Where Plato' s 
Idea flees or perishes, Deleuze's concept flies and dies, eternally. For Socrates, the choice 
is to flee Athens or to drink the hemlock. He chooses the latter. Deleuze's suicide by 
2 18 LS, l28. 
21 9 Nietzsche, 90. 
220 Ibid. , I 08. 
221 See Michel Serres, The Natural Contract, tr. Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995), 54: "This need for agreement about properties is behind Socrates ' 
real-time demand to his partners in dialogue, which we find so tiresome, concerning every single word and 
thing. In fact, he is requiring that they continually sign this sort of contract, which underlies, in minutest 
detail, Plato' s dialogue." 
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defenestration, 222 which must have seemed to him "expressive" rather than depressive, is 
at once flight and death. 
5.1 Thanatos and Eros 
Deleuze refuses to see death as privation; his amorphous, folding One is, and 
death (which from the perspective of the active selF23 is loss), understood in terms of a 
privation or negation, is equally (once we escape phenomenology) a creative folding of 
this amorphous One. Deleuze and Guattari write, in A Thousand Plateaus, "In one way or 
the other, the animal is more a fleer than a fighter, but its flights are also conquests, 
creations."224 "Everything is production,"225 for Deleuze and Guattari, even taking flight. ; 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization are but two motions of a single act. The 
phenomenological subject is not a priori for De leuze, it is not eternal. Since it must be 
formed, the subject cannot be defined merely by its capacity to shelter itself, to protect 
itself, to build artificial limits- or even to name natural limits- in an effort to care for 
what already is. The subject cannot hide, but must be in (creative) flight: 
Subjectification, that' s to say the process of folding the line outside, mustn't be 
seen as just a way of protecting oneself, taking shelter. It' s rather the only way of 
confronting the line, riding it: you may be heading for death, suicide, but as 
Foucault says in a strange conversation with Schroeter, suicide then becomes an 
art it takes a lifetime to learn. 226 
222 See Craig Whitney, "Obituary of Gilles Deleuze" New York Times (7 November 1995), 0 2 1. 
223 DR, 98-9. 
224 TP, 55. 
225 AO, 4. 
226 Oeleuze, Negotiations, 114. 
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Life as the practice not only of death, butspecifically of suicide. Why? Socrates' death, 
according to Deleuze, is "depressive"; he is depressed by the incredible weight of the 
outside, transcendent, Good. Deleuze's outside is but a fold of the inside- and his own 
suicide is but the surface expression of the depths. More profound is the "one dies", the 
decline of impersonal virtual singularities, than the "I die," for Deleuze. 
Being is having227 - for Deleuze as for Plato - but much depends on the nature of 
the property relation. There is no self-same S to which Ps can belong, and having is not 
an issue of appropriation, indebtedness, or reception for Deleuze. This is a having that has 
nothing to do with 'having need.' It is having as "Relation": an impersonal 
interconnection of external relations, a connective synthesis without the need for Hume' s 
"sensitive plate"228 to receive because time is what ensures the synthesis. 
Deleuze believes that by rooting out all traces of the negative and sealing up his One, he 
can explain the novelty of the world more completely. Earlier we saw him locate the 
philosophical history of confusion about the nature of desire in Plato. who makes us 
choose between "acquisition" and "production" . Deleuze' s desire is productive, where 
Plato's eros is generative. Deleuze. who everywhere opposes the hunt for origins, is not 
interested in 'fathering' and 'mothering,' in generation.229 Whatever is accomplished by 
Plato's description of the demiurge in the Timaeus as father and maker must for Deleuze 
be achieved without references to beginnings or ends: everything must happen in the 
middle, for him. We pursue. then, the question of love in Deleuze, to see whether 
217 
" It is as if philosophy were penetrating into a new element and were putting the element of Having in 
place ofthat of Being" (FL, !09). 
228 DR. 70. 
n
9 
" [B]y making familial relations the universal mediation of childhood, we cannot help but fai l to 
understand the production ofthe unconscious itself[ . .. ] For the unconscious is an orphan, and produces 
itself within the identity of nature and man" (AO, 48-9). 
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something important is lost in the assimilation of generation to production. For is not 
Deleuze' s charge against Plato that the latter wants to be rid of simulacra- that he does 
not have enough love for all creatures?230 
Badiou, so critical of De leuze on so many points, is prepared to stand together 
with him on this issue of love: 
This is a trait of Deleuze that I particularly appreciate: a sort of unwavering love 
for the world as it is, a love that, beyond optimism and pessimism alike, signifies 
that it is always futile, always falling short of thought as such, to judge the 
world?31 
IfBadiou is correct,232 this "unwavering" (perhaps unconditional?) love ofDeleuze's for 
the world is without a trace of eros, of rage. Love like this is enlightened, and the 
cultivation of it might well be the precondition for thought. But one wonders whether we 
should never fall short of thought. This love, after all, is spiritual in nature and bears some 
relationship to generation. But is this rather paternal or maternal love by itself generative? 
Does a love without judgment generate anything at all? 
230 Whether Plato genuinely sought to emerge from the cave, whether he he ld contempt for that which is 
imperfect. is of course a crucial question. At 130e of the dialogue named for him, Parmenides chastizes 
Socrates for despising hair, mud, and dirt. What about this love for that which is incredibly particular - mud, 
dirt, hair? Is this not a love for that which seems to be furthest from Being? 
23 1 Badiou, Clamor, 44. 
232 See Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation, 2: " But maybe that's the 
romantic in me .. . this I can never relinquish and maybe can never really be the true academic, certainly 
never a true Deleuzian . .. much too romantic for that! Such honesty and integrity are not part of the 
Deleuzian masquerade, discretion, disguise, deceit and delights. Perhaps I fell in love too soon with a 
philosopher who denied too much (certainly love- and yet at times his work is distinctly reminiscent of the 
romantics of the German tradition- but that 's another project?), decried too much and lost his humanity to 
the forces of the cosmos, the forces of the real, becoming-imperceptible." Kennedy is, I think, mistaken to 
suppose that honesty is not possible through disguise, but her characterization of De leuze is revealing. 
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Sexual love, for Deleuze, is not about union, but multiplicity. It is not about 
generation, but production. 233 Deleuze, in this very rich passage, asks: 
What does it mean to love somebody? It is always to seize that person in a mass, 
extract him or her from a group, however small, in which he or she participates, 
whether it be through the family only or through something else; then to find that 
person's own packs, the multiplicities he or she encloses within himself or herself 
which may be of an entirely different nature. To join them to mine, to make them 
penetrate mine, and for me to penetrate the other person's. Heavenly nuptials, 
multiplicities of multiplicities. Every love is an exercise in depersonalization on a 
body without organs yet to be formed, and it is at the highest point of this 
depersonalization that someone can be named, receives his or her family name or 
first name, acquires the most intense discernibility in the instantaneous 
apprehension of the multiplicities belonging to him or her, and to which he or she 
belongs. 234 
There is a moment of appropriation, of seizing, in the above account - though the 
motivation for this, the question of what it is that drives us to select this person over that 
person is not mentioned. The extraction is performed by the lover, and we get no sense of 
the needs of the beloved. Does this account of love begin too late, begin after the 
courtship, after the two have been drawn together by some neediness for each other? 
There is nothing in the above account of love that bears a trace of emotion about it, since 
that for Deleuze would be to engage with the question at the conscious register. But is 
love solely about the kind of composition that excites Deleuze, above? Or is the beloved, 
the other, completely engulfed by the endless packs of the lover' s self, totally 
depersonalized? Doesn't love involve not only submission but also resistance to the 
other? Deleuze will deny that love is a tension, but is it not precisely here, in this most 
233 
"How can we conceive of a peopling, a propagation, a becoming that is without filiation or hereditary 
production? A multiplicity without the unity of an ancestor?" (TP, 241 ). See also: "Making love is not 
becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand" (AO, 296). 
234 TP, 35. 
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clinicae35 account of that divine topic- which has inspired so much of the world's most 
passionate, violent, and beautiful writing, including that of Plato's Symposium- that 
something seems thoroughly incommensurate with our experience? And since the good 
for Deleuze is defined in a fashion that mirrors the definition of love, as above, we 
wonder whether there is enough difference in this philosophy, whether there is enough 
strength, enough courage to maintain a difference that tends toward its own dissolution.236 
5.2 Knowing and the (Semblance of) the Self 
Deleuze remains Platonist insofar as his philosophy is a response to the command, 
"Know thyself'. He does not submit to the question, does not presume that there is a 
'self to be known, and ultimately argues that the self is to be produced. Consequently, 
the boundaries of identity are forever being inscribed and erased. And not solely at the 
level of the person (even if always at the level of the self ... ): 
Was there ever a Palestinian people? Israel says no. Of course there was, but that's 
not the point. The thing is, that once the Palestinians have been thrown out of their 
territory, then to the extent that they resist they enter the process of constituting a 
people.237 
De leuze is concerned to explain the constitution of a "people" - because a people must be 
constituted if it is to be at all. Though an account of identity that defends the radical 
constructivism of the self might inspire a reflex reaction of opposition from some 
~35 Ronald Bogue characterizes Deleuze's style as one suggestive of"Dryness, coldness, objectivity, 
indifference, the detached clinical gaze of the forensic surgeon." Is the lover a forensic surgeon? See 
Ronald Bogue, "Deleuze's Style," Man and World29, no. 3, (July 1996), 252. 
236 
"The good is when a body directly compounds its relation with ours, and, with all or part of its power. 
increases ours" (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 22). 
237 Deleuze, Negotiations, 126. 
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commentators, since we really do feel that the self is given, such an account explains very 
nicely those identities (a national identity, for instance) which seem far more fragile. 
Is a people constituted through love? Through the interpenetration of 
multiplicities? Or by the capacity to resist, to enter into a tension with the other? There 
must be an integration. 238 The mere assembling of assemblages does not constitute an 
identity. Deleuze' s "love" is productive, but productive of what? Where is the resistance 
to penetration in Deleuze's account of love from A Thousand Plateaus, the resistance so 
crucial to the instantiation of a people? And what is this resistance? Can it be the 
conjunctive synthesis of the AND, where no tension seems possible? Is resistance 
difference? A disjunctive synthesis? If it is difficult to conceive of Palestine as a 
Common-place (or painful to conceive of what takes place there today as commonplace), 
it is equally difficult to conceive of it as a Fairyland.239 
De leuze has thrown open the question of the relation of love to difference, of love 
and the Different, the new. In his attempt to give a truer account of the production of the 
new, has he not lost sight of the dynamic of love, of generation - of that which will give 
rise to the new as same? In his Symposium, Plato plays with the same themes, the 
propagation that we seek: 
So you see, Socrates, that Love is not exactly a longing for the beautiful, as you 
suggested. 
Well, what is it then? 
238 Deleuze plays with the word 'plan,' which means both 'shot' and 'plane'. Thus, he writes, " But from our 
point of view for the moment, the notion of shot [plan] has sufficient unity and extension if it is given its 
full projective, perspectival or temporal sense. In fact a unity is always that of an act which includes as such 
a multiplicity of passive or acted elements" (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, tr. Hugh 
Tomlinson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 25). The plane, which appears in much of 
Deleuze's work and is developed particularly in WP is in some sense platial. Place, for Deleuze, can be the 
glace of unity if it is given its temporal sense. 
39 
"Fairyland is opposed to the Common-Place" (LS, 79). 
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A longing not for the beautiful itself, but for the conception and generation that 
the beautiful effects. 
Yes. No doubt you're right. 
Of course I'm right, she said. And why all this longing for propagation? Because 
this is the one deathless and eternal element in our mortality. And since we have 
agreed that the lover longs for the good to be his own forever, it follows that we 
are bound to long for immortality as well as for the good - which is to say that 
Love is a longing for immortality.240 
Deleuze agrees: generation is to do with deathlessness. It is precisely in contrast to this 
biological sense of the eternal, the iteration of needy selves that seek immortality in the 
endless reproduction of themselves, that Deleuze proposes his theory of the event which 
is itself"death". For Deleuze, the new is always new,241 and it is not reproduced so easily. 
What is there miraculous about the reproduction of life? It is rather a common 
occurrence, after all- and carried out without a great deal of difficulty. Perhaps it is 
exaggeration to go so far as to say that Deleuze does not value life - but how can one who 
has so much distaste for that which is not different be said to love the world so 
uncompromising! y? 
When Jean-Luc Nancy claims that Deleuze's philosophy is one of continuous 
creation, 242 we have to be cautious. What returns is the Different, but it always brings 
with it a becoming-identical that yields genuinely ' established' old forms. If we have only 
a philosophy of a given-once versus a given-repeatedly, then Nancy is right. But which is 
it? 
Deleuze strikes an interesting note, but dismisses an important question: 
240 Plato, Symposium, 206e-207a, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, tr. Michael 
Joyce, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 558-9. 
241 
"The new, with its power ofbeginning and beginning again, remains forever new, just as the established 
was always established from the outset, even if a certain amount of empirical time was necessary for this to 
be recognised" (DR, 136). 
242 
"His philosophy is a matter of continuous creation (always Descartes ... )" (Nancy, 112). 
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The schizophrenic is the universal producer. There is no need to distinguish here 
between producing and its product. We need merely note that the pure 'thisness' 
of the object produced is carried over into a new act of producing. The table 
continues to 'go about its business.' The surface of the table, however, is eaten up 
by the supporting framework. 243 
Deleuze is right to note that the table is "eaten up" by the framework and that it "goes 
about its business" - this is the acknowledgement of a teleology at work, implicating the 
agent in the act. The universal producer is assimilated into the production: here, the 
Heideggerian note is struck. But Deleuze, in a fashion admittedly different from that of 
Heidegger, is here silenced by Being. One needs to know how to produce through action, 
a process in which one's identity is necessarily lost, obliterated, hidden, deferred, or 
overturned. 244 
But one does need to distinguish producer, producing, and product, or risks losing 
the capacity to critique the process of production and to select new projects. It is the soul 
as place (chora) which is hidden in the acts which 'take place' on it, and which is thus 
only located by ''tracing". When Deleuze chooses mapping over tracing, is it with Derrida 
in mind? Derrida acknowledges a debt, of which he is reminded by traces of a giving. 
De leuze has sealed off the path. 
In so doing, it seems he has forfeited the subject. ' One' is now at best is capable 
of a counter-actualization, a rebirth through one's events. This is a modest philosophy. 
But is there not something virtuous in this modesty? What do we lose when we demand 
that we never fall short of thought? Are we rendered immobile, perhaps, by a great fear of 
243 AO, 7. 
244 Which verb we should choose of"to hide", "to obliterate", or "to defer" is an important question. 
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tumbling into that abyss over which we leap, of descending into the cave? Does not 
Deleuze finally himself/all short of thought? Or is his death his final becoming-Plato? 
5.3 Direction and Action 
We are talking about direction and action. How do directing and acting belong 
together? Through motion, through the intersection, communication, and integration of 
motions, through encounters of moving bodies. Deleuze has a vivid sense ofthis?45 
Somehow language will be, for Deleuze, the place where direction and action meet, the 
place where the 'purity' of change and becoming is tested for natural interruptions: "It is 
language which fixes the limits (the moment, for example, at which the excess begins), 
but it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite 
equivalence of an unlimited becoming."246 It is Deleuze's love for the transcendence of 
language over its limits,247 and his respect for the purity of becoming, which ultimately 
renders him motionless. 248 De leuze is a nomad in language, not in the actual world; he 
does not believe he is living in the "house of Being", navigating the sea of Being. 
If resistance is not opposition, what is it? Deleuze's whole metaphysical system is 
designed to block out any generative tension. By choosing external relations over internal 
relations, Deleuze does away with the place of the Good- the place that two elements 
245 His extended meditations on cinema are important here. 
246 LS, 3. 
247 Jean-Luc Nancy says of Deleuze's philosophy that: "It is a philosophy of nomination and not of 
discourse. It is a matter of naming the forces, the moments and the configurations, not unravelling the 
meaning or following it back. Naming, in itself, is not a semantic operation: the point is not to signify things 
but rather to index by means of proper names the elements of the virtual universe" (Nancy, Ill). He does 
not, however, provide an attractive alternative, paying lip service to a "following back" but understanding 
discourse as a matter of signification and not of reception and listening. 
248 We remember that Deleuze left France on only a couple of occasions. He traveled instead through 
literature. 
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share, such that they are implicated in each other's being and are therefore justified in 
making claims upon each other. Since value cannot, for Deleuze, be generated by the 
shared neediness of two internally-related beings, he must propose an alternative account 
of valuation. His alternative account, still entangled in the Platonic language of limit, is 
as follows: 
There is a hierarchy which measures beings according to their limits, and 
according to their degree of proximity or distance from a principle. But there is 
also a hierarchy which considers things and beings from the point of view of 
power: it is not a question of considering absolute degrees of power, but only of 
knowing whether a being eventually 'leaps over' or transcends its limits in going 
to the limit of what it can do, whatever its degree. 'To the limit' it will be argued 
still presupposes a limit. Here, limit [peras] no longer refers to what maintains the 
thing under a law, nor to what delimits or separates it from other things. On the 
contrary, it refers to that on the basis of which it is deployed and deploys all its 
power; hubris ceases to be simply condemnable and the smallest becomes 
equivalent to the largest once it is not separated from what it can do. The 
enveloping measure is the same for all things, the same also for substance, quality, 
quantity, etc., since it forms a single maximum at which the developed diversity of 
all degrees touches the equality which envelops them. This ontological measure is 
closer to the immeasurable state of things than to the first kind of measure; this 
ontological hierarchy is closer to the hubris and anarchy of being than to the first 
hierarchy. [ ... ] The words 'everything is equal' may therefore resound joyfully, 
on the condition that they are said of that which is equal in this equal, univocal 
Being: equal being is immediately present in everything, without mediation or 
intermediary, even though things reside unequally in this equal being.249 
The limit here is not imposed from outside. Deleuze knows that valuation is a 
"transcendence", a going beyond a limit; he wishes only not to have fixed limits. He is 
sensitive to the violence of a naming which lasts. The "enveloping" measure is the same 
for all things. It is a measure in terms of a being's own good; the only significant 
difference is a very significant one: limit is the limit of power and not of need. 250 
249 DR, 37. 
250 Aristotle and De leuze fall on two sides of the question of action: the latter need not ever limit power, and 
has (seemingly) no need of a phronetic knowledge that would inform the choice of when to break. "The 
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Deleuze is concerned about the potential for disaster when he advocates unlimited 
production. It appears as a musing in A Thousand Plateaus: 
You think you have made yourself a good BwO, that you chose the right Place, 
Power (Puissance), and Collectivity (there is always a collectivity, even when you 
are alone), and then nothing passes, nothing circulates, or something prevents 
things from moving. A paranoid point, a point of blockage, an outburst of 
delirium: it comes across clearly in Speed by William Burroughs, Jr. Is it possible 
to locate this danger point, should the block be expelled, or should one instead 
' love, honor, and serve degeneracy wherever it surfaces' ? To block, to be blocked, 
is that not still an intensity?251 
Because limit and blockage cannot be conceived of as privation or natural interruption, 
De leuze feels somewhat handcuffed. 252 When we need to ensure becomings, to free 
motion, we encounter that which interrupts. 
In his discussion of cinema, Deleuze shows that he does not oppose limits, but 
fixed limits. We find him opposing Plato to the Stoics here: 
In any case, framing is limitation. But, depending on the concept itself, the limits 
canbe conceived in two ways, mathematically or dynamically: either as 
preliminary to the existence of bodies whose essence they fix, or going as far as 
the power of existing bodies goes. For ancient philosophy, this was one of the 
principle features ofthe opposition between the Platonists and Stoics?53 
Both Aristotle and Deleuze try to get rid of the Good, Aristotle by naming it once, 254 
Deleuze by naming it again and again, by sealing up the folded world and by making time 
and place come together in the Event, the Void. There is no ' room' for the Good in 
Deleuze's thought, and Alain Badiou gives us the clue as to why: 
final act, the telos as Aristotle called it, is not so much what something is good for as it is what is good for 
the naturally existing subject," (Scott, "Having a Need to Act," 127). 
25 1 TP, 152. 
252 He warns: "Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us" (TP, 500). The aim is always to 
free becomings, but... 
253 De leuze, Cinema I , 13. 
254 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. G. Ramsauer (New York; London: Garland Pub., 1987), Bk.l, Ch.l, In 
l.Thanks to John Scott for this point. 
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If the thought of the Multiple put forth by De leuze-Leibniz is so fleeting, if it is 
the narration, devoid both of gap and outside, of the folds and unfolds of the 
world, this is because it is neither in opposition to an other thought, nor set up on 
the outskirts of an other. Its aim is rather to inseparate itself from all thoughts, to 
multiply within the multiple all possible thoughts of the multiple.255 
This is the Open Whole, relation, the inseparatioil of the thought of the Multiple from all 
other thoughts. This is Deleuze's brand of 'love' -a multiplication without destruction, 
where thoughts do not enter into a generative tension or opposition, but inseparate 
themselves from other thoughts. Distance begins to become a crucial matter. Deleuze 
knows he can never annihilate Hegel, but merely distance himself from the latter. 256 The 
incredible sadness that Deleuze feels, and against which he writes always, trying to 
distance himself from that which creates such pain, is the consequence of belonging to the 
world- to a world whose history is bloody. Thus Deleuze speaks of Primo Levi: 
I was very struck by all the passages in Primo Levi where he explains that the 
Nazi camps have given us a 'shame at being human.' Not, he says, that we're all 
responsible for Nazism, as some would have us believe, but that we've all been 
tainted by it: even the survivors of the camps had to make compromises with it, if 
only to survive. There's the shame of being men who became Nazis; the shame of 
being unable, not seeing how, to stop it; the shame of having compromised with it; 
there's the whole of what Primo Levi calls the 'gray area.' And we can feel shame 
at being human in utterly trivial situations, too: in the face of too great a 
vulgarization of thinking, in the face of TV entertainment of a ministerial speech, 
255 Alain Badiou, "Gilles Deleuze. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque," in Gilles Defeuze and the Theater 
of Philosophy, ed. Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowki (New York: London: Routledge, 1994), 
54. 
256 Though not necessarily with success. See SlavojZizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays 
on September 11 and Related Dates (London; New York: Verso, 2002), 68-9. Zizek calls attention to 
another of Badiou's criticisms of De leuze: "[ ... ] Alain Badiou drew attention to how, if ever there was a 
philosopher who, apropos of any topic whatsoever, from philosophy to literature and cinema, repeated and 
rediscovered the same conceptual matrix again and again, it was Deleuze. The irony of this insight is that 
this, precisely, is the standard criticism of Hegel -whatever he is writing or talking about, Hegel always 
manages to squeeze it into the same mould of the dialectical process. Is there not a kind of poetic justice 
that the one philosopher about whom one can in fact make this claim is Deleuze, the anti-Hegelian? And 
this is especially pertinent with regard to social analysis: is there anything more monotonous than the 
Deleuzian poetry of contemporary life as the decentred proliferation of multitudes, of non-totalizable 
differences? What occludes (and thereby sustains) this monotony is the multiplicity ofresignifications and 
displacements to which the basic ideological texture is submitted." 
Ill 
of 'jolly people' gossiping. This is one of the most powerful incentives toward 
philosophy, and it's what makes all philosophy political. In capitalism only one 
thing is universal, the market. There's no universal state, precisely because there's 
a universal market of which states are the centers, the trading floors. But the 
market's not universalizing, homogenizing, it's an extraordinary generator of both 
wealth and misery. A concern for human rights shouldn't lead us to extol the 
'joys' ofliberal capitalism of which they're an integral part. There's no 
democratic state that's not compromised to the very core by its part in generating 
human misery. What's so shameful is that we've no way of maintaining 
becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves. How any group 
will turn out, how it will fall back into history, presents a constant ' concern.' 
There's no longer any image of proletarians around of which it's just a matter of 
becoming conscious. 257 
Deleuze admits no responsibility, but feels "tainted" by the horrible episodes in world 
history- specifically, of his own time- and also by the utterly trivial failings-short of 
thought. It is as though the destiny of the great Event is in our domain, is something about 
which we are fated to deliberate. What does it mean for us to be tainted? How do we react 
to sadness and horror? - By finding a crystal of sense in it, Ian Buchanan reminds us. This 
patient exploration/creation, this Deleuzian mapping, which is inseparable from a 
surveying, ultimately should afford us some opportunity to evaluate ourselves. What is 
shame but a self-recognition in the light of the good, the recognition of a distance 
between what one has become (or is becoming) and what it would be good to be? For 
Deleuze, reflection cannot itselfbe philosophy, since it is that powerful incentive toward 
philosophy, that which stimulates philosophical activity. It opens us to our own failures -
and those of our world - and it inspires sadness and shame. 
Is it our objective to save morality? In what sense might we try to save it? As it 
stands, here, we might wonder whether it would have a purely negative value, defined in 
relation to an Ethics that we must also consider: morality as the shared realm of judgment, 
257 Deleuze, Negotiations, 172-3. 
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the realm in which one freely gives up, submits, the final power to decide about the value 
of one's own actions. While we cannot attribute to Deleuze the claim that one knows 
when one is Ethically good - that is, it may be possible not fully to be worthy of what 
happens to one, one's actions may not fully express one's powers, etc.- there is in 
De leuze an explicit will to get rid of the notion of a final judgment. Such would be the 
power only of a transcendent God, though there can be no doubting the pain that 
judgment causes. But what might it mean to hold out final judgment -perhaps an 
infinitely deferred final judgment, yet a judgment that would insist on raising the issue of 
the completeness? What might it mean to have one's existence structured not by the end 
of one's consciousness, not by one's death, but by this infinitely deferred finality? Of 
course if one wishes to have no guilt, no shame, no sadness, etc., it becomes imperative 
that one do away with even a deferred finality, for it is precisely this overhanging end that 
brings to light one's own failings- which are not necessarily failings to exercise a power. 
The nature of an act- a courageous, necessary, perhaps justifiable act, like the writing of 
a ;dangerous' book like Anti-Oedipus- is such that it might indeed thoroughly exhaust 
the actor' s potential, and it might even be a thing he had to do. But might there be in a 
humble acceptance of certain consequences a glimmer of morality - which is more than 
the sympathy that Nietzsche names as one of the chief virtues? For in solitude, there can 
be insight into the nature of the destruction of the persons one affects, there can be 
sympathy for them. But what would constitute courage in this case? The courage to 
endure the pain? Or the courage to risk one's own soul for that of the other, the courage to 
tie one' s own fate more closely to that of the other, to embrace and love the other in a 
potentially disastrous, destructive, sad manoeuvre, in hopes of maintaining a space in 
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which we too can be retrieved? Perhaps we are stretching here. But what would drive us 
to stretch this way, if not our sense that we are ourselves becoming lost- unable to 
forgive ourselves or to have forgiven the unhappy consequences of our actions. Are we 
ultimately suggesting that this course of action's aim is the redeeming of our own souls? 
As we raise again this question of the soul, we must remind ourselves that, if indeed it 
has the character of chora, we are not returning uncritically to an assumption of identity. 
Rather, such a place would be the site where the fluxing differences are preserved and 
considered as together in their differences. For identity is composed of and threatened by 
precisely those forces so well described by Deleuze. And yet, we do recognize both an 
ever-incomplete activity of unification, and a fracturing of that unified self, of its 
disappearance again almost into nothing. To concern oneself with the world is not to 
move wholly ' beyond' the self, since the self never finds itself in isolation from the 
world. And yet in our appreciation of the joined fate of myself and my world, do we fail to 
notice how this conjunction demands of us the strength to encounter, and not to engulf 
and appropriate, otherness? That is to say, there is no denial of the self (no morality in 
that sense) in the desire to establish a place of discourse in which I can assert my 
judgment about the other, since my fate rests in the world itself. 
Is this a desire to last as an integrated unit, or to be resurrected, to be saved, to live 
eternally - in some form, at least in memory? Even if there a way to be more fully myself 
than in the full exercising of my powers, in the sense of deploying, or putting something 
into motion, it might be asked what good could come of such a return to the self. We must 
ask, what might become available if we were to open the realm of the political, of 
resistance, sacrifice, and submission? Of morality, understood as that shared place in 
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which we allow ourselves to be considered not only in terms of our own powers and 
intentions, but in which we are held responsible for our sins (act or omission)- in which 
we do accept that role that consciousness does have (as that site at which we try to 
transcend that which composes us, to integrate the differences)? Does the fate of things 
rest on this power of judgment? Or is it thoroughly risked by it?258 
Consciousness, as often as not, rationalizes, selects for us the path likeliest to 
protect itself. Are our molecular powers likelier to bring us to happiness? Is the hesitancy 
to concede the moral a case of too much pride? Am I guilty of that great sin259 - as 
though the world depended upon me for its being, just as I depend upon it? Is it to go too 
far to assert that only this kind of resistance, this commitment to one's own needs, is the 
mechanism by which difference can function to give presence to the good? 
5.4 Text as Therapy? 
To what degree Deleuze's philosophy was determined by sadness, it is difficult to 
say. But philosophy as concept-generation seems to us to be a response inspired at least in 
part by the sad passions. In spite of his considerable joy in producing concepts, Deleuze's 
sadness remains the condition for such production - his sadness a gift of the heavens to 
258 One wonders whether the second war in the Gulf might have introduced a new stage in the impotence 
felt by the public, insofar as the doubt over the justification for the war was widespread and the role played 
by discourse at the international level seemingly (to the public) was minimal. Though this event has 
occurred at the outset of a new century, insofar as we are, at this stage in history, aware in advance of 
political actions over which we have no control, actions which often have unthinkable consequences, might 
we wonder whether the twentieth century was Deleuzian? For it is Deleuze's courage to think these 
consequences, and his metaphysics is a defense of the power of thought (through the production of 
concepts) to enable man to be free in an epoch characterized by the growing sense of absolute impotency. 
259 Though we must always be cautious with Nietzsche, let us not ignore the proud tone here: "My judgment 
is my judgment: no one else is easily entitled to it - that is what [ ... ] a philosopher of the future may 
perhaps say of himself' (Nietzsche, 53). 
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him, his despair an awareness ofthe lackofthe Good. Even in Deleuze's full, folded, 
monistic universe, the Good seems at times to be absent, and inspires through its 
recession into absence a great sadness, an emptiness, a neediness for that absent Good. He 
and Plato share the same desire, meeting the horrors of the cave, to drag the sunlight in. 
Plato failed, in Deleuze's estimation, to do any good by borrowing from the Good. 
What could Deleuze do but write away from it? Name it, point to the incredible 
evil it causes, and then write away from it. Heidegger's Being, Augustine's God, Plato's 
Good: we realize late that from the outset our souls were claimed, that they belong to 
'something' that needs them, and that we are equally in need of 'it'. If this is true, we 
need to wonder how we can have the Good, or Difference, or God, etc. This project is 
equally Plato's, Aristotle's ... and Deleuze' s. In the end, he can have it only by consigning 
himself to a lifetime fleeing the sadness it can inspire. De leuze destroys himself by 
folding the Other too much into himself, instead of preserving the only thing capable of 
maintaining even a fragile Gilles Deleuze: its difference. 
He offers us the choice actively to forget what is so dreadful or to be burdened by 
it forever. 260 We must actively forget, because the pure past does not. Perhaps the mark of 
wisdom in Deleuze is his recognition that the final and ultimate Good can never be 
present - and perhaps it is this that prevents him from tending toward a fascism, or 
equally from embracing a violent revolutionary tendency, each of which indicates the 
erotic desire for the presence of the Good. De leuze seems to know that man will never be 
free at the "molar" level, that laws which might be necessary by nature oppress and free 
simultaneously, though this relationship of tension in the actual register should not be 
260 
"The genius of eternal return lies not in memory but in waste, in active forgetting" (DR, 55). 
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read into the nature of Idea-structures. What De leuze finds so shameful, instead, is that 
we do not know how to maintain molecular becomings - the only route we have to 
freedom. 
These becomings are revolutionary, though they are not intended to give rise to a 
final end-state. De leuze is not in search of the City of God. Does this mean that his 
philosophy is not utopian? One wonders whether ethics is possible without the creation of 
a place for goodness. Jean-Luc Nancy seems to doubt that this world - this place- is 
De leuze 's preoccupation: 
One could say that other philosophies are occupied with matters of the world, 
matters of all kinds, while this one is occupied, strictly speaking, with nothing: it 
neither judges nor transforms the world, it effectuates it as otherwise, as a ' virtual' 
universe of concepts. This thought does not have 'the real ' for an ' object' - it has 
no 'object.' It is another effectuation of the real, admitting that the real ' in itself 
is chaos, a sort of effectivity without effectuation.261 
This philosophy is occupied with nothing, with void - and the victories Deleuze has may 
be due to his hesitation to judge the world. Nancy is mistaken to say that Deleuze does 
not transform "the world"; that indicates a preference on Nancy's part for the simple 
presence of a body in space, as though the world did not have its own potentiality. 
Concepts are events, and Deleuze's point is precisely that they do transform the world. 
This philosophy is, as Deleuze claims, a constructivism. 
5.5 Conclusion: An Eating Disorder? 
So what are we building? Is Deleuze advocating an unlimited production of 
"concepts"? Why production over reception? Why does Deleuze's response to the horrors 
26 1 Nancy, II 0. 
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of the world consist in re-stocking the world with givens? Whatever his reasons, he does 
not advocated mindless chattering. It is significant that Deleuze himself detested 
interviews and philosophy conferences,262 and also that he disliked eating. In The Logic of 
Sense, the two are inextricably linked, and it is the consumption of words and of food that 
he fmds intolerable. Deleuze is in the peculiar position of supporting endless production 
of novelty, and of claiming that everything is production, but also of rejecting so much of 
what is said: 
We sometimes go on as though people can't express themselves. In fact they're 
always expressing themselves. The sorriest couples are those where the woman 
can't be preoccupied or tired without the man saying, 'What's wrong? Say 
something ... ,' or the man, without the woman saying ... , and so on. Radio and 
television have spread this spirit everywhere, and we're riddled with pointless 
talk, insane quantities of words and images. Stupidity's never blind or mute. So 
it's not a problem of getting people to express themselves but of providing little 
gaps of solitude and silence in which they might eventually find something to say. 
Repressive forces don't stop people expressing themselves but rather force them 
to express themselves. What a relief to have nothing to say, the right to say 
nothing, because only then is there a chance of framing the rare, and even rarer, 
thing that might be worth saying. What we're plagued by these days isn't any 
blocking of communication, but pointless statements. 263 
Is it accidental that Deleuze chooses to speak here about couples? The problem is 
one of love, though it is debatable whether Deleuze sees it. We are plagued by pointless 
262 
"Opinion is the rule of correspondence of one to the other; it is a function or a proposition whose 
arguments are perceptions and affections, and in this sense it is a function of the lived. For example, we 
grasp a perceptual quality common to cats or dogs and a certain feeling that makes us like or hate one or the 
other: for a group of objects we can extract many diverse qualities and form many groups of quite different, 
attractive or repulsive, subjects (the ' society' of those who like cats or detest them), so that opinions are 
essentially the object of a struggle or an exchange. This is the Western democratic, popular conception of 
philosophy as providing pleasant or aggressive dinner conversations at Mr. Rorty 's. Rival opinions at the 
dinner table- is this not the eternal Athens, our way of being Greek again?[ ... ] One might object that 
Greek philosophers were always attacking doxa and contrasting it with an episteme as the only knowledge 
adequate to philosophy. But this is a mixed-up business, and philosophers, being only friends and not wise 
men, find it difficult to give up doxd' (WP, 145). 
263 Deleuze, Negotiations, 129. See also FL, 134: "It is as ifLeibniz were delivering us an important 
message about communication: don' t complain about not having enough communication for there is always 
plenty of it." 
118 
statements because we are so frightened of sadness, of loss, of losing that which we so 
desperately need. Deleuze does know, in any case, that the objective is to find something 
worth saying: this is a philosophy in search ofthe good name, just as is Plato's. 
Brian Massumi writes, in his "deviations" from Deleuze and Guattari, "Don't toe 
the line - be superlinear. Don't plod the straight and narrow path down the aisle - marry 
the void. "264 Indeed, this is a deviation from Deleuze, since one does not marry the void, 
according to Deleuze; one has nothing to do with it. The void is not other, and neither is it 
localizable within the subject. There is no marriage here, no eros, no needy love. It should 
not surprise us that love is above all what must be eliminated if we are to do away with 
sadness, for surely nothing inspires more sadness than love. But is Deleuze likely to find 
what is worth saying, a value, a good, if he leaves us no place for this good to be 
measured, no internal, reflective, needy place which is transformed by the presence of the 
Good? No soul, no chora? Is it not fatal for Deleuze, the true Stoic, tumbling without 
direction in an emptiness one cannot embrace, that indeed he is in the void - and that the 
void, tragically, is not in him? 
264 Brian Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations f rom 
De/euze and Guattari (Cambridge: The MIT f>ress, 1992), 41. 
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